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The structure of the U.S. hog industry is changing rapidly. U.S. hog farms have become 
smaller in number, larger in size and more specialized.  This study examines the factors that 
influence the hog producer’s choice among business arrangements offered in the U.S. hog 
industry. A national survey was mailed to 4,986 hog producers to determine these factors.  The 
survey consisted of questions covering topics such as: production characteristics, autonomy, 
transaction costs, risk, social relationships, and demographics.  A response rate of 21% was 
received from the mailed surveys.  Four alternative business arrangements were used: 
independent production, cooperative farming, flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract.  
The multinomial logit and binomial logit models were employed to determine factors influencing 
producers’ choice of business arrangement.  Results indicate that independent producers are, in 
general, more likely to be breeding sow operators, diversified, corn producers, located in the 
same counties as flat-fee contract producers, frequent checkers of market prices, have higher 
debt, value autonomy and relationships with feed merchants more, and be relatively more 
educated than incentive payment contract producers.  Cooperative producers are also more likely 
to be breeding sow operators, diversified, corn producers, and located in the same counties as 
flat-fee contractees.  They are also likely to have accumulated higher assets, have higher debt 
and greater farm assets, be risk averse, be concerned about autonomy and relationships with feed 
merchants, and be relatively more educated than incentive payment contract producers.  Flat-fee 
contract producers are more likely to be finishers located in counties with independent and 
cooperative producers, work more hours off-farm, and be owners of greater farm assets.  They 
are less likely to value autonomy and more likely to value relationships with neighboring 
farmers.  Finally, incentive payment contract producers are generally larger, lower debt finisher 
or breeding sow operators who work more hours off-farm, value autonomy less and relationships 
 x
with lenders more than other business arrangements.  They are likely to be located in counties 

























The structure of the U.S. agricultural sector has changed greatly in recent years.  Hog 
farms have decreased drastically in numbers and increased progressively in size.  Available data 
show that U.S. hog farm numbers have declined from a high of 4.85 million in 1920 to about 
85,760 in 2000 (Agricultural Statistics, 1930–2000, NASS, 2001).  A more microscopic view of 
how the hog industry has changed structurally can be seen in the number of hog operations in 
various size categories.   The two size categories that have shown the greatest change are the 1 to 
99 head and 5,000 or more head.  The number of farms having 1 to 99 head decreased 64% from 
1993 to 2000.  In contrast, farms having 5,000 or more head increased by 112% over the same 
time period.   This historical trend reveals that the larger operations are gaining the greatest 
market share, while the smaller are showing the greatest loss.    
The same conclusion can also be drawn from a marketing perspective.   In 1997, 145 
firms marketing 50,000 hogs or more a year marketed approximately 33.1 million hogs, 37% of 
the total (Lawrence et. al, 1998).   In comparison, in 1994, only 16 million head marketed by 66 
firms in that size category.    
As these changes in farm size materialize, the way hog farmers conduct business is also 
changing. There are many types of business arrangements used in hog production.  The most 
common ones are independent, cooperative membership, flat-fee contracts, contracts with 
incentives, tournament contracts, and vertical integration.  In recent years, the greatest increase 
in the participation of any one business arrangement has been with contract production.  
According to Rhodes (1992), approximately 10% of the nation’s hogs were produced under 
contract in 1989.  By 1994, he found that the number of growers producing hogs under contract 
production had increased to 16%.  Another follow-up to Rhodes’ study was conducted by 
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Lawrence et al. (1998).   They found that, in 1997, 40% of the hogs farrowed and 44% of the 
hogs finished were produced by producers involved in production contracts.  Most of the growth 
occurred in the over 50,000 head size category.       
Large contractors that contract with hog producers include Cargill, Carroll Foods, 
Murphy Farms, Prestage Farms, and others.  In many cases, contract production has allowed 
producers to establish large-scale hog units due to lower short-run capital requirements.  
According to Martin (1997), contract hog production is an important part of the emerging system 
of vertical coordination (VC).  To some, the phrase “contract farming” to some is analogous to 
vertical integration (VI); to others it implies a cooperative agreement.  Vertical integration and 
contract production have evolved along with or in response to production specialization that has 
gradually transformed the production of hogs.  Firms producing hogs under contract have 
enhanced the quality and quantity of pork produced within the industry (Kliebenstein and 
Lawrence, 1995).  There are many more specific factors influencing the trend toward rapid 
growth in contract production in the last decade.   Some of these factors will be discussed in later 
chapters.   
In spite of the increased number of contract producers within the last decade, the majority 
of the U.S. hog farm population still consists of independent producers.  Large changes are 
occurring among independent producers.   As the number of hog farms continues to decrease, a 
large proportion of farmers exiting the market are independent producers.  Also, there are some 
types of cooperatives, such as Farmland and ValAdCo (Value-Added Corn), that have made it 
possible for producers to stabilize farm income as well as maintain some control over marketing 
and production decisions.  Considering these past and present changes in the structure of the U.S. 
hog industry, it is of interest to determine the type of business arrangement that is best suited for 
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a producer, given his or her location, production specialty, risk awareness, and financial 
situation.       
This study examines the factors that influence the hog producer’s choice among business 
arrangements offered in the U.S. hog industry.  Specifically, the study will provide updated 
information about the decision making process of hog producers under alternative business 
arrangements, including factors that influence such decisions. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
 Since the late 1970's and early 1980's, the rapid change in the structure of the U.S. hog 
industry has altered the way U.S. producers raise hogs.  Thus, there are many questions that are 
of great interest concerning the U.S. hog industry, such as (1) What types of business 
arrangements do producers now accept? (2) What factors influence their decisions to accept one 
business arrangement over another?, and (3) Why do producers accept specific business 
arrangements with particular types of hog production?  
  In the hog industry, two keys to stabilizing and increasing farm income are reducing risk 
and transaction costs.  One of the problems that hog producers face is fluctuating hog prices 
(Iowa State University Cooperative Extension Service, 1991–2000).  For some producers, 
contract production has been the solution whereby they have reduced price risk and transaction 
costs.  Some types of cooperative farming have also enabled producers to stabilize farm income 
as well as maintain their control over marketing and production decisions.  According to Martin 
(1997), more than 80% of the hogs marketed in North Carolina are produced under contract.  
Lawrence (1998) states that more than seven million hogs are shipped annually into Iowa for 
contracted finishing operations.  Because of contracts and other supporting factors, such as the 
absence of corporate farming and environmental laws, there have been enormous changes in the 
hog industry, particularly in the Southeastern U.S.  In spite of the benefits contracts offer, a large 
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percentage of today’s hog producers remain independent.  It is of interest to determine the type 
of business arrangement that is best suited for a producer, given his location, production 
specialty, and financial situation. 
1.3 Justification 
 Hog enterprise incomes have increased as farms have become larger.   Along with these 
larger operations, income variability has increased as more hogs are sold from less diversified 
operations.  In conjunction with the increase in the size of hog farms, there have been increased 
transaction costs and increased asset specificity.  Like the poultry industry, the hog industry has 
vertically coordinated in an attempt to offset price risk, decrease transaction costs and more 
efficiently meet consumer demand.  However, in many of the traditional hog producing states, 
certain types of business arrangements have been banned.   Anti-corporate farming laws have 
become forceful public policies in states such as Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kansas, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.  Yet, in many non-traditional hog producing 
states, VC production has not been restrained.   States such as North Carolina, Arkansas and 
Oklahoma have recently experienced substantial increases in hog production through 
independent firms and vertically coordinated systems.  Some of the key factors that have been 
responsible for their expansions are combinations of relatively inexpensive land and labor, 
adequate water supplies, less stringent environmental laws, producers’ willingness to adopt new 
technology, and the welcoming of VC firms as business opportunities in the state.  It is of 
national interest to determine which types of producers have been willing and are able to adopt 
new business arrangements.  Are these producers significantly different in resources, 




1.4 Research Objectives 
 The main objective of this study is to evaluate the adoption of business arrangements by 
hog producers in the U.S.  The specific objectives of this study are to: 
1) Identify alternative business arrangements currently being used in the U.S. hog 
industry; 
 
2) Identify the determinants that influence hog producers’ choice among different 
types of business arrangements; 
   
3) Develop a survey to collect information on the various business arrangements 
used by hog producers in the U.S., and; 
 
4) Determine the influence of economic and non-economic factors on the choice of 
business arrangements by hog producers. 
 
 
Before the discussion is continued on factors influencing the choice of business 
arrangements, a general overview of the U.S. hog industry is given.   The overview of the U.S. 
hog industry includes the following: technology and management practices, U.S. pork 
consumption, U.S. export markets, environmental concerns, and types of business arrangements 
currently being used in the industry.     
1.5 External Factors Influencing the Structure of the U.S. Hog Industry 
1.5.1 The Impact of Technology on Today’s Hog Industry  
As new technology in hog production continues to be adopted, the structure of the hog 
industry is becoming more similar to that of the broiler industry, in which virtually all broilers 
are raised under contract.  Through research and technology, the hog industry has made major 
improvements in animal breeding stock, disease control, rations, equipment and facilities.  
Changes in equipment and facilities have included the adoption of automatic feeders, climate 
controlled buildings, and computerized information systems for monitoring herd performance 
and health.  Two of the most significant improvements in technology have been in breeding 
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stock and swine nutrition.  Improvements in the industry’s genetic pool have allowed farmers to 
produce greater numbers of leaner, faster growing pigs per sow.  For instance, in 1954, the 
average litter size per sow was 5.3 piglets; however, by 2000, this figure had increased by 68% 
to 8.89 piglets (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2000).    
In addition to improved breeding stock, the quality of hogs (in terms of the leanness and 
fat content) has also increased.  As a result of these advances in technology, U.S. hog producers 
have been able to increase their productivity.  However, the benefits of these advanced 
technologies have accrued only to those producers who could finance them.  Producers who 
could not adopt these new technologies due to insufficient funds, knowledge, or location, lost 
their ability to compete causing some to exit the industry.  Some other technologies such as, “all 
in – all out” hog finishing, weekly farrowing, high-density fat-added diets, intensive breeding to 
keep facilities full, split-sex feeding, terminal cross breeding programs, artificial insemination, 
porcine somatotropin, and computer programs, have also served to increase productivity.    
1.5.2 The U.S. Economy 
1.5.2.1 Domestic Pork Consumption  
 Pork has the world’s highest per-capita consumption of any meat.  According to USDA, 
of the world meat consumption in 2000, 41% was pork, 29% was poultry, 25% was beef and 5% 
was other meats.  Pork consumption has been on the rise in recent years.   From 1980 to 2000, 
the volume of pork consumed in the world rose 73% (Cunningham, 2000).  In the U.S., 
consumer interest in pork is steadily growing.  Pork ranks third in meat consumption in the U.S.  
USDA data show that U.S. pork consumption increased throughout the 1990s with the exception 
of small declines in 1993, 1995, and 1996.    
 One of the reasons for the increase in U.S. pork demand is the industry’s ability to 
enhance the quality of pork by reducing back-fat and increasing leanness.  Pork is viewed by 
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some as versatile, convenient and nutritious (Hendricks, 2001).  “The Other White Meat” 
campaign was launched in 1987 and studies reveal that consumers have changed their 
perceptions of pork, considering it as a white meat (Hendricks, 2001).  This association is 
important because 54% of consumers surveyed believed white meat was healthier, tasted good, 
was leaner, and their families liked it.  Results of this study showed that 40% of the respondents 
would like to see more pork on restaurant menus and almost 60% of these consumers felt that 
pork was different from their routine and was a delicious alternative (Hendricks, 2001).  The 
interest in pork by consumers has helped drive sales of pork both in restaurants and at the retail 
level.  
As the popularity of pork increases, supermarkets are enjoying the benefits of pork sales 
(Hendricks, 2001).  From 1999 to 2000, pork consumption increased by 9.3% and a USDA 
(2000) study recorded that retail price levels for pork had increased (Hendricks, 2001).  These 
findings indicate that consumers were increasingly willing to pay more for pork.  This speaks to 
the competitiveness of U.S. hog producers and their ability to produce a desirable product.  
Technology has made it possible for some independent, cooperative, or contract producers to 
finish more uniform hogs.  As a result, society has benefited from a continuous flow of uniform 
hogs that produce better quality pork products.             
1.5.2.2 Changes in the Domestic Price of Pork 
 Historically, low hog prices have presented major problems for many producers.  Iowa 
market prices for finished hogs fell as low as $13.92 per hundredweight in December 1998 (see 
Table 1.1).  As a result, some farmers were not able to cover their production expenses and were 
forced out of business.  Farm prices for finished hogs in 2001 averaged $45.40 per 
hundredweight, which is $2.54 higher than the 2000 farm price ($42.86) (USDA-Baseline 
Projections, 2002).  This up-swing can be attributed partly to a lower supply of hogs.  Hog prices 
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for April, 2001, reached a high of $67.00 per hundredweight.  Market analysts postulated that for 
all of 2002, profits were expected to average $10.41 per hundredweight compared with $13.37 in 
2001(USDA-Baseline Projections, 2002).  According to Hurt, these good fortunes can be 
attributed to smaller pork supplies than expected, and stronger demand as a result of higher retail 
beef prices and especially Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Europe between 1999-2001 helped 
stimulate U.S. pork exports (Hurt, 2001).      
Historically, U.S. hog prices have been known to exhibit a cyclical behavior.  One of the 
basic principles of economics states that as supplies of a commodity increase, prices decrease. 
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in supply, and higher prices.  “Hog cycles have been 
characterized to some extent by alternating major peaks and minor peaks” (McCoy, 1979: p. 83).  
In other words, the propensity for a high peak to be followed by a low peak is almost inevitable.  
The variation in prices during the hog cycle provides some insight to reasons why the structure 
of the hog industry is changing.  To reduce the price risks incurred during the hog cycle, some 
hog producers have turned to production contracts.  Production contracts have enabled producers 
to better stabilize income through fixed, incentive and guaranteed minimum payments.  Smaller 
hog producers who are not involved in production contracts are forced to compete with larger 
vertically coordinated firms that are able to produce better quality pork at lower per unit costs.  
This, in turn forces many small hog producers out-of-business, while large contract and 
cooperative producers expand to meet the market demands.   
Like most agricultural production cycles, the duration of the hog cycle is determined by 
many factors.  These factors may include “life-cycle of hogs, as well as the rate at which 
producers alter production practices in response to enterprise profitability” (Agricultural 
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Marketing Manual - February, 1999).  A hog seasonal cycle is 12 months (see Figure 1.1).  A 
hog market cycle is generally about three to four years, compared to a cattle cycle of ten years or 
more. 
According to Iowa market prices for hogs, which are usually lower than the average U.S. 
hog prices, the selling price per hundredweight from 1991 to 2000 followed this behavior.  Table 
1.1 shows Iowa’s market prices for finished hogs per hundredweight.  In 1991, the average price 
per hundredweight was $49.92.  The lowest selling seasonal price for that year was 22% below 
the average price, while the highest was 11% above the average.  During 1996, Iowa producers 
experienced the highest average price ($52.89 per hundredweight) of the decade.   The high price 
reported that year was 11% above the average seasonal price, while the lowest price was 19%    
below the average.  Lower hog prices occurred during the 1998 production period.  The average 
price for that period was $31.68, which is the lowest recorded in the Iowa market during the 
1990s.   The highest price recorded for that period ($42) exceeded only one other production 
period.   In December, 1998, Iowa producers experienced the lowest price for market hogs they 
had received in years.  The fluctuation in Iowa and U.S. market prices for finished hogs per 
hundredweight, along with some other factors, explain why contract production in the hog 
industry is increasing.  More hog producers are choosing contractual agreements to help reduce 
or eliminate the price risk associated with marketing finished hogs.   
1.5.3 U.S. Export Markets 
 The U.S. has become the second largest net exporter of pork in the world.  This is a 
surprising turnaround considering that the U.S. was the largest importer of pork during the 
1980s.  Pork exports totaled 556,895 metric tons in 2000, grossing $1.3 billion (Cohen, 2001).  
Pork ranks third among the meats exported by the U.S.  In 2000, hog exports increased 12% by 
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Average 49.92 43.24 45.72 39.53 41.85 52.89 51.29 31.68 32.01 42.76 
Highest 56.24 48.64 49.05 47.75 49.18 59.09 58.66 42.00 37.44 49.72 
Lowest 38.84 39.70 40.38 28.01 35.50 42.60 39.85 13.92 25.93 36.03 
Source: Iowa State University Cooperative Extension Service, years 1991 - 2000. 
 
 






























































volume and 18% by value compared to 1999.  During the first five months of 2001, pork meat 
exports were up 14%, which represents an increase of 23% in value from 2000.  From 1990 to 
1999, U.S. pork exports increased 469%, which is considerably higher than beef and veal (133%) 
or broilers (385%) (Agricultural Statistics, 1990–2000).  
 The major geographical regions that import U.S. pork are Latin America and Asia.  
Within these geographical regions, the countries that consume the most U.S. pork are Japan, 
South Korea and Mexico.  In 2000, Japan, South Korea, and Mexico imported 192,485, 12,439 
and 94,839 metric tons, respectively (ERS-Livestock, 2001).  These three countries accounted 
for 48%, 3% and 24% of the U.S. pork exports, respectively.   Other countries that are expected 
to become major importers of U.S. pork are Argentina and China.  Argentina recently opened its 
market to U.S. boneless pork.  In 2001, Argentina was expected to import 30,000 metric tons a 
year.  Likewise, the U.S.–China trade agreement was projected to increase the supply of pork to 
Chinese consumers by 1.2 billion, and boost the value of U.S. market hogs $5 per head in 2001 
(NPPC, 2000).   
1.5.4 U.S. Hog Production and Environmental Pollution  
There are negative externalities generated by hog production units that are presently 
threatening the quality of life of people living near them.  The move toward specialization and 
vertical coordination has increased the size and geographic concentration of hog operations 
(Metcalfe, 2001).  Hog operations with 2000 or more animals increased from 28% in December, 
1993, to 68.5% in December, 1999 (Metcalfe, 2001).  According to Hubbell and Welsh (1998), 
North Carolina and Arkansas have experienced the greatest growth in large operations.  Almost 
40% of this growth occurred in North Carolina (Martin and Zering 1997; Hubbell and Welsh, 
1998).  Due to the high density of hogs per square mile, many environmental issues have arisen 
and become of great concern.  
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Historically, agricultural industries have accounted for a large percentage of the nonpoint 
source pollution in the U.S.  To protect people and wildlife habitats, laws such as the Clean 
Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act were enacted by the federal government.  The Clean 
Water Act is a quality control policy that was established initially in 1972 to reduce nonpoint 
source pollution, such as runoff from urban and agricultural lands and industrial dumping 
(USEPA, 1995).  The Safe Drinking Water Act was originally passed by Congress in 1974, to 
protect public health by regulating the nation’s public drinking water supply.  Further 
amendments to these laws concerning non-point source pollution were added from 1986 to 1996 
(USDA, 1997 and 1999).  The purpose of both Acts was to ensure all U.S. citizens, regardless of 
their geographical location, clean drinking water.    
 The state of North Carolina has experienced manure runoffs that have caused both water 
and air pollution.  Manure runoffs from large intensive hog feeding operations have been 
responsible for pollution of rivers and shorelines, while large quantities of ammonia (nitrogen) 
have caused foul odors in residential areas located near large hog operations (Hog Watch).  The 
bacteria, antibiotics and heavy metals found in hog manure have also posed threats to human 
health.  Because of the breadth of these pollution problems in various regions of the U.S., the 
federal government has stepped in to ensure the employment of an adequate property rights 
regime.  Lax environmental regulation laws in the presence of increasing geographical 
concentration of hog feeding operations have been challenging for states like North Carolina.    
Studies that have examined the effect of environmental regulation on agricultural operations 
have discovered that higher stringency of regulation (as it relates to size and manure 
disbursement) does have a significant effect on the location of dairy farm operations (Osei and 
Lakshminarayan 1996; Outlaw 1993) and in aquaculture operations (Wirth and Luzar 1998).     
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1.6 Discussion of the Current Business Arrangements Used in the U.S. Hog Industry.  
The following discussion presents information about the major business arrangements 
used in U.S. hog production: independent production, cooperative, and contract production.  This 
discussion explains the different aspects of producing under these business arrangements and 
provides examples of specific firms in the U.S. producing under these business arrangements. 
1.6.1 Independent Production 
The “do-it-all” philosophy still characterizes the goals of many independent producers.  
An independent producer secures all of his or her production inputs, and makes all decisions 
concerning the production and marketing of hogs (Welsh and Bryan, 1999).  Hogs are sold on 
the open market by the producer.  All production expenses/profits generated through the 
production and sale of hogs are incurred/realized by the producer. 
1.6.2 Cooperative Farming 
 Cramer et al. (2001) define a cooperative as “an association of member-owners operating 
a business that provides services at cost to its patrons” (p.492).  Cooperative hog farming 
businesses are typically organized, capitalized, and managed by/for its members.  There are a 
number of different types of cooperatives involved in today’s U.S. hog production industry.  One 
of the largest cooperatives in the U.S. hog industry is Farmland Industries. As a cooperative, 
Farmland Industries strives to (1) provide world-class genetics at a reasonable cost; (2) 
incorporate “all in/all out” systems; and (3) identify producers who would maintain an “all in/all 
out” hog production system (Reilly and Reynolds, 1994).    
 From a production perspective, Farmland Industries offers a number of options to 
producers working under its program.  For instance, under a finishing agreement, producers’ 
choices include a guaranteed price contract, including incentives based on such factors as feed 
conversion, leanness and death/loss ratio (Reilly and Reynolds, 1994).  Producers also have the 
 14
choice of an option that entails some market risk, but leads to greater expected profits.  These 
agreements allow Farmland Industries to supply breeding stock, feed, veterinary care and 
medication, transportation, record-keeping needs and other technical assistance to producers, as 
well as supplying a market for pigs. 
In 2001, Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed utilized three hog production systems.  They 
include the nursery management system, the lean gain program, and the sow nutritional program. 
Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed has a highly productive wean starter program.  The program 
incorporates a wide base of protein ingredients – milk, animal and plant protein blends – to 
produce an optimal mix of protein for the starter – feeding program.  Land O’Lakes Farmland 
Feeds typically weans at less than 21 days.  The all-in/all-out nursery utilizes 7-day weaning and 
had a mortality rate of 1.5% in 2001.  The lean grain nutrition program has helped Land O’Lakes 
Farmland Feed to produce yearly litter weaning weights that are more than 30 percent greater 
than 10 years ago.   
 Another example of a cooperative is ValAdCo (Value-Added Corn) in Minnesota, which 
is a farmer-owned cooperative consisting of 130 members (Cooperatives, 2002).   The primary 
goal of ValAdCo is to add value to products such as gilts, corn and soybeans for resale to farmers 
and markets.  Of the many production sites ValAdCo has, two of them are “crossing farms” 
production sites.  At crossing farm 1, breeding, gestation and farrowing are done in three 
separate barns at one location.   Crossing farm 2 consists of a nursery and four finishing barns 
and two-site production involving an “all in/all out” system.  ValAdCo’s by-laws require 
producers to produce and supply the cooperative with 2,000 bushels of corn a year.   According 
to Bill O’Hare, chief executive officer, ValAdCo is the fourth largest load served by Renville-
Sibley and has annual sales of about $23 million (Cooperatives, 2002).  
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Alternatively, there are other cooperatives that may offer risk-sharing programs that 
include various forms of floor contracts.  With such contracts, in exchange for guaranteeing a 
certain minimum price to the producer, the cooperative takes a certain percentage of returns 
when prices are high (Rhodes, 1994).   In addition to cooperatives that are involved directly in 
the production of hogs, there are also cooperatives that provide hog producers transportation, 
feed, and access to slaughter houses/packers.  Transportation cooperatives are entities made up 
of hog producers and trucking companies.  They are established to help producers reduce the cost 
of transporting feed to production sites and hogs to markets.  
 There are also grain cooperatives of which hog producers are members.  Grain 
cooperatives are organized to create more markets for grain suppliers.  One example is the 
Farmers Cooperative Elevator Company (FCEC) of Iowa Falls, in North Central Iowa, which 
markets grain and supplies, feed, petroleum, fertilizer and other agronomic services  (Reilly and 
Reynolds, 1994).  FCEC also provides agreements that supply technical and other field services 
to hog finishers.  With these agreements, an active role is taken to help hog producers qualify for 
loans to purchase state-of-the art facilities.  FCEC guarantees to pay a portion of a seven-year 
financial loan that coincides with the length of the production contract.  FCEC is involved in hog 
production to broaden the demand for its feed products and grains  (Reilly and Reynolds, 1994).     
 Similarly, there are cooperatives for slaughter houses or packers.  These cooperatives are 
designed to increase the number of hogs slaughtered by packers and to secure markets and 
premium prices for quality hogs marketed by producers.  
 For some independent hog producers, cooperatives have been the key to improving 
productivity as well as reducing production costs.  As a result, cooperatives have become an 
alterative business arrangement that has enabled independent hog producers to compete with 
vertically integrated firms.   
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1.6.3 Contract Production 
Contract production involves “contractual agreements between producers and their input 
suppliers or product marketing firms” (Cramer et al., 2001: p.492).  Contract farming in the hog 
industry began in the late 1960's with Murphy Farms in Rose Hill, North Carolina, and was later 
followed by Tyson Foods in the early 1970's at Springdale, Arkansas (Futrell, 1989).  Most of the 
early contracts in the U.S. hog industry were offered by feed suppliers who were interested in 
obtaining or expanding markets for their goods (Martin, 1994; Gillespie, Karantininis, and 
Storey, 1998).  Producers’ reasons for entering into these contracts were largely to secure credit, 
input supplies, and/or a market for their hogs. Some of the early contractual arrangements fell 
into one of five categories: (1) open account, (2) hog feedlot, (3) profit-sharing, (4) feed 
conversion, and (5) flat fee contracts.  
1.6.3.1 Open Account Contracts   
 Open account contracts consist of an agreement where the contractor sells producers 
inputs, such as feed, feeder pigs and medication, on credit or at the retail price (Martin, 1994).   
Profits for the seller are made by the mark-up on the inputs sold.   The producer makes all of the 
production and marketing decisions.  Producers participating in open account contracts are able 
to shift very little risk, if any, to the input seller.  Producers’ reasons for accepting this contract 
are primarily to secure quality production inputs (Martin, 1994). 
1.6.3.2 Hog Feedlot Contract 
 The hog feedlot contract is sometimes referred to as a “hog motel” (Martin, 1994).   With 
this contract, producers who do not have space, equipment or labor to accommodate the number 
of hogs scheduled for grow-out arrange for a second party to raise the animals.  Space at the 
“motel” is rented based on a flat fee, per square footage, per day, or per pound gained basis.  The 
feed may be supplied by either party.  Payment for rental space is made to the owner of the 
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“motel.”  Once the hogs have reached market weight, the owner retrieves and sells the hogs.  
Because the owner of the hogs pays a rental fee and markets his or her own hogs, this 
arrangement does little to decrease risk exposure to the hog owner.  On the other hand, risk may 
be reduced for the contractee since the contractor pays a flat-fee or agreed upon formula price for 
hog space and, in some cases, labor.  This type of arrangement is common in the upper Midwest.  
1.6.3.3 Flat-Fee Contract  
               With a flat fee contract, the contractor (in most cases a grain supplier) supplies the 
producer with feed, feeder pigs, and medication (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000, and Martin, 
1994).   The producer uses his or her finishing house, utilities, labor, and other equipment to 
raise hogs for the contractor.  The contractor retains ownership of the animals throughout the 
production process.   After the grow-out period, the contractor is responsible for marketing the 
hogs.  The producer is paid a guaranteed flat fee payment (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000).  As a 
risk reduction method, the flat fee agreement transfers all price risk associated with pigs, feed, 
and medication prices to the contractor, but not for facilities, labor, etc.  
1.6.3.4 Profit-Sharing Contracts 
 Profit-sharing contracts allow profits to be shared between the producer and the 
contractor (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000, and Martin, 1994).  Analogous to open account 
contracts, the contractor supplies the producer with the major inputs at retail prices, while the 
producer furnishes the finishing house, utilities, labor, and equipment.  The contractor controls or 
regulates all production and marketing practices.  Contractor profits are derived from input mark-
up and revenue from hog sales, while the producer’s profit comes strictly from revenue 
generated from hog sales.  Profit-sharing contracts do not shield the producer from the 
fluctuations of market hog prices, but they do reduce the producer’s operating capital 
requirements. 
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1.6.3.5 Feed Conversion Contracts 
 Feed conversion contracts are designed such that producer compensation is based on feed 
efficiency (Martin, 1994).  Similar to profit-sharing contracts, the contractor provides the feeder 
pigs, feed and some other variable inputs, while the producer furnishes the finishing house, 
utilities, labor, and equipment.  When the hogs reach market weight, the producer is paid a flat 
fee price plus a bonus based on the feed-to-gain ratio of the hogs.  If the ratio is below a set feed 
to gain ratio, the producer will receive a higher bonus payment.  If it is above the suggested feed 
efficiency ratio, the producer’s bonus will be reduced or zero. 
1.6.3.6 Tournament Contracts 
Tournaments are competitive contracts that reward producers with bonuses (monetary) based 
upon performance relative to other contract producers.  The best performer receives the largest 
bonus and the worst performer receives the smallest.  Similar to the incentive-based contract, 
tournament contracts are resource-providing.  The contractor provides the feeder pigs, feed and 
other inputs, while the producer furnishes the finishing house, utilities, labor, and other 
equipment.   
1.6.4 Vertical Integration 
“Vertical integration is the linkage of up- and downstream firms through ownership in a 
single firm” (Gillespie, Karantininis, and Storey, 1998).  Within the vertically integrated system, 
employees are paid an hourly wage by the integrator to manage and raise hogs.  The integrator 
provides all resources used in the production process of hogs, with the exception of labor and 
managerial ability.    
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1.7 Segments Involved in Hog Production 
 Swine production can be classified into four segments: specialized farrow-to-nursery, 
feeder pig, finishing, and farrow-to-finish units.  Some types of VC contracts associated with 
each are included in the discussion of each segment. 
1.7.1 Specialized Farrow-to-Nursery Units 
 Specialized farrow-to-nursery units are designed to provide husbandry for piglets from 
the time they are farrowed until they are weaned.  In a contractual farrow-to-nursery agreement, 
the contractor typically determines when the pigs are to be weaned, and supplies the producer 
with sows and inputs such as feed, veterinary service and medication (Martin, 1994).  The 
producer provides the facilities, labor, and utilities.   After the pigs are weaned, the contractor 
gathers the pigs and pays the producer for the services.  Payment to the producer can be based on 
a piece-rate, flat fee, per day, or per pound gained basis.  Incentive payments may also be 
provided based on the number of pigs weaned (Martin, 1994).  
1.7.2 Feeder Pig Enterprises 
 Feeder pig enterprises are designed to provide husbandry for weaned piglets until the pigs 
reach a weight of approximately 60 pounds (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000).  Under a contract, 
the contractor typically supplies the producer with feeder pigs, feed, veterinary services and 
medication (Martin, 1994). The producer provides the facilities, labor, utilities, and equipment.  
Once the growth period is completed, the contractor gathers the pigs and pays the producer for 
his or her services.  Payment to the producer can be based on a piece-rate, flat fee, per day, or per 
pound gained basis.  Incentive payments to the producer may also be offered.  The incentive 
payment may be determined by feed efficiency, grow-out time, or mortality.  With this 
agreement, the contractor absorbs all output price risk if the producer is paid on a flat fee or a 
piece-rate basis (Martin, 1994).  
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1.7.3 Finishing Operations  
 In finishing operations, hogs are raised from between 40 and 60 pounds to market weight.  
Under most contracts, the contractor makes the majority of the production and all marketing 
decisions (Martin, 1994).  The contractor may require the producer to purchase specific 
equipment or build specific production units.  Inputs such as the feeder pigs, feed, and veterinary 
services and medication are supplied by the contractor.  Other inputs, such as labor, utilities, etc., 
are supplied by the producer.  At the end of the grow-out period, the contractor retrieves the hogs 
and pays the producer based on feed efficiency, grow-out time and weight or based on a 
tournament, which involves other producers with similar characteristics.  If the producer is in a 
tournament, the bonus payments are determined on a competitive basis with other producers 
selling during the same time period.  Producers are rewarded based on standards and criteria set 
by the contractor (Martin, 1994).  This is the most common segment of hog production for 
contracts.   
1.7.4 Farrow-to-Finish Units 
 Farrow-to-finish units involve production facilities that are used to facilitate the entire 
growth process of a hog.  There are three phases: a farrowing unit, a wean to feeder pig unit, and 
a grow-out unit.   The producer is required by the contractor to supply the facilities, equipment, 
utilities and labor needed for production, while the contractor supplies inputs such as animals, 
feed, veterinary service and medication.  Most production and all marketing decisions are made 
by the contractor.  Once the hogs reach market weight, they are retrieved by the contractor.  The 
payment received by the producer is generally based on a flat fee plus a bonus.  The bonus is 
determined by feed efficiency, mortality rate, number of pigs weaned per sow and/or grow-out 
time.  Similar to finishing operations, this agreement also reduces price risk since a flat fee 
payment is guaranteed (Martin, 1994).  
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1.8 Thesis Outline 
 A literature review is presented in Chapter 2.  It includes a discussion of autonomy, risk, 
asset specificity, transaction costs, and social capital.  An extensive literature search was done to 
define and explain the economic theory guiding producers’ choice of business arrangement as it 
relates to the aforementioned terms.  Chapter 3 presents the methods, the models and the 
variables used in the study.  It consists of strategies for data collection, description of data, 
discussion of multinomial and binomial logit models, and a discussion of endogenous and 
exogenous variables.  The results and discussion are presented in Chapter 4.   Chapter 5 gives a 
summary, conclusions and implications of the study, recommendations future research, and a 
















PREVIOUS STUDIES EXAMINING FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ADOPTION OF 
CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURE 
2.1 Factors That Influence the Choice of Business Arrangement in the Hog Industry 
 Why do some producers favor contracting while others do not?  According to Rhodes 
(1994), contracting allows producers to expand their production units, reduce market risk, share 
management responsibilities and expertise with the contractor, stabilize income, and adopt new 
technology.  Kliebenstein and Lawrence (1995) argue that the primary advantage of contractual 
arrangements in the hog industry is risk reduction.   It is hypothesized that producers decide 
among alternative business arrangements on the basis of risk, transaction costs arising primarily 
from asset specificity, and autonomy. 
2.2 Autonomy  
Gillespie and Eidman (1998) argue that income risk is not the dominant factor that 
influences business arrangement selection for some independent producers.  Some producers 
prefer to remain independent because it gives them complete control over the production and 
marketing of their animals.  This differs from producers under contracts who share power and 
management responsibilities.  This control is referred to as producer autonomy.  Autonomy 
represents “the desirability of a business arrangement on the basis of how business structure and 
lifestyle aspects other than income and variability of income are affected” (Gillespie and 
Eidman, 1998).  There are different levels or measures of autonomy.  The level of control a 
producer has over his or her farm operation can influence the choice of business arrangement, 
with independent farming having the greatest control, generally followed by cooperative 
farming, contracts with VCs and lastly, VI.  For some independent producers, the preference for 
autonomy is great enough to offset the risk-reducing benefits of contracts (Gillespie and Eidman, 
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1998).  However, other producers are willing to forfeit some of their control to benefit from 
various contractual arrangements (Gillespie and Eidman, 1998).  Therefore, it is important to 
determine the degree to which autonomy influences a producer’s choice of business 
arrangements. 
2.3 Risk 
The production of agricultural commodities involves more uncontrollable factors than 
production of most other items.  These uncontrollable factors cause variability in net returns, 
which is identified as risk.  Risk is present in situations where there are a number of potential 
outcomes that might occur, and there are probabilities associated with each outcome (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld, 1995).  In the production of agricultural goods, output is subject to variable 
factors such as weather, disease, prices and technology.  Production economists analyze at least 
two types of risk: price risk and production risk.  In addition to these risks, economists working 
in the field of industrial organization have also conducted extensive research in the area of 
contract risk (Ward et al., 2000). 
2.3.1 Price Risk 
  From a production perspective, price risk arises due to “differences between realized and 
expected prices” (Tomek and Robinson, 1990: p.56).  According to Martin (1994), price risk 
makes up approximately 94% of the risk that causes income variability in independent hog 
production.  The amount of price risk a hog producer faces is dependent upon the business 
arrangement chosen.  Roberts et al., (2000) and Martin (1997) conducted studies that examined 
contracts, risk shifting, and relative performance payments in the pork industry.  Martin’s 
findings indicate that, assuming “independent hog producers face 100% price risk, contractees 
with and without tournaments face only 6.5% and 9.5% price risk,” respectively.  Therefore, 
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93.5% and 90.5%, respectively, of the price risks that independent producers face are shifted to 
the contractor (Martin, 1997).   
2.3.2 Production Risk 
 Production risk arises due to the variability of farm inputs and output.  According to 
Martin (1994), and Knoeber and Thurman (1995), there are two different types of production 
risk: common risk and idiosyncratic risk.  Common risk arises as a result of events that are 
common across all production units in a given area.  Drought is an example of an event that is 
common across many units.  In the context of VC firms, a common risk might be the probability 
associated with a contractor altering the feed or animal genetics provided to all growers 
producing under contract (Martin, 1994).  
 Under a tournament situation, all producers face similar common risks and their relative 
rankings are likely to remain unchanged regardless of the common risks faced (Martin, 1994).  
An example would be a contractor supplying substandard feed for a particular week to its 
producers.  The feed will not affect the efficiency rankings because all producers who obtained 
feed from the contractor would receive the same substandard feed.  Independent producers are 
susceptible to all common risks. Cooperative producers’ susceptibility to risk varies depending 
upon how the cooperative is structured.  
 Idiosyncratic risk is another production risk that has different effects upon production 
units  (Martin, 1997).   Idiosyncratic risk may arise from dysfunctional physical capital.  An 
example of an idiosyncratic risk is the risk of a cooling system breaking in a hog farrowing 
building during the summer.  This event is not likely to be common among all producers in an 
area at the same time.  All producers are subject to idiosyncratic risk.  However, the idiosyncratic 
risk experienced by contract producers may be less than that experienced by independent 
producers given that most contractors require specific technologies that sometimes obligate 
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producers to upgrade or purchase new facilities and equipment (Spiekerman, 1998).   
Independent producers often have limited capital resources available, due partially to their lower 
chance of obtaining loans from lenders and greater associated initial capital investment (since 
they must purchase pigs, feed, and some other inputs provided by a contractor).  Therefore, their 
ability to upgrade production facilities as technology changes may be less likely than with 
producers under contract.   As a result, contract producers may experience less idiosyncratic risk 
since most of their capital inputs are likely to be relatively new in comparison to independent 
producers.    
2.3.3 Contract Risk     
 Williamson views market failure as resulting from “contractual incompleteness and 
strategic misrepresentation risk” (Williamson, 1971).  Contractual incompleteness is often 
caused by ex-ante but not necessarily ex-post uncertainty (Williamson, 1971).  “Specifically, ex 
ante costs include: (1) search and information costs; (2) drafting, bargaining and decision costs; 
and (3) costs of safeguarding an agreement.  Ex post costs of contracting include: (1) monitoring 
and enforcement costs; (2) adaptation and haggling costs; (3) bonding costs; and (4) 
“maladaptation” costs (Williamson, 1971).  For example, producers who engage in short term 
contracts that require investment in long-life equipment may not be able to fulfill their loan 
obligations if the contract is not renewed (Williamson, 1971).  Strategic misrepresentation risk is 
high where there are both ex-ante and ex-post uncertainties (Hobbs, 1997).  Not only is the future 
uncertain but it may not be possible, except at great cost, for an outside agency to establish 
accurately what has transpired after the fact.  Perhaps the greatest contract risk that contract 
producers face is the risk associated with unrenewed or broken contracts.  Broken and 
unrenewed contracts can leave specialized producers in precarious positions.  If the producer 
cannot find another contractor with whom to contract, the producer’s possibility of covering his 
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or her fixed cost may be slim, given the specificity of equipment used.  A producer’s best option 
may be to sell the equipment to a producer who is specializing in the same production process.  
However, it can be difficult to find a buyer for specialized equipment and housing.  Hence, 
contract risk becomes important when determining the full risks associated with hog production 
using contracts. 
 2.3.4 Risk Attitudes 
 Previous studies have identified risk as one of the main factors influencing farmers’ 
reasons for accepting different business arrangements (Rhodes and Grimes, 1994; Gillespie and 
Eidman, 1998; Martin 1994 and 1997; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995).  When evaluating risk, it is 
common to begin with expected utility theory.  von Neumann and Morgenstern postulated that 
various sets of axioms validate the existence of utilities with the property that expected utility is 
an appropriate guide for consistent decision making.  The four major axioms that support 
expected utility theory are state independence, reduction of compound lotteries, continuity, and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (Silberberg, 1990).  Expected utility theory assumes that 
“if (L, ) satisfy the above axioms, there is a utility function µ defined on L that satisfies the 
expected utility property” (Varian, 1992: p. 174).  Many economists believe that, based on 
normative theories of decision making, an individual should choose a course of action that is 
associated with the highest expected utility (Mellers, 1992).   
A decision maker is said to be risk averse if his utility function is concave and he prefers 
the expected consequence of any nondegenerate lottery to that lottery.  A risk neutral decision 
maker’s utility function is linear; the decision maker is indifferent between a nondegenerate 
lottery and the expected consequence of that lottery.  Lastly, a decision maker is said to be risk 
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prone if his utility function is convex and he prefers any nondegenerate lottery to the expected 
consequence of that lottery. 
Over time, economists have used a number of models to elicit the risk attitudes of people.  
Officer and Halter (1968) compared three models, von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M), a 
modified version of the von Neumann and Morgenstern (Modified N-M) and the Ramsey 
method.  A single valued utility function was estimated for each model allowing for calculation 
of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  The N-M model was the least preferred 
model.  The Ramsey model performed better than the modified N-M model.  People found it 
easier to make choices using the Ramsey model, although calculating the utility associated with 
each outcome can be more cumbersome than with the Modified N-M (Officer and Halter, 1968, 
and Knowles, 1984).     
 King and Robison have used the Interval Approach to measure decision makers’ risk 
attitudes.  This approach calculates the interval between the lower and upper bounds on a 
decision maker’s absolute risk aversion function.  The respondents are asked to choose between 
two distributions, each having six possible payoffs with equal probability.  A series of questions 
is asked until the range of the interval is narrowed.  Based on the respondent’s final choice, the 
range of the lower and upper bounds determines whether the respondent is very or moderately 
risk averse, risk neutral or very or moderately risk prone.  The Interval Approach is not exact, in 
that it does not give a single coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the respondent like single-
valued utility functions (King and Robison, 1981).  Other researchers who have used the Interval 
Approach include Wilson and Eidman (1983), Tauer (1986), and Schurle and Tierney (1990). 
 Using a mail survey, Cardona (1999) utilized a method that asked farmers about their risk 
attitude.  Louisiana sugarcane producers were asked to rate their risk attitudes when making farm 
management decisions.  A continuous line was provided between risk averse and risk taker and 
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producers were to indicate where they fell in terms of risk preference.  Once the risk attitude was 
determined, a model was employed to determine whether risk preferences affected the adoption 
of best management practices.  The risk attitude of sugarcane producers was found to be 
statistically significant in the adoption decision.           
 Gillespie and Fausti (2000) used a mail survey to examine the degree of consistency 
across alternative risk preference elicitation procedures.  They compared six risk preference 
elicitation procedures: (1) a self-rank elicitation method, (2) a scenario looking at a job 
opportunity, given different income probabilities, (3) five hypothetical investments, each with 
low, average and high net returns at equal probabilities, (4) the Interval Approach, (5) a 
hypothetical question measuring the riskiness of calf marketing alternatives, and (6) the 
Modified von Neumann-Morgenstern approach.  Their findings indicated that only questions one 
and three were rank-order consistent.  There was little consistency found in the risk preferences 
elicited via the other questions.                 
2.4 Asset Specificity 
 Specific assets are assets whose value is much greater in a particular use compared to the 
next-best alternative.  Asset specificity exists when one or both parties to a transaction make 
investments in equipment and/or machinery that involve design characteristics specific to the 
transaction and which have lower values in alternative uses (Joskow, 1985).  Investments of this 
type are common among contractees; contracts typically involve the performance of work that 
uses task-specific assets.  A specific asset may be physical (unique physical characteristics), 
human (unique skills), or site specific (unique location) capital (Martinez et al., 1998). 
  Williamson (1990) indicates that vertical integration is expected to evolve among firms 
experiencing recurrent transactions when asset specificity is present.  One reason for this is 
vertical integration and some forms of vertical coordination reduces transaction costs.  Sporleder 
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(1994) argues that asset specificity is viewed as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
firms to choose vertical integration as a vertically-allied, inter-industry form of coordination.  
State-of-the-art hog production facilities are typically useful only for hog production.  Initial 
investment for such facilities today often exceeds $1 million (Hurt, Boehlje, and Hale, 1995).  
Thus, there is an incentive for producers investing in such facilities to identify markets for hogs 
that are stable and profitable.  In areas with few or no alternative markets, contracts with 
financially stable VCs are likely.  Thus, divestiture from mistakes when specific assets are 
involved may prove costly (Sporleder, 1995). 
2.5 Transaction Costs 
 Coase provides a theoretical framework to understand why resource-providing contracts 
have become more prevalent than others in the U.S. hog industry. Coase (1937) argues that 
market transactions between independent units are costly, and that the integrated firm can 
perform repetitive transactions at lower costs.  Resource-providing contracts fall between the two 
extremes of the open market and the vertically integrated firm, and may be viewed as a hybrid 
between the firm and the market.   
 Perhaps one reason why hog producers have accepted resource-providing contracts has 
been to reduce the number of business transactions, thus reducing transaction costs (Ward et al., 
2000).   Transaction costs are those costs that are required to establish and maintain property 
rights (Allen, 1991).  On the other hand, Joskow (1995) defines transaction costs as expenses  
associated with inefficient pricing and production behavior.  In general, transaction costs are 
merely expenses producers incur due to the lack of perfect information and resources.  
Transaction costs arise in day-to-day business because of communication breakdowns, imperfect 
information, incomplete contract stipulation, and ambiguous entitlements.  The number of 
transactions involved in the production and marketing of agricultural products is many.  As more 
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transactions occur during the production and marketing of goods, the total cost of transactions 
increases; thus, larger producers are likely to incur higher total transaction costs since they are 
likely to buy inputs and sell outputs more often than smaller producers (albeit the average 
transaction cost per unit sold may be lower for larger producers).  Some of the most common 
transaction costs incurred in the livestock industry are information costs, negotiation costs and 
monitoring costs (Hobbs, 1997).  
2.5.1 Information Costs 
 Independent producers may incur costs in the search for information about products, 
prices, inputs, and buyers or sellers.  For instance, in order to produce and sell farm products, the 
producer must determine where to purchase inputs and where to market finished products each 
time a transaction is made.  According to economic theory, a rational producer seeks to minimize 
cost by purchasing homogeneous inputs at their lowest prices.  Likewise, a producer who seeks 
to maximize his or her returns will sell output (hogs) to the buyer who offers the highest price.   
In the process of obtaining price information, a cost is incurred.  This cost may vary depending 
on the availability of information on market prices.   In the U.S., hog producers have access to a 
time series of published market prices as well as information on the four-year hog cycle.   
Nevertheless, U.S. hog producers incur costs associated with educating themselves on hog prices 
offered by different buyers, who are likely to pay different prices on a given day.  Compounding 
this price uncertainty, through public market sales, there is no way of knowing the actual price 
that hogs will bring before the sale takes place.  Thus, public market sales are uncertain and 
become problematic for independent producers.  This situation presents fewer problems to 
contractees since payments for hogs are set once their contracts are signed.  Intuitively, it can be 
inferred that risky situations lead to higher transaction costs.  Likewise, input price uncertainty is 
reduced for contractees since, with many contracts, inputs are furnished by the contractor. 
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 Human capital gives rise to another form of information costs.  Human capital is 
heterogeneous across firms due to differences in the experience, education, and skill level of 
managers (Boehlje, 1992) and laborers.  To a large degree, a person’s managerial skills 
determine his or her ability to process and evaluate information as well as implement new 
technology.  For example, a hog producer’s ability to conduct such tasks as keeping accurate 
records of the pedigree of each sow and artificially inseminating hogs in a timely manner 
requires technical and managerial skills.     
Although it may seem obvious as to why human capital is important to independent and 
cooperative producers, given their production and managerial responsibilities, the importance of 
human capital to contract producers may not be as obvious.  Contract producers need human 
capital to efficiently run breeding sow operations.  Breeding sow operations run under 
production contracts are used to supply feeder pigs for finishing operations.  Human capital is 
also essential for those producers who are operating under incentive payment contracts.  
Producers under this type of contract are often competing for bonus payments, which require 
certain managerial skills in order to achieve the lowest costs production, lowest mortality rate 
and highest percentage of pigs weaned.     
Over time, there has been an increase in the investment of human capital in agriculture, 
allowing producers and agribusiness managers to manage larger scale specialized units and adopt 
cost-reducing/output-increasing technology more cost effectively (Boehlje, 1992).  Thus, hog 
producers who do not incorporate efficient levels of human capital within their production 
processes may incur additional information costs from business planners and plant technicians. 
2.5.2 Negotiation Costs 
Another important classification of transaction costs is negotiation cost.  “Negotiation 
costs arise from the physical act of the transaction, and are influenced by the way the transaction 
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is carried out” (Hobbs, 1996).  Negotiation costs are incurred in all transactions encountered by a 
producer from the time production inputs are purchased to the time payment is received for the 
hogs.  Hobbs (1997) discusses some negotiation costs and how they influence the decisions made 
by cattle farmers.  There are negotiation costs between contractors and contractees in setting up 
the contract.  For most resource-providing contracts, the contractor supplies the animals, feed, 
veterinary care, medication, management expertise and all marketing services, while the 
contractee (producer) furnishes the labor, buildings, equipment, utilities and some management 
skills.  The initial negotiation costs for these types of contracts are normally minimized or 
limited due to the set features of the contract for all producers.  Little negotiation occurs after the 
contract is signed if the contract covers most contingencies.  Most resource-providing contracts 
are designed such that the contractor incurs the costs of locating a suitable market, negotiating 
prices for animals, and conducting administrative transactions.  Thus, before the initial signing of 
the contract, the producer incurs time, transportation costs, and the opportunity cost of 
contracting with another contractor.  But, because the life expectancies of these cattle contracts 
range from three to ten years, the frequency in which both parties incur these negotiation costs is 
minimized.  
 In contrast to the negotiation costs incurred under resource-providing contracts, an 
independent producer faces many of the costs that both the contractor and the contractee incur.  
An independent producer’s negotiation cost could begin with his or her negotiations concerning 
the location and size of production facilities.  Assuming that the producer has the land, hogs, and 
all the necessary facilities needed for production, some of the first negotiation costs an 
independent producer incurs involve the purchase of inputs such as feed, medication and labor.  
The administrative transactions involved in establishing and documenting these agreements are 
negotiation costs.    
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Employment of labor also leads to negotiation costs.  As an employer, the producer draws 
up an agreement that establishes the wage per hour and number of hours of work required of 
employees, as well as other required benefits.  The administrative transactions of processing 
employee applications are continuous negotiation costs that an independent producer incurs.  For 
independent producers, the nature of labor differs from those under contract in that independent 
producers are managing, working, and also have other laborers conducting various tasks.   On the 
other hand, contract producers of the same size typically are operating with less additional labor 
since they likely spend less time in managerial operations and more time in operator labor. 
 Independent producers also incur various other negotiation costs when marketing hogs.  
The marketing process begins with the price negotiation between the producer and buyer.  
Independent producers incur costs associated with the chance of default in price agreements, and 
the delay between the time the hogs are sold and when payment is received (Hobbs 1997).    
 2.5.3  Monitoring Costs  
 Monitoring or enforcement costs arise after a transaction has occurred.  It may be 
necessary to monitor the quality of inputs from a supplier or to monitor the behavior of a supplier 
(or buyer) to assure that all pre-agreed terms of the transaction are in compliance (Hobbs, 1996 
and Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000).  The cost of monitoring can be expensive for either contract 
or independent producers.  The value of the time spent by a producer assuring that the input 
quality, production procedures and marketing process meet certain expectations are all 
considered monitoring costs.  Part of this monitoring cost may be borne through the contractor’s 
employment of a field person. 
 Most contractors operating large hog operations with multiple units have production 
procedures that are specified within the contract that must be followed by the contractees.  For 
instance, there are usually specific rations that should be fed to pigs (Cline et al., 1995).  In 
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addition, producers must maintain room temperatures, specified levels of cleanliness and 
biosecurity.   The costs of policing these production sites and evaluating producer performance 
can be significant.   
 For independent producers, monitoring costs begin at the production site and end at the 
marketplace.  At the production site, independent producers face many of the same monitoring 
costs that contractees incur, such as monitoring hired labor, input quality and payment fairness.   
According to Hobbs (1997), in cattle production there are other situations that lead to monitoring 
costs such as “shrinkage, stress, and exhaustion” in the handling of animals during the exchange 
process, which can be minimized if detected.  Some independent hog producers experience 
similar problems.  For instance, a disease outbreak in a production unit can destroy an entire herd 
if it is not detected in time.   Hence, monitoring the performance and health conditions of hogs 
can prove to be vital to the success of independent producers. 
2.5.5 What Is Missing in Economic Models?  
Economists often conduct market analyses based on demand and supply concepts. For 
these constructs, determinants of demand and supply of goods and services are often specified as 
given.  However, Neoclassical models often leave out factors, such as bounded rationality and 
social capital that could possibly have tremendous effects on the endogenous variable(s).  The 
propensity of economists to use ‘ceteris paribus0’ (all other things remaining equal) qualifies 
them to make predictions given the stated exogenous variables.  However, when conducting 
these analyses, statistical programs are able to identify the incompleteness or inaccuracy of 
models given the size of their error terms.  So, the question arises; what are the missing factors or 
variables that are common across social and economic interactions and transactions that could 
improve economists’ ability to better understand consumer/producers’ behavior?  One of the 
dilemmas economists face when examining economic problems is that of “bounded rationality”, 
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which is to say information is incomplete (Simon, 1978).  Complete information or unbounded 
rationality is impossible for humans to obtain.  Bounded rationality exists when hog producers 
do not have complete information or complete knowledge about available contracts offered by 
vertically integrated or vertically coordinated firms, market hog prices, feed prices or lean-
values.  The lack of complete information creates opportunities for exploitation.  On the other 
hand, asymmetric information, which is not complete information, is advantageous to the 
exploiting party in that it can give rise to opportunistic behaviors.  Producers who have 
asymmetric information are privileged to better contracts, higher hog prices and lower 
transaction costs, relative to those who do not have asymmetric information.    
Another factor that some economists have failed to consider to narrow the margin of error 
in their analyses is social capital.  Human interactions and relationships with one another 
influence the flow of resources from one hand to the next.  This was recognized by Adam Smith 
(1759) who noted that preferences are “interpersonally dependent,” but vary “according to the 
strength of the relationship” (Robison, 1996).  “Every man feels his own pleasures and his own 
pains more sensibly than those of other people… After himself, the members of his family, those 
who usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters, 
are naturally the objects of his warmest affection” (Robison, p.321).  What this implies is that 
people respond or express different feelings for family members, friends, associates, and 
members of organizations.  This leads us into defining social capital.  “Social capital is a 
person’s or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation toward another person or group that may 
produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for others beyond what might 
be expected in an exchange relationship” (Robison, Schmid, and Siles, 1999).   
Studies support the idea that relationships matter in the aggregate as well as at the 
individual level.  Some economists agree that relationships matter, but none feel they are 
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unimportant (Hirshliefer, 1994, and Gardner, 1995).  Economists who share these same feelings 
also “believe that we can continue business as usual with selfish preferences as the foundation 
for our models” (Hirshliefer, 1994, and Gardner, 1995).  Social capital is important because it 
determines the way goods and services are allocated, consumed and purchased.  People who 
have businesses and trade with family members, friends, associates and members of 
organizations, sometimes show favoritism or preferential treatment toward people with whom 
they have an established relationship.  An example of this phenomenon is a farmer who goes to a 
bank to obtain a loan to purchase a new tractor.  At this bank, the loan officer is his neighbor and 
friend.  Through his or her relationship with the loan officer, the individual receives the loan at 
the lowest possible interest rate with less regard to the farmer’s qualifications.  In some sense, 
the farmer’s relationship with the loan officer acts as collateral.  Another example of social 
capital is a trading relationship between a hog farmer and feed supplier.  The farmer and feed 
supplier have been trading for several years and, through this interaction, they have become close 
acquaintances.  The benefits of this relationship are at least twofold.  For the farmer, he or she 
can anticipate a fair price for feed, while the feed supplier can expect continuous patronage from 
the farmer.  As the level of trust between the two persons continues to grow, the farmer may 
receive discounts or benefits that exceed his or her perceived costs.                       
 “Whenever the relationship or social capital between individuals is being considered, it is 
assumed that there is a level of mutual respect, concern, sympathy or feelings toward one 
another” (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999).  In other words, there is a balance.  This assumption 
enables one to eliminate opportunistic behaviors.  Hence, relationships that involve individuals 
who have greater feelings or concerns for other persons that are not reciprocated can be 
exploitive in nature (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999).  A symmetric relationship in nature is also 
a mutually beneficial relationship (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999).  Such conditions lay out the 
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foundation on which social capital is established and discussed within this study with respect to 
business arrangement choice.   
2.6  Social Capital 
2.6.1 How Is Social Capital Created?  
There are specific resources that are used to build social capital.  These resources are 
discussed by Peterson, Robison, and Siles.  They postulate that trust, reputation, and identity 
create three types of social capital: direct, indirect and identity-based social capital (Peterson, 
Robison, and Siles, 1999).   
Direct social capital is believed to be obtained through repeated transactions between 
exchange partners (Peterson, Robison, and Siles, 1999).  As these transactions take place, a level 
of trust is established between exchange partners through consistency.  All relationships are 
founded on some level of trust.  Friendships, boyfriends, girlfriends, and marriages are based on 
some level of trust that is shown through commitments, responsibilities, respect, loyalty and 
sympathy.  This confidence that is displayed in members of a relationship gives rise to social 
capital.  Common kernels contribute to social capital because their similarities create 
comfortable environments for communication, interactions, and transactions (Robison, 1999).         
Indirect social capital is built upon reputations established with individuals that share 
direct social capital (Peterson, Robison, and Siles, 1999).  Reputations are derived from 
consistency and reliability of transactions between individuals.  A person’s ability to consistently 
deliver goods or services as promised helps foster new relationships with other individuals.  For 
example, a truck driver who picks up and delivers hogs to market safely every week develops a 
reputation for his reliability.  Producers who receive this service tell others of his reliability and 
the truck driver’s clientele increases.   
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Identity-based social capital is a short-term acquaintanceship that is based on association 
or affiliation but requires reinforcement to establish a trusting relationship (Peterson, Robison, 
and Siles, 1999).  The association that initiates the acquaintance between the two can be as 
fundamental as an inherited trait or characteristic such as one’s gender, age, ethnic background, 
nationality, values acquired from parents and other resources inherited as a result of the 
conditions of one’s birth (Robison, 1999).  As this commonality unites the two to bring about 
interactions, as well as transactions, the trading between the two is only temporary.   A more 
sound relationship that is based on consistency, loyalty and reliability is warranted in order to 
maintain continued transactions (Peterson, Robison, and Siles, 1999).  If the relationship is not 
nourished through trust, then the acquaintanceship will soon be terminated.  An illustration of 
identity-based social capital is the following.  Suppose your best friend Farmer Brown and his 
young son were shopping in your farm supply store and one of the salesmen recognizes the 
father and son.  The father has purchased items from the store on numerous occasions in the past.  
Given the father’s reputation, the son also receives preferential treatment, although he has not 
reached the age to establish a reputation of his own.  However, if the son does not prove himself 
worthy of the special treatment that has been granted to him based on his father’s merits, his 
privileges will eventually be taken away.   
Robison and Siles (1998) posed a question, “What can organizations achieve that lack 
social capital.  Can people successfully pursue their economic needs without social capital? The 
answer is probably no, unless the other needs are being met in other organizations” (Robison and 
Siles, 1998).  A continuous flow of transactions that generates economic activity is expected to 
occur, many of which are created through some form of association or affiliation between the 
buyer and the seller.  However, the purpose of theoretical economics is to explain why they are 
socially attractive (Robison and Siles, 1998).  
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2.6.2 What Impact Does Social Capital Have upon the Economy?  
 Social capital is a phenomenon that can influence the flow of goods and services 
(Robison, 1999).  Just as good credit to a loan officer, and good grades and work experiences to 
an potential employer are used to evaluate one’s eligibility for loans or jobs, the status of one’s 
relationship is also used to the determine the magnitude of the treatment received by an 
individual.  The special privileges people receive through a shared sympathetic and committed 
relationship have not been fully identified (Robison, 1999).  It is believed that social capital 
separates and distinguishes one consumer from another, but there is no known terminology 
explained in economic literature that identifies the type of financial incentive it provides.   The 
financial incentive associated with social capital is similar to some form of price discrimination, 
in that the price an individual pays is discounted, because of his or her social relationship with 
the owner of the merchandise.  For example, the price a father or faithful customer pays for a 
tractor purchased from a farm tractor dealership in which a son or trusted friend works may be 
discounted and sold at a lower price, due to the existing relationship between the buyer and 
seller.   
There are three forms of price discrimination.  First degree price discrimination is “a 
practice in which the seller is able to sell each successive unit of product at the maximum price 
that any buyer is willing to pay” (Eckert and Leftwich, 1988: p. 635).  Second degree price 
discrimination is a “practice in which the seller is able to sell blocks of output, charging the 
maximum possible price for each block and selling additional blocks at successively lower 
prices” (Eckert and Leftwich, 1988: p. 635).  Third degree price discrimination is a “practice in 
which the seller charges different prices in different markets for a product not accounted for by 
variations in production or selling costs but based primarily on differences in demand elasticities 
and prevention of resale among the markets” (Eckert and Leftwich, 1988: p. 635).  A fourth 
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degree of price discrimination is warranted to account for the financial deduction received 
through social capital.  It is true that social capital does not involve direct institutional regulated 
discounts, but different prices for the same goods and services are charged to different 
customers.  In other words, the price, quantity, and quality of goods and services for sale have 
little to do with the discounted price received.  The deciding factor for preferential treatment is 
based upon social capital or the buyer’s social relationship with the seller.            
2.6.3 How Might One Measure Social Capital? 
Now that social capital has been defined and its effects are properly identified, one may 
wonder how social capital is measured.  One way to perform this task is to design a study 
eliciting information about people’s relationships with other people, businesses, and 
organizations.  Robison, Myers and Siles (1999) conducted a study examining the percentage of 
farmland purchases from sellers whom the buyer viewed as a friendly (unfriendly) neighbor, 
complete stranger, relative, influential person or legal entity.  They conducted a survey of 1500 
farm owner-operators located in Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska.  This study was designed to 
determine the influence of relationships on the selection of trading partners and terms of trade for 
farmland exchanges.  The lowest price farm owner-operators were willing to accept “from their 
friendly neighbors” was $1,664.77 (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999).  Respondents were willing 
to accept $1,686.45 from friendly neighbors as well.  Influential individuals received a higher 
minimum-selling price than did strangers, $1,876.63.  In drawing a distinction, results indicated 
that unfriendly neighbors received the highest minimum-selling price ($2,114.81), which 
increases the possibility of a sale not being made between sellers and friendly neighbors 
(Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999).   
Robison (1996) also conducted another study examining the response of college seniors 
in Agricultural and Natural Resources to a hypothetical prisoners of war problem.  The surveyees 
 41
were assumed to be prisoners of war with no knowledge of when or if they would be released.  
The food was tasteless.  One day the prisoners were given Hershey candy bars and were told that 
they may do whatever they wanted with them.  The surveyees were asked how many candy bars 
they would consume and how they would share with other prisoners.  Assuming that all 
respondents had the same Cobb-Douglas function, the own consumption coefficient was the 
largest followed by sharing, promise keeper (together), and goodwill. Of all the possible 
outcomes, the most significant correlation was found between own consumption and promise 
keepers.  The more candy bars the prisoner consumes, the less likely he or she will keep 
promises (Robison, 1996).      
Some of the business transactions and neighborly interactions that are highlighted in this 
study are neighboring farmers, lending institutions, feed merchants (grain supplier), packers 
and/or slaughter houses, veterinarians, and neighbors that are non-farmers.  (See Appendix D, for 



























 The following chapter expounds upon the concepts and principles of economic and 
choice theories.  Consumers and producers are guided by some form of maximization theory, 
whether it is utility, profit or welfare.  This chapter discusses the neoclassical theory of choice, 
the utility function, qualitative choice models and their estimation, design of the survey, and 
hypotheses testing procedures.  
3.2 Neoclassical Theory of Choice and Preferences 
Adam Smith (1776) defines economics as “the” theory of choice.  The choices humans 
make may be pleasant or dismal, but the aspect of choice is asserted to be pervasive.  Decisions, 
i.e., choices, are a consequence of the scarcity of goods and services.  However, without scarcity, 
whatever social science might exist would be vastly different than the present variety.  Scarcity, 
in turn, depends upon postulates about individual preferences, in particular that people prefer 
more goods to less.  If such were not the case, then goods, though limited in supply, would not 
necessarily be scarce.  Therefore, the fundamental conceptualization of the determinants of 
choice upon which the neoclassical, or marginalist, paradigm is based begins with individual 
preference. 
Why does a consumer prefer good “A” over good “B” and not good “B” over good “A”? 
The foundation on which the theory of choice stands is sustained and supported by properties 
that are rational and exhibit normal behavior.  Rational or normal behavioral properties are 
guiding principals that are experientially proven through human interactions, whether they are 
viewed individually, socially or economically.  In addition to individual preferences, there are 
other properties or axioms that guide economic theory.  The axioms that justify consumer 
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preferences are completeness, reflexivity, transitivity, continuity and strong monotonicity 
(Varian, 1992).               
 The axiom of completeness implies that it is possible to compare any two bundles.  
Assume that a consumer has a choice between any c–bundle and any d–bundle.  Also, assume 
that (c1,c2) (d1,d2), or (d1,d2) (c1,c2) or both (Varian, 1992).  Given this scenario, the consumer 
will make a decision based on the two bundles or act indifferently between the two bundles.  The 
second axiom, reflexivity, implies that any bundle is just as good as itself: (c1,c2) (c1,c2) 
(Varian, 1992).  Reflexivity may be viewed as trivial because any bundle is just as good as an 
identical bundle.  That is, homogenous goods with similar attributes are preferred or indifferent 
to themselves.   
 The third axiom, transitivity, assumes that if (c1,c2) (d1,d2) and (d1,d2) (g1,g2), then  
(c1,c2) (g1,g2) (Varian, 1992).  In other words, if a person believes that C is at least as good as D 
and that D is at least good as G, then that person also believes that C is at least as good as G 
(Varian, 1992).  For most people, transitivity is more cumbersome.  It is not certain whether 
transitivity of preferences is an important property that preferences must have.  From a logical 
perspective, there is not a compelling reason as to why preferences have to be transitive.  In fact, 
transitivity is viewed more as “a hypothesis about people’s choice behavior, not a statement of 
pure logic” (Varian, 1993: p. 36).   
 The fourth axiom, continuity, states that for all d in C, the set {c:cd} and {c:cd} are 
closed sets.  In other words, if d is strictly preferred to g and if c is a bundle that is close enough 
to d, then c must be strictly preferred to g (Varian, 1992). 
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 The last and final axiom is strong monotonicity.  Strong monotonicity implies that if c ≥ 
d and c ≠ d, then c d (Varian, 1992).   This axiom means that more of any good is strictly better.  
That is, all goods under observation are good or desirable.   
  Assuming that these axioms exist, there is said to be a continuous utility function that 
represents a consumer’s preferences.  By specifying the above axioms, it can be better 
understood how to analyze choices through utility functions.  
3.3 The Utility Function and Utility Maximization 
A utility function enables one to identify all possible consumption bundles arranged in an 
order such that more preferred bundles get assigned higher values than the less preferred bundles 
(Varian, 1993).  That is, a bundle (c1,c2) is preferred to a bundle (d1,d2) if and only if the utility 
of (c1,c2) is larger than the utility of (d1,d2): in symbols, (c1,c2)  (d1,d2) if and only if u(c1,c2) > 
u(d1,d2) (Varian, 1993).   
 From a neoclassical perspective, utility is ordinal.  That is, utility is not quantifiable.  It is 
used only to rank the different consumption bundles in some orderly fashion.  In other words, 
one person’s utility cannot be compared to another person’s utility by assigning numbers to 
bundles of goods.  The primary concept on which emphasis is placed, is that more of a good is 
preferred to less.  Because consumers prefer more to less, whether it is in terms of quality or 
quantity, non-satiation is perhaps the most essential property when ordering and ranking utility 
functions (Varian, 1993). 
In keeping with the non-satiation property, it is assumed that consumers strive to get the 
most satisfaction they can out of the various goods and services purchased and consumed.     An 
optimal utility solution U*(p1,p2,M) maximizes an individual’s utility given two prices and 
income.  The quantities x1 and x2 are used to “maximize utility subject to the budget constraint” 
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(Silberberg, 1990: p. 310).  The behavioral assertion is that a consumer engages in constrained 
maximizing behavior such that desirable alternatives are those that satisfy the individual’s 
constraints.  However, given that we live in a world of scarcity, consumers are faced with 
making choices concerning the levels of consumption they will undertake (Silberberg, 1990).  
Assuming the consumer is rational, the intricate calculations will be made regardless of scarce 
resources to achieve a maximum of utility.    
In summary, it has been shown in the last three subsections that the choices of a rational 
consumer are rooted in his or her preferences, which are supported by specific axioms that give 
rise to a utility function, capturing the individual’s personal desires.  Given the postulated utility 
function, consumers seek to maximize their levels of satisfaction.  Using these same fundamental 
principles, the next section identifies and discusses choice models appropriate for analyses of 
alternative dependent variables.        
3.4 Choice Models  
This study utilizes a polychotomous choice framework to determine the factors that 
influence producers’ decisions for accepting certain business arrangements (BA).  An empirical 
multinomial logit (MNL) model is used to analyze the choice of alternative BAs.  According to 
Maddala (1997), the MNL model was originally derived from the Luce model.  Luce (1959) 
derived the model given by Equation 3.4.1 starting from the independence of irrelevant 
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The Luce model is associated with this property because the odds ratio for the ith and jth choices 
is exp(Vi)/exp(Vj), where V=X, which is the same irrespective of the total number m of choices 
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considered.    The property of the IIA axiom exists when probabilities are not equally shared for 
two or more alternatives that are close substitutes (Kennedy, 1998).  In 1974, McFadden updated 
the model, which became known as the multinomial logit (MNL) model.  As a special case of the 
Luce model, the multinomial logit model also has the property of the IIA axiom on the choice 
probabilities.  Logit models can be expressed as having dichotomous or polychotomous 
variables.   Dichotomous or binary models give the option of choosing one of two alternatives.  
Polychotomous models such as the multinomial logit consist of many alternative choices, of 
which one is chosen (Kennedy, 1998).   
The multinomial logit model is derived from a random utility function.  Utility Uij is 
derived by the ith individual from the jth choice.  This can be written as: Uij = U ij
−
+ eij = xij + 
eij where Uij is the average utility, eij is a random error, xij is the set of explanatory variables, and 
 is a vector of unknown parameters (Judge et al., 1985).  For this utility function, eij is a random 
variable that is independently and identically distributed with a Weibull density function.   The 
model assumes the choice probabilities are dependent on individual characteristics (Maddala, 
1997).  The multinomial logit model has been used to study choice of transportation modes 
(Theil, 1969), automobiles (Cragg and Uhler, 1970), the determinants of occupational choice 
(Schmidt and Strauss, 1975b), factors influencing technology adoption (Caffey and Kazmierczak 
1994), whether part-time farming is a step in the way out of agriculture (Kimhi, 2000) and 
others.  In this study, the probability associated with the individual’s adoption of the business 
arrangement is assumed to follow an underlying logistic distribution and can be described as 
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where Pij represents the probability that Y=j, for j=1,2,...m,  m is the number of choices, X 
represents the set of characteristics for individual i, and β  is a set of estimated parameters that 
describe the influence of X on the probability of preferring a given item.   
 The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumptions associated with MNL 
become problematic because they impose the restriction that cross-price elasticities are the same 
across alternatives.  As a solution, McFadden (1981) proposes the Nested Multinomial Logit 
(NMNL) model, which is a computationally feasible generalization of the MLN model.  The 
NMNL model relaxes the homoscedasticity assumption in the conditional logit model that also 
provides an intuitively appealing structure to group the alternatives into subgroups.   The 
subgroups allow the variance to differ across the groups while maintaining the IIA assumption 
within the groups.  
3.5 Binominal Logit 
  While the MNL model is used to analyze producers’ choice of business arrangements 
from a more general prospective, the binomial logit model is employed to identify specific 
characteristics associated with production contracts.  Flat-fee and incentive payment contracts 
had to be analyzed separately from business arrangements as a whole in order to capture the 
influence of certain contract-specific variables on the selection among production contracts.   
Binary choice models are used when decisions of individuals involve two alternatives, 
where only one is chosen.  The binomial logit model has been used in such studies as applying 
marketing channel theory to food marketing in developing countries (Dijkstra and Meulenbery, 
2001), determining the effect of strawberry density on the spread of anthracnose caused by 
colletotrichum actatum (Madden and Boudreau, 1997), estimating densities of grasshopper 
assemblages (Legg et al., 1993), analyzing spring and summer infestations of the Russian wheat 
aphid (Legg et al., 1992) and many others.  The binary choice of the ith individual is conveniently 
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represented by a random variable yi that takes the value 1 if one choice is made and 0 if the other 
choice is made.  If Pi is the probability that yi takes the value 1, then 1-Pi is the probability that yi 
is 0.  This can be summarized by writing the probability function for yi  as:  





i i= − =−                               (3.5.1) 
Economists are typically interested in examining the factors that affect the choice probability Pi.   
The average utility derived from a choice by an individual is based on the attributes of the 
choice, which are specific to the individual.  By taking the utility derived from the choices as the 
average utility plus a random disturbance, we have:  
U U e Z W ei ij i i i i0 0 0 0 0= + = ′ + ′ +
−
δ γ                                     (3.5.2) 
U U e Z W ei i i i i i1 1 1 1 1 1= + = ′ + ′ +
−
δ γ .        (3.5.3) 
where Ui0 and Ui1 are the utilities of the two choices, U i
−
0 and U i
−
1 are the average utilities, ′Zi0 and 
′Zi1 are vectors of characteristics of the alternatives, as perceived by individual i, ′Wi is a vector of 
contract production characteristics of the ith individual, and ei0  and ei1 are random disturbances 
(Judge et al, 1988).  Suppose utilities Ui0 and Ui1 are random.  The i
th individual will choose 
alternative one only if Ui1 > Ui0 or if the observable, or latent, random variable 
y U Ui i i

















             (3.5.4) 
The probability that yi =1 is P y y e xi i i i i= = = > = > ′Pr[ ] Pr[ ] Pr[ ]
* *1 0 β  (Judge et al, 1988: p. 
787).  To make the model complete, a logistic probability distribution is chosen for disturbance 
terms ei
* .  The cumulative density function (CDF) of the logistic random variable is 
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F t t( ) / [ exp( )]= + −1 1  (Judge et al, 1988: p. 787).  The logistic distribution closely approximates 
the normal distribution. Both distributions are symmetric with zero means.  
3.6 Marginal Effects   
 The marginal effects (marginal probabilities) are calculated for the choice of alternative 
business arrangements.  In the multinomial logit model, the coefficients for β are not directly tied 
to the marginal effects (Greene, 2000).  From Equation 3.6.1, we can express the marginal 
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∑             (3.6.1)          
  Each subvector of β is taken into consideration in every marginal effect by way of 
probability and weighted average that exists in j (Greene, 1997).  These can be calculated using 
the parameter estimates.  Equations 3.6.1 could possibly cause some confusion, although the 
usual focus is on the coefficient estimates.  “Note, for example, that for any particular Xk , Pj/ 
Xk need not have the same sign as jk” (Greene, 1997: p. 916). 
 The Delta method is used to compute the standard errors for functions of parameters 
obtained by the standard estimator.  To test the null hypothesis, Ho: j = 0, the t-statistic (3.6.2) 
is used, which follows an asymptotically standard normal distribution (Greene, 1997) and is 








.                              (3.6.2)  
The asymptotic standard error of ˆ jδ  is given by the root square of the asymptotic variance, 
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l j j j jj l I X X= = − − − ′[ ( ) ][ ] [ ]1   with a vector with entries equal to 1 if j = l, 
and zero if not (Greene, 1997).  
 When analyzing models with discrete dependent variables, the marginal effects are 
sometime calculated differently.  For the binomial logit model, the two choices are flat-fee 
contract (0) or incentive payment contract (1).  The predicted probabilities F x F(  ) ′ =β and the 
estimated marginal effects F x F(  ) ′ =β  multiplied by   β β= f  are nonlinear functions of the 
parameter estimates.  To calculate the standard errors, a linear approximation approach (delta 
method) is used.  The predicted probabilities are,    
Asy Var F F V F. [  ]  / ] [  / ],= ′∂ ∂ β ∂ ∂ β                 (3.6.4) 
where  
V Asy Var= . [ ]β .        (3.6.5) 
The marginal effects for the binomial logit model are calculated as   (  )f = −Λ Λ1 , where the 
notation Λ  represents the logistic cumulative distribution function.      
3.7  Multicollinearity Analysis   
Because economists are rarely involved in controlled experiments, there are often 
concerns surrounding the effects of multicollinearity in their data.  Multicollinearity is not a 
statistical or econometric problem, but a data problem that violates one of the assumptions of the 
Classical Linear Regression (CLR) model, which specifies that there must not be an exact linear 
relationship between independent variables (Kennedy, 1998).  The major “consequence of 
multicollinearity is that the variances of the OLS estimates of the parameters of the collinear 
variables are quite large” (Kennedy, 1998: p.184).  If there is high correlation between two 
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variables, little variation is unique to each variable, leaving a larger percentage of the variation 
common among the two variables (Kennedy, 1998).   “This means that the OLS procedure has 
little information to use in making its coefficient estimates, just as though it had a very small 
sample size, or a sample in which the independent variable did not vary much” (Kennedy, 1998: 
p. 185).   Having high variance minimizes the accuracy of the parameter estimates, which in turn 
makes the hypothesis test groundless.    
Multicollinearity problems normally arise when the data that are being analyzed are cross 
sectional or panel.  Cross sectional or panel data may cause multicollinearity problems for 
several reasons other than linear relationships among independent variables.  Other possible 
reasons cross sectional or panel data may become problematic are: 1) some independent 
variables may have varied together because the data were not collected from a wide enough base, 
or 2) there could in fact exist some type of approximated value among some of the regressors 
(Kennedy, 1998).    
3.8 Detecting Multicollinearity 
The procedures used in detecting multicollinearity have become quite controversial 
among economists.  This is believed to have occurred due to the inadequacy of some detection 
methods, which are scrutinized justifiably (Kennedy, 1998).  The inadequacies of these methods 
are centered around their inability to lower the variance of the independent variables.  Perhaps 
one the most popular ways of detecting multicollinearity is by examining the correlation matrix.   
The correlation matrix can be obtained by conducting simple regression analyses where all pairs 
of independent variables are compared.  A successful analysis of the data reveals correlation 
coefficients, which are the off-diagonal elements in the variance co-variance matrix for a given 
data set.   Multicollinearity is believed to exist whenever the correlation coefficients have values 
of 0.8 or greater (Kennedy, 1998).   A value of 0.8 or greater indicates that the two independent 
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variables are highly correlated with one other.  Alternatively, one may use the condition index to 
detect multicollinearity.  The condition index measures “the square root of the ratio of the largest 
to the smallest characteristic root of X`X” (Kennedy, 1998: p. 187).   Any number greater than 
20 gives indications of possible collinearity problems (Greene, 2000).  Another way of detecting 
multicollinearity is by calculating the inverse of the correlation matrix (Kennedy, 1998).  The 
inverse correlation matrix gives us the variance inflation factor (VIF), which is represented by 
the diagonal elements of this matrix.  If the Ri
2  is near unity, the VIF is high, which indicates 
that there are collinearity problems (Kennedy, 1998).  Collinearity is believed to be harmful 
when VIFi is greater than 10 (Kennedy, 1998).  
3.9 Testing for Heteroskedasticity  
Given the nature of the survey data (cross-sectional), possible heteroskedasticity 
problems become a normal concern when testing model significance.  Heteroskedasticity is an 
econometric problem that exists when the variances in the variance/covariance matrix are not 
constant (Judge et al, 1988).  In testing for the significance of the model, the null hypothesis and 
alternative hypothesis are as such: 
H0: β1 = β2 = β3 =…….= βn = 0 
HA: at least one ≠ 0   
where βs represent the variances in the null hypothesis.  If the null hypothesis (H0) is not 
rejected, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that heteroskedasticity exists, but if the 
alternative hypothesis (HA) is not rejected, heteroskedasticity exists.   
One method of testing for inconsistence of variances in the variance-covariance matrix is 
by way of the multiplicative heteroskedasticity model.  Similar to the above test, the 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity model tests “the null hypothesis H0:α* = 0 against the 
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alternative hypothesis H1:α* ≠ 0” (Judge et al, 1988: p. 370).  The multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity model utilizes an estimator α = (ZZ)-1Zq, where  is the estimator, Z = 
(z1z2…zT), and the matrix (ZZ)
-1 represents D (the unknown covariance matrix) (Judge et al, 
1988).   In the (ZZ)-1 matrix the first row and first column are deleted.  Then, from  
T d Nd zz(  . ) ( , . )α α− +  →
−12704 0 4 9348 1Σ ,        (3.9.1) 
 * ~ [ *, . ]α αN D4 9348          (3.9.2) 
 and  
(  *) (  *)
.
~









4 9348          (3.9.3) 
hold approximately.  Given the null hypothesis α* = 0, Equation 3.9.3breaks down to  
(  * *) / .α α′ −D 1 4 9348 .  To test for heterosckedasticity, the multiplicative model computes this 
value and evaluates it based on the χ 2 distribution (Judge et al, 1988). 
The final model that may be used is the Heteroskedasticity Extreme Value Logit (HEVL).  
HEVL is also a constructive method that is not frequently used but is recommended by 
Munizaga et al., (2000) and Greene (2000) for correcting heteroskedasticity between options.  In 
order to account for heteroskedasticity between options, HEVL assumes that the error terms are 
mutually independent extreme value distributed but are allowed to have differing variances.  The 
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When testing for the two heteroskedasticity problems, Munizaga et al. 2000, found that 
Multinomial Probit (MNP) and the HEVL were the theoretically correct models that showed 
better results than the other observed models.  The HEVL model “recovered accurately the target 
parameter values and performed satisfactorily in terms of the response analysis” (Munizaga et 
al., 2000).                                                                                                                              
3.10 Measuring Goodness-of-Fit 
“A goodness-of-fit measure is a summary statistic indicating the accuracy with which a 
model approximates the observed data” (Maddala, 1997: p. 37).  There are many ways to 
measure the goodness-of-fit for a particular model.  For linear regression models, one of the most 
frequently used methods is the R2.  However, for logit models, goodness-of-fit can be measured 
by computing the direct R2 or the pseudo R2 from the likelihood-ratio test (Maddala, 1997).  As 
we consider the goodness-of-fit for limited dependent variable models, the R2 criterion does not 
satisfy specific properties of economic theory.  The results indicate that the β coefficients are 
inconsistent and the parameters are meaningless.  However, hope of finding a legitimate 
goodness-of-fit criterion was given through the ingenuity of Cragg and Uhler (1970) and 
McFadden (1974) in creating the pseudo-R2.  This criterion can be illustrated by defining R2 in 











= −  
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where n is the number of observations, LΩ is the maximum of the likelihood 
function when maximized with respect to all parameters βj and Lω is the maximum when 
maximized with respect to the constant term αj only” (McFadden, 1998: p. 39).  When 
considering this goodness-of-fit in the logit model, “even though R2 → 0 as LΩ → Lω, the upper 
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bound is much less than 1” (McFadden, 1998: p. 39).  Pseudo-R2 is believed to be a better 
measure.  Cragg and Uhler (1970) define pseudo-R2 as 
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∏ , Lmax = 1, and LΩ is the same as defined above (Cragg and Uhler, 1970).  
The Cragg and Uhler method is ideal because it allows the upper bound on pseudo-R2 to be one.  
Thus, as a measuring criteria for goodness-of-fit, one can now make the assumption that the 
larger the pseudo-R2, the better the fit of the model. 
3.11 T-Test of Different Population Sizes 
Before conducting the multinomial logit or binomial logit analysis, it is useful to test for 
the differences between the dependent variables for each independent variable.  Suppose we 
were given two populations with means µ1 and µ2.  Now assume that we have independent 
random samples of size n1 and n2 for which the sample means x1  and x2  and s1
2 and s2

































































          (3.11.2) 
are calculated (Kanji, 1993).  The test statistic in Equation 3.11.2 may be compared with the 
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.         (3.11.3) 
The interpretation of this t-test is as follows: if the critical value associated with degrees of 
freedom is less than the Student’s t-distribution, then the hypothesis that the two population 
means are equal is rejected.  If the contrary is true, then there is no significant difference between 
the two population means. 
3.12 Survey Design and Implementation 
 3.12.1 Mailing the Survey 
A national survey was conducted during the summer and fall of 2000 to provide data for 
this study.  Approximately 4,986 surveys were mailed with a response rate of 21% (1,030).  The 
producers surveyed were taken from a random sample of National Hog Producer magazine 
subscribers.  Sufficient numbers of respondents for each business arrangement were represented 
in the data sample.  As shown in Table 2, a stratified sample of U.S. hog producers was used, 
more specifically, 831 producers in each of the following hog inventory categories: 200-999 
hogs, 1,000-1,999 hogs, 2,000-2,999 hogs, 3,000-4,999 hogs, 5,000-9,999 hogs, and 10,000 hogs 
and over. The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that in 1999, 52,730 producers had 1-99 
hogs, 32,105 had 100-999 hogs, 6,500 had 1,000-1,999 hogs, 5,120 had 2,000-4,999 hogs, and 
2,005 had over 5,000 head in inventory.  Thus, our group has a higher percentage of the larger 
producers than the general hog producer population. 
The producers surveyed were asked a series of questions.  The survey was divided into 
five sections. Section I of the survey attempts to capture the production characteristics of U.S. 
hog farmers.  The purpose of this section is to determine the size of the farmer’s hog operation 
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and farm (in terms of the number of acres), types of labor, as well as the different modern 
technologies incorporated within the production and marketing process.   
 Section II was designed to elicit farmers’ levels of and preferences for autonomy.  The 
ability to make production and marketing decisions are authoritative powers that are important to 
some farmers, and less important to others.  This section is used to determine the decision-
making power exercised by farmers.  More specifically, it is of interest to know the inputs and 
marketing decisions farmers are more likely and less likely to allow contractors to control. 
Table 3.1:  Farm Size Categories Surveyed. 
________________________________________________________ 
Size Category    Number of Names Requested 
________________________________________________________ 
10,000+     831 
5,000 -- 9,999     831 
3,000 -- 4,999     831 
2,000 -- 2,999     831 
1,000 -- 1,999     831 
   200 --   999     831  
________________________________________________________ 
Total              4,986 
________________________________________________________                                                              
 Section III was designed to identify the business arrangements and transaction costs that 
are common in the hog industry.  More specifically, this section determines whether farmers are 
independent farmers, cooperative farmers, vertical integrators or contract farmers.  If contract 
farmers, the type of contract is determined among flat-fee contract, contract with incentive 
payments, or tournament contract.     
Section IV elicits the socioeconomic characteristics of farmers.  This section captures 
personal information that may influence farmers in choosing one business arrangement over 
another.  These questions ascertain information such as age, gender, martial status, education, 
family size, household income, race, social relationships, and reasons for farming.    
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Section V was designed to elicit the risk preference of each farmer.  Given the nature of 
hog production, risk will always be a determining factor that farmers use to make production 
plans and marketing decisions.  The first question allows each farmer to evaluate and define his 
or her own risk preference.  The second question gives the farmer a hypothetical situation of a 
financial investment venture.  Farmers are then asked to choose one of the five investment 
options.             
In our efforts to design a survey that maximizes response rate, a hybrid stemming from 
Dillman’s (1978) Total Design Method (TDM) was used.   The major strength of the TDM as a 
comprehensive system is that it meticulously follows the prescribed procedures that consistently 
produce high response rates for most survey populations.  The first step to the TDM is to 
formulate questions that are interesting to the respondent and provide a cover letter identifying 
the purpose of the survey and the types of questions that will be asked.  The second step is to 
construct the questions so that they are relatively easy to read and answer.  Third, the survey 
should be printed in booklet format with a topically neutral but interesting cover.  The fourth step 
is to use a photo reduction of regular-sized type to make pages seem smaller and easier to 
complete. The final step is to use four carefully spaced mailings.  These mailings must include a 
postcard follow-up one week after the original mailing; a replacement questionnaire and cover 
letter informing the recipient the questionnaire has not yet been received four weeks after the 
original mailing; and a second replacement questionnaire and cover letter seven weeks after the 
first mailing.  Some other methods to improve response rates are first class postage, and 
monetary awards or gifts as incentives for completing the survey. 
The hybrid method used for this study consisted of an initial mailing of the survey 
followed by a postcard reminder two weeks later.  After the postcard reminder was mailed, a 
second mailing of the survey was sent.  In keeping with Dillman’s approach, all of the letters 
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sent to farmers during the second mailing of the survey were signed personally.  Contrary to 
Dillman’s approach, all surveys and reminders were mailed out as bulk mail due to financial 
constraints.   As a gift, a Community tea bag was mailed with each survey in the first mailing. 
3.12.2 Data Specification  
In order to conduct a thorough analysis, a sufficient number of respondents for each 
business arrangement must be represented in the sample data.  It was estimated that 
approximately 167 observations of each business arrangement would be received.  Of the 167 
observations, 140 were expected to be complete, which is enough to properly determine factors 
influencing the choice of business arrangement.  The expected response rate was 20%, based on 
previous similar studies.  Thus, approximately 5,000 hog producers were surveyed in order to 
obtain the desired sample size of 1,000.  Because previous studies (Lawrence et al. 1998 and 
Rhodes and Grimes 1994) have shown that larger producers are more likely to be involved in 
some form of contractual agreement with vertical integrators or coordinators, the random 
stratified sample was designed to represent the farm size categories shown in Table 2.  The study 
area is the entire United States, thus enabling the examination of a traditional region of 
production (Midwest), as well as the newly expanding regions (Southeast and West). 
3.12.3 Pilot Study 
A pilot study that consisted of two Louisiana hog farmers, two Louisiana State University 
faculty and one staff member was conducted to obtain constructive criticism and ways to 
improve the survey.  The respondents were informed that this was a pilot study and that the 
information collected from the survey would to be used for dissertation research.  Emphasis was 
placed on the importance of their feedback.   
The two LSU faculty members did not answer the survey as if they were hog producers, 
but were merely asked to comment on the content.  The two Louisiana hog producers and the 
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LSU swine unit manager were given the survey and a cover letter addressed to them and asked to 
complete the survey as if they had received it in the mail.  Respondents were also encouraged to 
ask questions in relation to any item that appeared on the survey that they did not understand.  
Immediately after the respondents finished, their times of completion were recorded and they 
were asked a series of questions in reference to their overall perception of the survey.  Each 
respondent was asked if the survey was attractive and, if they received it in the mail, would they 
fill it out.  All of the respondents agreed that the survey was attractive and that they would fill it 
out if it were received in the mail.  Respondents were then asked to rank the clarity of the survey 
on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being extremely clear and 1 being unclear.  One of the respondents 
ranked the clarity of the survey as a 9, while two gave it a ranking of 8.  Likewise, respondents 
were asked to rate the quality of the survey on a scale of 1 to 10.  To prevent biasing the results, 
the respondents were allowed to use their personal definitions of quality in answering this 
question.  Using the same measure as in the previous question, they rated the quality of the 
survey as 8, 9, and 10, respectively.  It was also important to know whether any of the questions 
offended the respondents.  All responded “no” to this question.  Finally, the respondents were 
asked whether or not they would fill out this survey if it were from another university outside of 
the state of Louisiana. The respondents agreed that they would fill out the survey if it were 
received from another university outside of Louisiana.     
 The comments and suggestions received from the respondents were useful in that they 
enabled us to add, delete or clarify the questions in our final survey.  All information given by  





3.13 Theoretical Model 
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the MNL model is a tree-like structure that consists of the 
root and four trunks.  The business arrangement is expressed as the root, and the choice of 
business arrangement (independent, cooperative, flat-fee contract and incentive payment 
contracts) as the trunks.  The type of contract chosen (flat-fee or incentive payment/tournament) 
is estimated using a binominal logit model.  Table 3.2 defines each business arrangement.  
However, only four of these business arrangements are used in this study, independent 
production, cooperative farming, flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract.  One of the 
business arrangements, vertical integration, was deleted due to few observations; another 
business arrangement, tournament contract, was combined with the incentive payment contract 
due to similar characteristics and few tournament contract observations.     
The MNL model proposed above can be written under the following general form: 
Business Arrangement = f(Farm/Locational Characteristics, Farm Financial 
             Characteristics, Producer Attitudes, Social Capital, Production 
             Characteristics).     
                                                         
A more specific theoretical model can be expressed as: 
 
BAMT  = f(NGHF, MKTPRICE, TIMEHSYS, CORN, RISKAVER, AUUNOTIMP, 
AUERIMP, COMPHS, BACHELO, AGE, TOTALFD, HOG250, SOUTH, 
BIOSECUR, HIINCOME, BREEDSOW, HIGHDEBT,  NHWOFFFA, 
FCONTRWI, FFLATFEE, VALFAMAS, LENDINST, FEEDMERC, 
NEIGFARM)  
 
 CONTRACT = f(MOPUNDCO, CONTWNFA, NEWREFAC, NUACRES, 




























































Table 3.2:  A Description of the Business Arrangements Analyzed. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Business Arrangement     Description  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Production     All inputs involved in the production process are owned and 
managed by the producer.  The producer incurs all risk and 
transaction costs through the production and marketing of hogs. 
 
Cooperative Farming     A jointly owned farm enterprise consisting of two or more 
farmers who aggregate their resources and expertise to finance, 
produce and/or market hogs.  
 
Contract with Incentives     The contractor or integrator provides the producer with inputs 
such as feeder pigs, feed, veterinary services and medication, 
while the producer supplies the labor, utilities, buildings, and 
fuel. This contract includes an incentive-based payment that is 
rewarded on the basis of feed efficiency, minimum mortality, 
and length of time in grow-out.    
 
Tournament Contract     This agreement is similar to the previous contract in terms of 
input supply and incentive criteria; however, this contract differs 
in the number of farmers competing for incentive payments, 
which varies with performance.  
 
Flat-fee Contract      This contract has the same characteristics as the previous 
contract, but it does not include bonus or incentive payments.  
The producer is paid a guaranteed piece-rate payment for his/her 
services, and at the end of the grow-out period, the contractor 
reclaims the hogs.  
 
Vertical Integration   A firm that owns up-and downstream firms and                                     
                                                                                             supplies all inputs for the production of hogs and employs     












3.13.1 Exogenous Variables Used in the Multinomial Logit Analysis 
 Farm/Locational Characteristics 
HOG250 = Number of 250 Pound Hogs Sold per Year 
 HOG250 is measured as a continuous variable.  Producers were asked if they raised hogs 
to a weight of 200 – 300 pounds for market in 1999 and, if yes, approximately how many?  
Technological change has encouraged hog operation expansion.  Studies have shown that the 
average production costs of larger hog farms is significantly lower than that of small hog farms 
(Barkema and Cook, 1993).  Some producers seeking an opportunity to expand small hog farms 
have turned to contract production since contractual arrangements help producers establish 
steady cash flows and obtain loans for expansion.  In order to qualify for some production 
contracts, the producer must rent or own land for manure application and purchase new or 
renovate existing facilities.  Some of the facilities recommended or required by contractors are 
capable of housing up to 1,100 pigs per unit.  It is hypothesized that producers who finish more 
hogs will be more likely to adopt contracts than independent or cooperative production.  
BREEDSOW = Number of Sows Used in Hog Operation 
BREEDSOW is a continuous variable indicating the number of breeding sows used in the 
operation. Producers surveyed were asked, “How many breeding sows are used in your hog 
operation?” It is hypothesized that producers with more breeding sows are more likely to be 
independent or cooperative producers than contract producers.  The reason for this is that 
breeding sow operations are specialized, more highly skilled operations that require more 
intensive labor than finishing operations.   Given that contractors have no control over the 
additional labor force hired to run breeding sow operations, the quality and quantity of pigs 
farrowed are subject to vary from one contract producer to the next.  This variation has potential 
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to reduce the uniformity of animals produced, which in turn affects the value of the hogs.  Many 
vertically coordinated firms own the farrow to nursey units and contract out the finishing portion. 
TOTALFD = Number of Other Farm Enterprises 
 TOTALFD is measured as a continuous variable.  Producers were asked, “What other 
type(s) of farm animals and/or crops do you raise”?  Producers were asked to identify any other 
additional livestock and/or crops they were raising on the farm.  Traditionally, producers have 
used diversification as a financial risk management tool.  The rationale guiding this management 
strategy is that more enterprises reduce total income variability.  Today, there remain a 
substantial number of producers who utilize this management strategy.  Some producers 
supervise all the breeding, gestation, farrowing, weaning, nursing, finishing of hogs, and raising 
of other animals, as well as plant, harvest and mill their own feed on one farm.  The incentive to 
diversify is less for most contract producers since most contracts are set up to reduce price risk to 
the producer.  One of the drawbacks of diversified farming is the potential reduction of 
production efficiency due to the inability to excel at multiple tasks.  Some contractors do not 
allow certain types of diversified farming (often due to concerns of disease that can be 
transferred among species).  As a result of these factors, it is hypothesized that diversified farms 
will more likely be managed by independent producers.  
CORN = Corn Production 
 CORN is measured as a dummy variable.  Each producer was asked if he or she raised 
corn.  Corn is the major ingredient in most U.S. hog feed rations, and corn accounts for almost 
two-thirds of the costs of hog production (Barkema and Cook, 1993).  It is hypothesized that 
corn production is more likely to be vertically integrated with independent or cooperative hog 
producers than contract producers.  Most producers under resource-providing contracts receive 
feed and other inputs from the contractor.  This provides the contractor the ability to control 
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inputs and, ultimately, the type of hog produced.  In such cases, feed costs are incurred by the 
contractor; thus there is no need to grow corn for hog feed.   
FCONTRWI = Incentive Payment Contracts Used in County 
FCONTRWI is measured as a dummy variable.  Each producer was asked, “What type(s) 
of business arrangements are farmers in your county presently producing hogs under”? This 
variable seeks to determine the types of hog operations that are presently being used by other hog 
producers in the surveyee’s community.  It is hypothesized that, in counties with incentive 
payment contracts, the producer will be more likely to adopt a contract.  The justification for this 
hypothesis could conceivably be based on many factors, anti-corporate farming laws being one 
of them.  Most states that have anti-corporate farming laws do not allow any form of contracting 
to coexist with independent or cooperative operations.  Agglomeration economies is another 
justification.  Based on the hypothesis, it is expected that more flat-fee contracts and incentive 
payment contracts would congregate in the same communities.  One of the advantages of 
economics of agglomeration is lower input, production and marketing costs.  Vertically 
coordinated and vertically integrated firms who own or coordinate with up- and down stream 
businesses supply inputs and marketing services to growers at lower cost.  The costs of these 
production inputs and marketing services are lower because the hog production sites are located 
within close proximity of feed suppliers, packagers/slaughter houses and contractors, which help 
reduce transportation costs, transaction costs and shorten communication gaps.         
FFLATFEE = Flat-fee Contracts Used in County 
FFLATFEE is measured as a dummy variable.  Similar to FCONTRWI, producers were 
asked to indicate whether other flat-fee contracts exist within their communities.  Using the same 
reasoning expressed for the variable FCONTRWI, it is hypothesized that flat-fee contracts are 
more likely to exist in communities where there are other flat-fee contracts.      
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SOUTH = Hog Production in the South 
 South is a dummy variable indicating that the farm is located in one of the following 11 
states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, or Virginia.  During the past twenty years, hog production in the 
Southern region has increased significantly.  For instance, in North Carolina, the number of hogs 
produced increased from 1.9 million in 1975 to 9.3 million in 1996, an increase of almost 400% 
(Hubbell and Welsh, 1998).   Today, North Carolina ranks second in production in the U.S.  
Other southern states that have experienced significant expansion include Arkansas, Mississippi, 
and Georgia.  The growth of hog production in the Southern states has been attributed to 
producers’ willingness to accept vertically coordinated and integrated firms since they had little 
existing industry that could be threatened by the advent of a new business arrangement.  In 
addition, it can be attributed to a lack of anti-corporate farming laws in the South.  Thus, it is 
hypothesized that producers from the Southern U.S. are more likely to be contract producers than 
producers in other regions. 
TIMEHSYR = Number of Times Hogs are Sold per Year 
 TIMEHSYR is measured as a continuous variable.  Producers were asked how many 
times per year they sold hogs at local auctions, packers or slaughter houses.  The number of trips 
a producer makes to a market to sell his/her hogs or purchase production inputs is directly related 
to the cost of production.  The more transactions a producer makes in selling animals or 
purchasing production inputs, the higher are his/her transaction costs (Hobbs, 1997).  A guiding 
criterion for choosing the appropriate business arrangement lies in the number of market 
transactions a producer makes.  In today’s hog industry, larger independent hog operations are 
more likely to conduct more market transactions than smaller ones due to the number of animals 
involved and, in the case of farrow-to-finish operations, year-round breeding.  However, over the 
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past several decades, producers have been able to reduce these transaction costs via contract 
production and certain forms of cooperative farming.  This is mainly because contractors and 
some types of cooperatives absorb or conduct the transaction.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that 
producers requiring more market transactions are more likely to contract to reduce transaction 
costs.  
NHWOFFFA = Number of Hours Worked Off-farm  
NHWOFFFA is measured as a continuous variable.  The producers surveyed were asked 
how many hours per week they worked off the farm.  An increasing number of U.S. producers 
have accepted off-farm jobs to supplement their primary income.  However, it is hypothesized 
that producers who work fewer hours off farm are more likely to be independent or cooperative 
producers, given their production and marketing responsibilities.  Since contract producers of the 
same size spend less time making production and marketing decisions, they are expected to have 
more time to work off-farm. 
 Farm Financial Characteristics 
HIGHDEBT = High Debt 
HIGHDEBT is a dummy variable indicating that the farmer’s debt-to-asset ratio is 40 
percent or greater.  Producers were asked, “What is your debt-to-asset ratio”?  One of the 
advantages of most production contracts is that some of the inputs are supplied by the contractor.  
Inputs (such as feed, animals, veterinary care, and medication) supplied by the contractor enable 
producers to reallocate resources toward purchasing other factors of production.  Initial 
investment for other factors of production such as farrowing, nursery and finishing facilities may 
cost more than $1 million (Hurt, Boehlje, and Hale, 1995).  Most contract producers are required 
to purchase one or more of these facilities in order to be eligible for a production contract.  In 
contrast, independent and cooperative producers are responsible for all inputs involved in the 
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production hogs; but are under no obligation to purchase new state-of-the-art facilities.  Thus, it 
is hypothesized that higher debt producers are more likely to be independent or cooperative than 
contract producers.       
VALFAMAS = High Level of Farm Assets ≥ $1.5 Million 
VALFAMAS is a dummy variable that indicates the value of the operator’s total farm 
assets is greater than or equal to $1.5 million.  Each producer was asked the total value of his or 
her farm assets, including land value. For contract eligibility, there are two essential criteria that 
many contractors require of potential contractees.  The first is the ownership of state-of-the-art 
facilities or renovation of old facilities.  The second is the ownership or rental of adequate arable 
land for manure application.  These two resources account for a large proportion of the total farm 
assets.  Based on these criteria, it is hypothesized that flat-fee or incentive based contracts will 
likely have greater total farm assets than independent or cooperative producers.   
HIINCOME = Producer’s Net Household Income ≥ $100,000 
 HIINCOME is measured as a discrete variable.  To measure income, each producer was 
asked to indicate his or her total net household income for the year 1999.  For this study, the 
influence of HIINCOME on the choice of business arrangement is indeterminate.  However, it 
will be used as an exploratory variable in this study. 
 Producer Attitudes  
AUERIMP = Autonomy Is Very Important  
 AUERIMP is measured as a dummy variable.  Some producers have opposed contract 
farming due to the amount of control lost in their operations.  The ability to make one’s own 
production and marketing decisions is of great importance to some producers.   A producer’s 
level of autonomy is related to his or her choice of business arrangement.  Independent farming 
is considered to involve the highest level of autonomy, followed by cooperative farming, and 
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contractual arrangements, respectively.  The autonomy of producers was measured by 
determining each producer’s preference for making production and marketing decisions.  Based 
on this information, it is hypothesized that producers who feel that autonomy is very important 
will more likely be independent and secondly cooperative producers (Gillespie and Eidman, 
1998).    
AUNOTIMP =Autonomy Is Not Very Important 
 AUNOTIMP is measured as a dummy variable.  Hog producers were asked, “how 
important is it to you for you to have complete control over all production, marketing, and 
management decisions in your hog operation?”  The possible responses were “not important”, 
and “not very important”.  Consistent with AUERIMP, it is hypothesized that autonomy will not 
be as important to persons under flat-fee or incentive based contracts as it is to persons involved 
in independent or cooperative operations.          
BIOSECUR= Rating of Operation Bio-security  
  BIOSECUR is measured as a continuous variable.  Producers were asked to rate their 
bio-security system on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest level of bio-security and 0 
being the lowest.  Biosecurity is a level of protection producers have on the farm to prevent 
diseases from destroying their herd.  Some biosecurity strategies are shower-in, shower-out, air-
tight rooms, limited access, etc.  With a higher rating indicating greater agency costs and a lower 
rating indicating a lower agency costs of bio-security, it is hypothesized that producers who rate 
their bio-security higher will more likely be involved in contracts or cooperatives, and producers 
who rate their bio-security lower will more likely be independent producers.  In reference to 
contract producers, it is hypothesized that producers operating under incentive contracts will 
have higher bio-security than flat-flee contract producers.   There are two rationales guiding 
these hypotheses.  The first rationale is based on the fact that many contract producers are 
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required to upgrade or purchase new facilities that are highly task programmable.  Higher task 
programmable facilities give rise to uniformity in the quality and quantity of products produced.  
However, if bio-security is low, the quality and quantity of hogs produced by higher task 
programmable facilities stand the chance of being destroyed by disease outbreaks.  Therefore, 
high bio-security is a necessary condition for higher task programmable facilities.   
MKTPRICE = Frequency of Checking Hog Prices   
MKTPRICE is measured as a continuous variable.  Producers were asked how regularly  
they consulted sources for information on market hog prices and desired leanness/back-fat 
values.  The possible responses were “never”, “once quarterly”, “once monthly”, “once every 
two weeks”, “once a week”, or “two or more times a week”.  The cost of obtaining price 
information is a transaction cost incurred by a producer who markets his or her own hogs.  Hog 
prices can vary greatly from month to month.  For instance, the U.S. average price for hogs from 
mid 1996 to mid 1997 ranged between $50 and $60 per cwt, but dropped as low as $13 in 
November, 1998.  To measure MKTPRICE, producers were asked the number of times per 
month they collect information on market prices for hogs and desired leanness/back-fat values.  
It is hypothesized that producers who consult these sources frequently will more likely be 
independent or cooperative producers than contract producers.  Contract producers are less likely 
to consult various sources for price information because the base price, bonus incentive and 
quality of animals desired are specified in their contracts.  
RISKAVER = Producer Is Risk Averse 
 RISKAVER is measured as a discrete variable. Because different business arrangements 
involve different associated risks, producers are likely to choose among business arrangements 
according to their risk attitudes.  To measure producers’ risk attitudes, a hypothetical question 
used by Fausti and Gillespie was phased as follows:  
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“Suppose you have $100,000 to invest.  Suppose there are five different options in which you 
might invest your money.  These options are illustrated below in the chart and table.  With the 
first option, you are certain to receive $10,000, or a 10% return.  Thus, at the end of the year you 
will have $100,000 + $10,000 = $110,000.  Money in a savings account would be an example of 
such an investment.  However, you can increase your average net return by increasing the 
riskiness of your investment.  In Option 2, for instance, you have a 1/3 chance of receiving an 
average net return of $10,600.  However, with this investment, you increase the riskiness since 
you would also have a 1/3 chance of receiving $8,170 and a 1/3 chance of receiving $13,030, 
other options involved larger variances in income.  Please examine the five options and answer 
the following question.  Of these investments, which investment would you choose?”  A bar 
graph and table showing the returns for each choice were provided on the survey form.   
The investments were developed so that the selection of one would indicate the decision 
maker fell into one of five intervals of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  These five 
intervals were chosen according to a study conducted by Babcock, Choi and Feinerman (1993).  
Based on the answer chosen, a producer could be classified as highly risk averse, very risk 
averse, moderately risk averse, moderately risk prone or very risk prone.  This question was used 
by Fausti and Gillespie (2001), in a comparative analysis of risk preference elicitation procedures 
using mail survey.  Given its applicability and understandability for most producers, this 
question was added to the survey.  It is hypothesized that risk averse producers will more likely 
accept risk-reducing contracts, while moderately risk prone or highly risk prone producers will 
more likely be involved in independent or cooperative production.  One purpose of many 
contracts is to reduce both production and price risk.  Most contracts offer payment floors and a 
constant flow of animals throughout the operations that help stabilize producer income.  
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Producers who are not sheltered from production and/or price risk are subject to incur substantial 
risk.   
LENDINST = Producer’s Relationship with Lending Institutions 
LENDINST is measured as a dummy variable.  Producers were asked to rate how 
important were their social relationships with lenders.  The possible answers to the question were 
“not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important” and “very important”.  Along 
with the competitive nature of the hog industry comes the need for better production facilities 
and resources for expansion.  To purchase these facilities, producers must have the financial 
resources required, and may be required to obtain a loan from a financial institution.  In addition 
to the basic criteria required by lenders to provide loans, positive relationships with bankers or 
loan officers are often considered advantageous.  Personal knowledge of an applicant can make a 
difference in the loan approval process in cases where the applicant is “marginal.”  To measure 
the value of social relationships, surveyed producers were asked to rate the importance of their 
relationships with lending institutions.  It is hypothesized that relationships between loan officers 
and independent and cooperative producers are more important than they are between loan 
officers and contract producers.  The justification for this hypothesis is twofold.   First, 
independent and cooperative producers are more likely to be dependent on lending institutions 
for loans to purchase animals, feed, and other inputs that are supplied by many contractors for 
contract producers.  Secondly, contract producers may use their contractual agreements as 
leverage or payment security.  Because independent and cooperative producers cannot guarantee 
a steady flow of animals circulating through their hog operations, social capital may become 





FEEDMERC = Producer’s Relationship with Feed Merchants  
 
 FEEDMERC is measured as a dummy variable.  Producers were asked to rate how 
important were their social relationships with feed merchants.  The possible answers to the 
question were “not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important” and “very 
important”.  Most independent and cooperative producers rely on feed merchants to supply feed 
for their hog operations.   Most contract producers are not faced with the problem of providing 
feed for their operations, given that most contractual agreements include feed as one of the inputs 
supplied by contractors.  Thus, development of social capital between the two parties is likely to 
be less important.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that producers who rate social relationships with 
feed merchants higher are more likely to produce under an independent or cooperative 
arrangement producers than a contract.  
NEIGFARM = Producer’s Relationship with Neighboring Farmers 
 NEIGFARM is measured as a dummy variable.  Producers were asked to rate the 
importance of their social relationships with neighboring farmers.  The possible answers to the 
question were “not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important” and “very 
important”.  Producers have historically shared production and marketing information to help aid 
new producers and others who were unfamiliar with procedures used for operating new 
technologies.  This information held substantial economic value, as producers could use it to 
increase productivity and, thus, profit.  It is hypothesized that there is less need for information 
exchange among contract producers than independent or cooperative producers.  Production 
contracts involve a relationship between the contractor and contractee, where the production and 
marketing decisions are shared.  In some instances, the contractor determines the technologies to 
be used, the type of feed to use, when to market the hogs and where they are to be sold.  The 
independent producer holds all decision making power, but may benefit economically from 
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information from other producers.  Hence, it is hypothesized that social capital with neighboring 
farmers is likely to be more important to independent and cooperative producers than contract 
producers.    
 Producer Characteristics 
AGE = Age of the Producer 
 AGE is measured as a continuous variable.  The age of producers was obtained by simply 
asking them their present age.  The age of a producer is likely related to his/her willingness to 
accept a contract.  It is expected that young or beginning producers are more apt to accept 
contracts to help establish a steady cash flow and to enhance chances for loan eligibility.  
Contracts are likely more appealing to young, beginning producers because less equity capital is 
needed to begin producing and most production inputs with the exception of buildings, land, 
labor and utility are supplied by the contractor.   However, the opposite is true for experienced 
producers who are nearing retirement.  Older producers are less likely to be concerned with 
expanding production and are likely to have developed and adjusted their own production and 
management practices.  Boehlje (1992) identifies this point as the third stage in the family life 
cycle where producers exit and intergenerational transfer of property takes place.  Thus, the 
likelihood of their producing under a contract is expected to be lower.  It is hypothesized that 
new and younger producers will more likely be involved in production contracts, while older 
producers will more likely be involved in independent and cooperative operations. 
BACHELO = Producer Finished a Bachelor’s Degree 
 BACHELO is measured as a discrete variable.  The higher the level of education a 
producer has, the greater the probability that he/she will understand and incorporate the 
necessary skills to efficiently manage a hog operation.  It is hypothesized that producers with 
Bachelors degrees are more likely to be independent or cooperative producers than contract 
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producers. The rationale guiding this hypothesis is based on the greater responsibilities held by 
independent and cooperative producers as compared to those held by contract producers.  
Independent and cooperative producers are more likely to make their own production and 
marketing decisions, which require certain amounts of financial, marketing, farm, and 
managerial knowledge.  Many studies have used education as an indicator for management 
capabilities (e.g., Cardona 1999, Caffey and Kazmierczak, 1997).  In contrast, most contract 
producers do not make all of their production and marketing decisions; many are made by the 
contractor.  Thus, education is less likely to be of importance. 
COMPHS = Producer Completed High School  
 COMPHS is measured as a dummy variable.  As discussed in BACHELO, the higher the 
level of education a producer has, the greater the probability that he/she will understand and 
incorporate the necessary skills to efficiently manage a hog operation.  Thus, it is hypothesized 
that producers who completed high school are more likely to be independent or cooperative 
producers.  
3.13.2 Exogenous Variables Used in the Binomial Logit Analysis 
MOPUNDCO = Months the Producer Has Raised Hogs Under Contract 
 MOPUNDCO is measured as a continuous variable.   Producers were asked to indicate 
the number of months they have produced hogs under contract.  The influence of MOPUNDCO 
on the choice of production contracts is indeterminate.  The variable is included for exploratory 
purposes.    
CONTWNFA = Contracts with Neighboring Farmers 
CONTWNFA is measured as a dummy variable.  Producers surveyed were asked if their 
present contract was with a neighboring farmer.  Contracts with neighboring farmers are often 
short-term agreements.  This type of contract exists in situations where one neighbor has an 
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overflow of hogs for which he or she does not have space to complete the grow-out; a contract is 
offered to a neighboring farmer to raise them.  In these situations, the owner of the hogs is likely 
to pay the contractee for the space that the animals occupy plus feed costs and any other costs 
associated with the grow-out.  Such “farmer-to-farmer” contracts do not normally include 
enough producers to involve tournaments and may not include incentive payments to encourage 
efficiency.  Thus, it is hypothesized that contracts with neighboring farmers will be more 
strongly associated with flat-fee contract producers than incentive contract producers.      
NEWREFAC = Purchase New Facilities or Renovate Existing Facilities 
 NEWREFAC is measured as a dummy variable.  Producers surveyed were asked if new 
facilities or the renovation of old facilities was a requirement for their contract.  Producers were 
to answer “yes” or “no” to this question.  The influence of new facilities or renovated facilities is 
indeterminate.  Thus, this variable is included for exploratory purposes.       
NUACRES = Number of Total Farm Acres 
 NUACRES is measured as a continuous variable.  Each producer was asked, 
“Approximately how many acres of land were used to support your hog operation”?  An 
important requirement for raising hogs commercially is land.  The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) requires that all commercial hog producers have sufficient land for manure 
management (Spiekerman, 1998).  In addition to the EPA requirement, most contract producers 
are also required by the contractor to utilize a certain number of acres in their production 
process.  For instance, Murphy Farms requires its applicants to own or lease a minimum of 320 
acres for 3,300 pigs.   It is indeterminate the influence that the number of acres will have on the 





EXRAIHOG = Producers with Experience Raising Hogs 
 EXRAIHOG is analyzed as a discrete variable.  A survey question asked producers to 
indicate whether or not they had experience raising hogs before signing their first production 
contract.  Growers who are producing hogs under incentive-based contracts are hypothesized to 
be people who will more likely have prior experience raising hogs than flat-fee contract 
producers.  The rationale for this hypothesis stems from the nature of incentive contracts.  
Incentive contracts are competitive and their bonuses are based on production efficiency.  In any 
given situation, producers try to maximize profits by utilizing their farming expertise or 
knowledge of animal husbandry.  Producers who are not able to employ these types of skills are 
not likely to be as competitive; thus they are hypothesized to be less willing to accept an 




























RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The following section presents comparisons of descriptive statistics on survey data for 
each business arrangement, in addition to discussing the model results.   
4.1 Descriptive Analysis of Survey and Data 
 During the summer and fall of 2000, two mailings of the U.S. Hog Production survey 
(Appendix D) were sent.  Four thousand nine hundred and eighty six surveys were mailed in the 
first mailing.  A postcard was sent after the first survey mailing.  A total of 1,031 surveys were 
returned completed.  Excluding producers who indicated they were no longer in business, the 
return rate was 21 percent.  To explain producers’ choices of business arrangements, information 
was collected on six basic categories: farm characteristics, financial characteristics, producer 
attributes, social capital, producer and locational characteristics, and contract characteristics.   
Of the 1,031 complete surveys returned, 684 were from independent producers, while 66, 
81, 118, 21 and 61 were from cooperative, flat-fee, incentive payment/tournament, vertical 
integration and other producers, respectively.  For the purpose of this study, vertical integration 
and other types of business arrangements are not included in the multinomial logit or binomial 
logit model.  Reasons for their exclusion are the lack of sufficient observations and the lack of 
clearly defined business arrangements.    
In addition, for each variable, a statistical analysis was conducted using a t-test for two 
population means (where the variances are unknown and unequal) to determine if the means for 
all business arrangement combinations (independent versus cooperative, cooperative versus flat-
fee, flat-fee versus incentive, cooperative versus incentive, independent versus flat-fee, or 
independent versus incentive producers) were equal.  Using a two-tailed t-distribution, the 
 80
hypothesis that the means for each business arrangement combination are equal was tested at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels (see Appendix A). 
  4.2 Farm Characteristics 
Producers were asked to indicate the structure of their farm businesses.  From Table 4.1, 
the percentage of producers who were involved in sole proprietorships was greater for flat-fee 
contract producers than it was for independent, cooperative or incentive payment contract 
producers.  The mean values were significantly different for independent and cooperative 
producers, cooperative and flat-fee contract producers, and cooperative and incentive payment 
contract producers.  The percentage of producers who were a part of partnerships was greater 
among cooperative producers than it was among independent, flat-fee contract or incentive 
payment contract producers.  Producers who were involved with partnerships were significantly 
different for independent and cooperative producers, cooperative and flat-fee contract producers, 
and cooperative and incentive payment contract producers.  Incentive payment contract 
producers had a larger percentage of family corporations than did producers under other business 
arrangements.  Independent and cooperative producers as well as cooperative and incentive 
payment contract producers had mean values that were significantly different.  The percentage of 
cooperative producers involved in non-family corporations exceeded that of independent, flat-fee 
contract or incentive payment contract producers, but only independent and cooperative 
producers’ mean values were significantly different.  As expected, producers who operated under 
cooperative agreements were highest, percentage wise, among cooperative producers than among 
independent, flat-fee contract, or incentive payment contract producers.  Statistically, only 




Table 4.1:  Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables for the Multinomial Logit Model. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable            Independent                  Cooperative             Flat-fee          Incentive  
                              Production             Member             Contract          Payment Contract 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Farm / Locational Characteristic 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Business Structure 
 - Sole Proprietorship  367.00   17.00  46.00  56.00 
                  - Partnership  127.00  26.00  16.00  22.00 
- Family Corporation   162.00    9.00  15.00  31.00 
- Non-Family     17.00    7.00     4.00        5.00  
 - Cooperative                   1.00    9.00      0.00     2.00  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Business Structure 
 - Sole Proprietorship    54 .00  25.00  56.00  47.00 
                  - Partnership     19.00  38.00  20.00  19.00 
- Family Corporation      24.00  13.00  18.00  26.00 
- Non-Family       3.00  10.00    5.00        4.00  
 - Cooperative                   0.00  13.00    0.00     2.00  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   
Average No. of 250 Pound Hogs                  2,523.00               7,795.00              3,900.00            10,927.00   
Produced per Farm 
 
Percentage of Producers Who Have a         0.37    0.51    0.84    0.81   
Finishing Operation 
    
Average No. of Breeding Sows        263.00                 759.00                   49.00                 297.00      
Used in Operation, per Farm 
 
Percentage of Producers Who Have a        0.06    0.04     0.04      0.03  
Breeding Sow Operation 
 
Average No. of 50 Pound Feeder Pigs    357.00               1,323.00               2,179.00              2,184.00  
Produced per Farm 
 
Percentage of Producers Who Have a        0.18    0.32     0.27      0.21      
Feeder Pig Operation 
 
Percentage of Producers Who Have a        0.58    0.37     0.01      0.03      
Farrow to Finishing Operation 
 
Percentage of Producers Who Have a        0.15    0.25     0.09      0.16      
Farrow to Wean Operation 
 
Number of Enterprises                           3.30            2.80                       2.60                      2.90  
 
Average No. of  Years Raising Hogs      26.80                   20.80    18.50                    19.20    
 
Average No. of Acres per Farm                         623.00                 803.00                   497.00                  479.00   
        
Percentage of Producers Who Raised         0.87    0.71      0.80                      0.65  
Corn on the Farm  
 
Percentage of Producers Who Raised         0.81    0.69      0.75                      0.65  
Soybean on the Farm                     
 
Average No. of Technologies and        2.57    3.96      1.98        2.37  
Management Practices Adopted 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 









Variable            Independent                  Cooperative                Flat-fee          Incentive  
                              Production             Member               Contract          Payment Contract 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Farm / Locational Characteristic 
Percentage of Flat-fee Contracts Used       0.40            0.49   0.68    0.35        
in the County                 
     
Percentage of Incentive Contracts      0.37                    0.60   0.50                     0.81              
in the County     
 
Percentage of Farms Located in the      0.02   0.01    0.13    0.31  
Southern U.S. 
       
No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year    32.00                  48.00                   19.00                    12.00         
 
No. of Hours Worked Off-Farm Weekly           26.00                  22.00                   33.00   30.00    
 
No. of Full-Time Workers       1.12   3.40    0.79     1.69  
 
No. of Part-Time Workers       0.78   1.17    0.45     0.70    
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

















































Variable            Independent           Cooperative                   Flat-fee          Incentive  
                              Production             Member             Contract          Payment Contract 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Farm Financial Characteristics 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio         
- No Debt   179    7     8  12 
- 1 to 20%   136   11    16  24 
- 20 to 40%  175   15   19  23 
- 40 to 60%  107   17   20  30 
- 61% or Greater     35     4   15    14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio         
- No Debt     28.3   12.9   10.2  11.6 
- 1 to 20%     21.5   20.3    20.5  23.3 
- 20 to 40%    27.6   27.7   24.3  22.3 
- 40 to 60%    16.9   31.4   25.6  29.1 
- 61% or Greater       5.5     7.4   19.2    13.6 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Value of Farm Assets    
- $0 - $499,999  166   11   26  32 
-  $500,000 to $999,999 201   12   23  35      
- $1,000,000 to $1,499,999 114     6   10  18 
- $1,500,000 to $1,999,999   49     8      8    12 
- $2,000,000 to $2,499,999    43     3     5     6 
- > $2,500,000    78   21     6   12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Value of Farm Assets    
- $0 - $499,999    25.5   18.0   33.3  31.0 
-  $500,000 to $999,999   30.8   19.6   29.4  33.9      
- $1,000,000 to $1,499,999   17.5     9.8   12.8  17.4 
- $1,500,000 to $1,999,999     7.5   13.1    10.2    11.6 
- $2,000,000 to $2,499,999      6.6     4.9     6.4     5.8 
- > $2,500,000    11.9   34.4     7.6   11.6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Net Household Income     
- $19,999 or Less    81    2    6    8  
- $20,000 to 39,999  183  14  30  24 
- $40,000 to 59,999   161  19  22  22 
- $60,000 to 79,999    69  12    8  19  
- $80,000 to 99,999    43    4    4  15 
- $100,000 to 199,999    46    4     4  17  
- $200,000 or More     24    5    1    2         
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Net Household Income     
- $19,999 or Less    13.3    3.3    8.0    7.4  
- $20,000 to 39,999    30.1  23.3  40.0  22.4 
- $40,000 to 59,999     26.2  31.6  29.3  20.5 
- $60,000 to 79,999    11.3  20.0  10.6  17.7  
- $80,000 to 99,999      7.0    6.6    5.3  14.0 
- $100,000 to 199,999      7.5    6.6     5.3  15.8  
- $200,000 or More       3.9    8.3    1.3    1.8         
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 


















Variable            Independent           Cooperative                   Flat-fee          Incentive  
                              Production             Member             Contract          Payment Contract 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Producer Attitudes   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Importance of Having Complete Control over All Production, Marketing 
and Management Decisions in Your Hog Operation. 
 - Not Important at All        16    5    20    25           
- Not Very Important  169    8    13    17 
- Somewhat Important 466  30    33    44 
 - Very Important      6  22    13    30 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Importance of Having Complete Control over All Production, Marketing 
and Management Decisions in Your Hog Operation. 
 - Not Important at All          2.4    7.7    25.3    21.5          
- Not Very Important    25.7  12.3    16.4    14.6 
- Somewhat Important   70.9  46.1    41.7    37.9 
 - Very Important      0.9  33.8    16.4    25.8 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




Frequency of Checking Market Hog Prices        
- Never     36    4     35    31 
- Once Quarterly    19    3       3      3 
- Once Monthly    24    3       3    10 
- Once Every Two Weeks   46    5       4         8 
- Once a Week   118  13     11    20 
- Two or More Times a Week 422  39     23    40 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frequency of Checking Market Hog Prices        
- Never      5.5    6.0     44.8    27.4 
- Once Quarterly     2.8    4.5       3.8      2.9 
- Once Monthly     3.5    4.5       3.8      9.7 
- Once Every Two Weeks    7.0    6.0       5.1         7.8 
- Once a Week    17.7  18.1     14.1    17.7 




Frequency of Checking Lean and Back-Fat Value        
- Never   157    8     47    59 
- Once Quarterly  133   23     15    23 
- Once Monthly  117   10       8    15 
- Once Every Two Week   77    5       3         3 
- Once a Week     90  12       3      6 
- Two or More Times a Week   74    7       3      6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frequency of Checking Lean and Back-Fat Value        
- Never     24.2   12.3     59.5    52.6 
- Once Quarterly    20.5   35.3     18.9    20.5 
- Once Monthly    18.0   15.3     10.1    13.4 
- Once Every Two Week   11.8    7.6       3.8         2.6 
- Once a Week     13.8   18.4       3.8      5.3 
- Two or More Times a Week   11.4   10.7       3.8      5.3 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Labor Quality per Farm      5.9        7.2        6.3      6.5 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________          
Producers Who Were Risk Averse in Invest.     0.79                            0.83                               0.73                            0.77 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 










Variable            Independent           Cooperative                   Flat-fee          Incentive  
                              Production             Member             Contract          Payment Contract 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Social Capital  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Lenders      
- Not Important at All     29     0     3     2    
- Not Very Important     43     4     6     4 
- Somewhat Important    205   13   23    26 
- Very Important   389   49   47   85 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Lenders      
- Not Important at All       4.3     0     3.7     1.8    
- Not Very Important       6.4     6.0     7.5     3.1 
- Somewhat Important      30.7   19.6   29.1    22.4 
- Very Important     58.4   74.2   59.4   72.3 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Feed Merchants   
- Not Important at All     23     0     6   15    
- Not Very Important     58     4   12     9 
- Somewhat Important    327   35   42    53 
- Very Important   262   27   18   39 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Feed Merchants   
- Not Important at All       3.4     0     7.6   12.5    
- Not Very Important       8.6     6.0   15.3     7.1 
- Somewhat Important      48.8   53.0   53.8    46.2 
- Very Important     39.1   40.9   23.0   34.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Veterinarians   
- Not Important at All     11     0     6     7   
- Not Very Important     42     7   11   10 
- Somewhat Important    257   25   35    42 
- Very Important   355   34   27    58 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Veterinarians   
- Not Important at All       1.6     0     7.5     6.0   
- Not Very Important       6.3   10.6   13.9     8.0 
- Somewhat Important      38.6   37.8   44.3    36.0 
- Very Important     53.3   51.5   34.1    50.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Neighbors that are Non-Farmers 
- Not Important at All     21     2     2     0    
- Not Very Important     55     4     1     7 
- Somewhat Important    257   27   40    37 
- Very Important   334   33   36   70 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importance of Relations with Neighbors that are Non-Farmers 
- Not Important at All     3.1     3.0     2.5     2.8    
- Not Very Important     8.2     6.0     1.2     6.0 
- Somewhat Important    38.5   40.9   50.6   32.5 
- Very Important   50.0   50.0   45.5   60.3 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Packers and/or Slaughter Houses   
- Not Important at All     29     0   15   27    
- Not Very Important     72     7   17   17 
- Somewhat Important    269   24   27    37 
- Very Important   291   35   20   35 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Importance of Relations with Packers and/or Slaughter Houses   
- Not Important at All     4.3     0   18.9   23.0    
- Not Very Important   10.8   10.6   21.5   14.0 
- Somewhat Important    40.6   36.3   34.1    32.0 
- Very Important   44.0   53.0   25.3   31.0 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 







Variable            Independent           Cooperative                   Flat-fee          Incentive  




Importance of Relations with Neighboring Farmers 
- Not Important at All     20     2     1     1    
- Not Very Important     18     2     1     2 
- Somewhat Important    234   28   27    34 
- Very Important   396   34   50   80 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Importance of Relations with Neighboring Farmers 
- Not Important at All     2.9     3.0     1.2     1.0    
- Not Very Important     2.6       3.0     1.2     1.8 
- Somewhat Important    35.0   42.4   34.1    29.0 
- Very Important   59.2   51.5   63.2   68.0 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




















































Variable            Independent           Cooperative                   Flat-fee          Incentive  
                              Production             Member             Contract          Payment Contract 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Producer Characteristics   
 
Average Age        49  45   44  47              
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Years of Educational Training               
- Less than  High School  29    2    4    9 
- Completed High School                 226  17  21  44  
- Some College or Tech School         245  20  37  40  
- Bachelor’s Degree                 147  21  17  21  
- Master’s Degree  22    3    2    3 
- Doctoral Degree  11    1    0       1  
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Years of Educational Training               
- Less than  High School    4.2    3.1    4.9    7.6 
- Completed High School                   33.2  26.5  25.9  37.2  
- Some College or Tech School          36.0  31.2  45.6  33.9  
- Bachelor’s Degree                   21.6  32.8  20.9  17.8  
- Master’s Degree    3.2    4.6    2.4    2.5 



















cooperative and flat-fee contract producers’ mean values were significantly different from each 
other.        
The average number of finished hogs sold per farm was higher for incentive payment 
contract producers than for flat-fee contract or independent producers.  Cooperative and flat-fee 
contract as well as cooperative and incentive payment contract were the only combinations that 
were not significantly different.  The percentage of producers who had a finishing operation was 
higher for contract producers than it was for cooperative or independent producers.  All business 
arrangement combinations were significantly different except flat-fee contract and incentive 
payment contract.   
On average, cooperative producers had more breeding sows on their farms than did 
incentive payment contract, independent, or flat-fee contract producers.  The number of breeding 
sows was significantly different for all business arrangement combinations except for 
independent and incentive payment contract.  Six percent of the independent producers ran 
breeding sow operations, while 4%, 4% and 3% of the cooperative producers, flat-fee contract 
producers, and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, ran breeding sow operations. 
However, there were no significant differences among the business arrangements as to whether a 
breeding sow operation was run.   
 The average number of feeder pigs sold by contract producers was higher than it was for 
independent producers.  A larger percentage of cooperative producers (32%) raised feeder pigs 
than did flat-fee (27%), incentive payment producers (21%), or independent producers (18%).  
Producers who sold feeder pigs were significantly different only for independent and 
cooperative, and independent and flat-fee contract.  
 The percentage of producers who had a farrow to finish operation was higher for 
independent producers than it was for cooperative, incentive payment contract or flat-fee 
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contract producers.  All of the business arrangement combinations were significantly different 
except for flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract.  The percentage of producers who 
had a farrow to wean operation was higher for cooperative producers than it was for independent 
or flat-fee contract producers.  Cooperative and incentive payment contract as well as 
independent and incentive payment contract were the only business arrangement combinations 
that were not significantly different.       
Independent producers had more other farm enterprises than did producers under the 
other business arrangements.  The only business arrangement combinations that were 
significantly different were independent and cooperative, independent and flat-fee contract, and 
independent and incentive payment contract.    
 On average, independent producers had been raising hogs longer than producers under 
any other business arrangement.  The average number of years independent producers had been 
raising hogs was 27.  On the other hand, cooperative, flat-fee and incentive payment contract 
producers had been raising hogs for averages of 21, 18, and 19 years, respectively.  The business 
arrangement combinations that were significantly different were independent and cooperative, 
independent and flat-fee contract, and independent and incentive payment contract.    
 Cooperative producers, on average, used more acres for their hog operations than did 
producers under contract.  The average number of acres used by cooperative producers was 803.  
Independent, flat-fee, and incentive payment contract producers used 623, 497, and 479 acres, 
respectively.  All means were significantly different except for independent and cooperative, and 
flat-fee and incentive payment contract.   
More independent producers raised corn than did cooperative producers or incentive 
payment contract producers.  Eighty-seven percent of the independent producers surveyed raised 
corn, while 71%, 80% and 65% of the cooperative, flat-fee, and incentive payment contract 
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producers, respectively, raised corn.  Given these percentages, only independent and cooperative, 
flat-fee and incentive payment contract, and independent and incentive payment contract were 
significantly different.    
 Similar to corn production, more independent producers were involved in soybean 
production than incentive payment contract or cooperative producers.  Eighty-one percent of the 
independent producers surveyed raised soybeans, while 69%, 75%, and 65% of the cooperative, 
flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, raised soybeans.  
Cooperative producers adopted more technologies and management practices (TMP) than did 
other producers.  TMP include four breeding practices: weekly farrowing, terminal cross-
breeding programs, intensive breeding, and artificial insemination; and five production 
management practices: all-in all-out production, the use of high-density fat-added diets, split-sex 
feeding, porcine somatotropin, and the use of computer programs for hog farm management.  
Flat-fee contract producers adopted fewer TMPs than did the other producers.  Only the number 
of technologies and management practices adopted by independent and incentive payment 
contract producers were not significantly different. 
 Sixty-eight percent of the flat-fee contract producers surveyed indicated that there were 
other flat-fee contract producers in their counties, while 49%, 40% and 35% of the cooperative, 
independent, and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, indicated that there were 
flat-fee contract producers present in their counties.  There were no significant differences in 
independent and cooperative, as well as the independent and incentive payment contract mean 
values.  Eighty-one percent of the incentive payment contract producers indicated that there were 
other incentive payment contract producers present in their counties, while 60%, 50%, and 37% 
of the cooperative, flat-fee and independent producers, respectively, revealed that there were 
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incentive payment contract producers residing in the same counties.  All business arrangement 
combinations were significantly different except cooperative and flat-fee contract.      
 Thirty-one percent of incentive payment contract respondents were from one of the 
Southern states of the U.S.  Only 13%, 1% and 2% of the flat-fee contract, cooperative, and 
independent producers who responded to the survey had hog farms located in the South.  All 
combinations were statistically different except independent and cooperative business 
arrangements. 
 The average number of times per year cooperative and independent producers sold hogs 
was 48 and 32, respectively.  Flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract producers grew 
hogs out for market sale an average of 19 and 12 times per year, respectively.  There were 
significant differences in all business arrangement combinations except for independent and 
cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract.  
Flat-fee contract producers worked more hours, on average, off-farm than did producers 
under any other business arrangement.  All business arrangement combinations were 
significantly different except independent and cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive 
payment contract.     
The average number of full-time workers employed on any given hog farm was higher 
for cooperative hog farms than for other hog farms.  Cooperative hog farms employed twice as 
many full-time workers as incentive payment contract producers, and three and four times as 
many as flat-fee contract and independent producers.  Only independent and flat-fee contract, 
and independent and incentive payment contract were not significantly different.  The average 
number of part-time workers employed also was higher among cooperative producers.  All 
business arrangement combinations were significantly different except for independent and 
cooperative, and independent and incentive payment contract.  Following cooperative producers, 
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independent, incentive payment contract and flat-fee contract was the order in which the number 
of part-time workers per farm descended.  
4.3 Financial Characteristics  
 Independent producers had lower debt to asset ratios than did cooperative, flat-fee 
contract or incentive payment contract producers.  There were no significant differences between 
the mean values for cooperative and flat-fee, flat-fee and incentive payment contract, or 
cooperative and incentive payment contract.    
 The value of total farm assets, including land, was higher for cooperative producers than 
for other business arrangements.  Only the mean values for independent and cooperative, 
cooperative and flat-fee, and cooperative and incentive payment contract were significantly 
different.     
 The percentage of producers who had a net household income greater than or equal to 
$100,000 for 1999 was higher for incentive payment contracts than for any other business 
arrangement, but not significantly greater than cooperative producers.  Following incentive 
payment producers, cooperative producers, independent, and flat-fee producers had progressively 
lower total net household incomes.  All business arrangement combinations were significantly 
different except cooperative and incentive payment contract.   
4.4 Producer Attributes 
Producers were asked how important it was to have complete control over all production, 
marketing, and management decisions in their hog operations.  A larger percentage of flat-fee 
and incentive payment contract producers rated autonomy as not important at all than did 
cooperative and independent producers.  All of the business arrangements were significantly 
different except flat-fee and incentive payment contract.  The percentage of contract producers 
who rated autonomy as not very important exceeded that of independent, while a higher 
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percentage of cooperative producers rated autonomy as somewhat important than did 
independent producers.  The percentages of producers who rated autonomy as very important 
were highest among independent producers relative to producers under any other business 
arrangement.  Only flat-fee and incentive payment contract, and cooperative and incentive 
payment contract were not significantly different.     
Using a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest and 0 being the lowest, producers 
were asked to rate the bio-security system on their hog farms.  Cooperative producers rated their 
bio-security systems 7, while incentive payment contract, flat-fee contract, and independent 
producers rated their systems 6.96, 6.69, and 5.90, respectively; independent production had a 
significantly lower rating than the others.     
 Sixty-three percent of the independent producers consulted sources of information on 
market prices for hogs two or more times a week, while 58%, 29%, and 35% of the cooperative, 
flat-fee and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, did likewise.  Cooperative and 
independent producers checked prices more often than did contract producers.   All business 
arrangement combinations were significantly different except independent and cooperative, and 
flat-fee and incentive payment contract.   
 The percentage of producers who checked information on lean value and back-fat once a 
month or more was greatest among independent producers relative to producers under any other 
business arrangement.   Combinations that were not significantly different include independent 
and cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract. 
The quality of labor available for hog production was rated higher by cooperative 
producers than by independent, flat-fee contract, or incentive payment producers.  On a scale of 
0 to 10, where 0 is the lowest quality and 10 is the highest quality, the average rating for 
cooperative producers was 7.2, while the averages for independent, flat-fee contract and 
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incentive payment contract producers were 5.9, 6.3, and 6.5, respectively.  There were significant 
differences between all of the business arrangement combinations except flat-fee contract and 
incentive payment contract, and independent and flat-fee contract.  
 To measure risk attitudes, producers were asked to choose between five investment 
opportunities.   Each of the five investments had three states of nature and, thus, three potential 
net returns outcomes (See the Appendix E).  Over 72% of the producers under each alternative 
business arrangement were rated risk averse, but no combinations were significantly different.  
This result does not indicate that risk is unimportant in the business arrangement selection 
decision.  Larger, less diversified producers generally incur greater risk, providing greater 
incentive to adopt an alternative business arrangement.   
4.5 Social Capital 
Social relationships with other people were measured by the producer rating whether the 
relations were “not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important”, or “very 
important”.  Cooperative producers rated relationships with lending institutions as more 
important than did independent or flat-fee contract producers.  Interestingly, incentive payment 
contract producers rated relationships with lending institutions as more important than did flat-
fee contract producers.  However, a large percentage of each business arrangement rated 
relationships with lending institutions as very important and all were significantly different 
except independent and flat-fee contract, and cooperative and incentive payment contract.  The 
percentages of cooperative, incentive payment contract, flat-fee contract, and independent 
producers who rated relationships with lending institutions as very important were 74%, 72%, 
59%, and 58%, respectively.  
      Both cooperative and independent producers felt that relationships with feed merchants 
were more important than did contract producers.  There were no significant differences between 
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independent and cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract.  More 
producers felt that relationships with feed merchants were somewhat important than they did 
very important, not very important or not important.  
 Independent, cooperative, and incentive payment contract producers rated relationships 
with veterinarians of greater importance than did flat-fee contract producers.  Contract producers 
felt that relationships with veterinarians were of less importance than did independent or 
cooperative producers.  The percentage of producers who rated relationships with veterinarians 
more important was greater for independent producers followed by cooperative, incentive 
payment, and flat-fee contract producers, though all were not significantly different.
 Incentive payment producers rated relationships with non-farmers as more important than 
did independent producers.  Fifty percent of the independent and cooperative producers felt that 
these relationships were very important, while 46% and 60% of the flat-fee contract and 
incentive payment contract producers, respectively, felt likewise.   
Cooperative and independent producers rated relationships with packers and/or 
slaughterers more important than did contract producers.  Cooperative producers rated 
relationships with packers as more important than did independent producers.  All business 
arrangement combinations were significantly different except flat-fee and incentive payment 
contract.     
 Social relationships with neighboring farmers were rated as important among contract 
producers, independent and cooperative producers, though the mean values of flat-fee contract 
and independent were not significantly different.  Following incentive payment contract 
producers in declining order, flat-fee contract, independent and cooperative producers, 
respectively, felt relationships with neighboring farmers were important, but not all were 
significantly different. 
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4.6 Producer Characteristics  
Independent producers were older than cooperative and flat-fee contract producers.  The 
average age for independent producers was 48 years old, while the average ages of cooperative, 
flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract producers were 45, 44, and 47, respectively.  
Cooperative and flat-fee contract, cooperative and incentive payment contract, and independent 
and incentive payment contract were not statistically different. 
 More incentive payment contract producers completed high school than did flat-fee 
contract producers.  The percentage of producers who had completed some college was highest 
for flat-fee contract (46%) followed by independent (35%), cooperative (32%) and incentive 
payment contract (21%).  The combinations that were significantly different include cooperative 
and flat-fee contract, flat-fee and incentive payment contract, and independent and flat-fee 
contract.  A higher percentage of cooperative producers completed a Bachelor’s degree than did 
producers under any other business arrangement, though the difference between cooperative 
producers and flat-fee producers was not statistically significant.  
4.7 Contract Production Characteristics 
 Of the producers under contract, the average number of months under contract was higher 
for incentive payment contracts than for flat-fee contracts, and significantly different.  The 
incentive payment contract producer’s average number of months under contract was 55 months, 
while the average for flat-fee contract producers 43 (see Table 4.2).   
Thirty-nine percent (32) of the flat-fee contract producers had contracts with neighboring 
farmers, while only 10% (12) of the incentive payment contract producers did.  These mean 
values were significantly different.  Sixty-nine percent (81) of the incentive payment contract 
producers were required to purchase new or renovate existing facilities.  The percentage of   
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Table 4.2:  Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables for the Binomial Logit Model. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                           Flat-fee           Incentive  
                                              Contract           Payment Contract 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Contract Production Characteristics 
 
Number of Months Producing Under Contract     43.21    55.49          
                      
Percentage of Producers Who Had Contracts with Neighboring Farmers           0.39      0.10 
                                               
Percentage of Producers Required to Obtain New or Renovate Facilities              0.41      0.68                   
 
Percentage of Feed Is Provided by the Contractor          0.88       0.91 
                                                                                                             
Percentage of Animals Are Provided by the Contractor                       0.87                               0.92 
        
Percentage of Medication Provided by the Contractor           0.87                               0.90 
 
Percentage of Producers Who Had Raised Hogs Prior to Accepting a Contract        0.89                               0.91 
 

































flat-fee contract producers who were required to do the same was 41% (34).  These percentages 
were significantly different. 
The primary inputs supplied by contractors are feed, animals, and medication.  Ninety-
one percent (107) of the incentive payment contract producers received feed from the contractor, 
while 88% (72) of the flat-fee contract producers were provided feed.  Ninety-two percent (108) 
and 87% (71) of the incentive payment contract and flat-fee contract producers, respectively, 
were supplied animals for their production operations.  Medication was received by 90% (106) 
of the incentive payment contract producers and 87% (71) of the flat-fee contract producers, but 
there was no statistical difference between the two.        
 Approximately 91% (107) of the incentive payment contract producers had experience 
raising hogs prior to accepting a contract, while 89% (73) of the flat-fee contract producers did 
likewise.  The average number of acres used for hog production was higher for flat-fee contract 
producers than for incentive payment contract producers, though the difference was not 
statistically significant.              
4.8 Heteroskedasticity Analysis 
Using selected variables expressed in the categories above, both multinomial logit and 
binomial logit analyses were conducted to determine their influence on a producer’s choice of 
business arrangement.  However, there are some potential problems that must be detected and 
corrected for in the case of their presence before estimating either of the models.  When logit 
models employ cross-sectional data, one of the statistical problems that may arise is 
heteroskedasticity.  Heteroskedasticity implies that the disturbances (error terms) have different 
variances (Judge et al, 1988).  Although multinomial logit models have been widely used in 
agricultural research, the problem with heteroskedasticity has received less attention.  Munizaga 
et al., (2000) identify two different kinds of heteroskedasticity: between observations and 
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between options.  Heteroskedasticity between observations exists when two separate data sets are 
used concurrently; for example, one data set from a Stated Preference (SP) experiment and 
another from a Revealed Preference (RP) experiment.  Heteroskedasticity between options exists 
when ranking the outcomes from SP experiments where respondents have to consider several 
options and rank them in order of preference.  Given the two heteroskedasticity problems, the 
one that is more applicable to this study is heteroskedasticity between options.  There were 
several questions asked within the survey that required producers to rank their responses.  Thus, 
between options could conceivably be a problem, and not between observations given that only 
one data set was used.  In the study conducted by Munizaga et al., (2000), the MNL, Hierarchical 
Logit, Single Element Nested Logit, Heteroskdasticity Extreme Value Logit (HEVL) and 
Multinomial Probit were used to test two heteroskedasticity problems that were artificially 
incorporated into the data generation process.  Of the possible options available to test and 
correct for heteroskdasticity problems, Greene (2000) and Munizaga et al., (2000) recommended 
using the HEVL.  (HEVL was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.)  
Within the framework of the MNL model, the HEVL was implemented and executed 
using the Limdep 7.0 software.  The results yielded from this analysis indicated that there were 
no heteroskedasticity problems since the standard errors and associated P-Values, and the 
predicted outcomes remained unchanged after the test was performed.   The correctly predicted 
outcomes before and after testing for heteroskedasticity were 77.6%.  These findings were not 
surprising given that the exogenous variables used in this particular analysis did not include any 
responses that were ranked in nature.  For purposes of this discussion, suppose that there was a 
heteroskedasticity problem between observations and not between options.  Munizaga et al. 
postulated that MNL is remarkably robust in the case of heteroskedasticity between observations. 
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Thus, the HEVL model and Munizaga et al. postulation address both heteroskedasticity problems 
that are encountered when running MNL models (see Appendix B).   
When testing for heteroskedasticity in the binomial logit model, Greene (2000) utilizes a 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity model.  The multiplicative heteroskedasticity framework is a 
constructive model in that it allows one to test and correct for heteroskedasticity.  This 
heteroskedasticity test for the binomial logit model was conducted and conveniently run using 
Limdep 7.0 software.  The analysis revealed that there was no evidence of heteroskedasticity in 
the binomial logit model.  The standard errors, P-Values and the percentage of correctly 
predicted outcomes (70.5%) remained the same before and after the heteroskedasticity test (see 
Appendix B, Table 5.7a & b).  The procedure used to execute the multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity model is discussed in Chapter 3.    
4.9 Multicollinearity Analysis 
 A second problem that one may encounter when using cross-sectional data is 
multicollinearity.  Multicollinearity exists when there are two or more independent variables 
correlated with one another.  Since multicollinearity is a data problem and not a statistical 
problem, it can be resolved by adding more uncensored data, changing the form of certain 
correlated variables, or deleting the less important variables that show strong correlations with 
more important ones.  Technical procedures, such as the Pearson Correlation analysis, Variance 
Inflation Factor, or Condition Index can be used to detect this problem.  The Pearson Correlation 
coefficient was first used to detect multicollinearity.  Based on the rule of thumb, if a correlation 
coefficient is greater than or equal to 0.80, multicollinearity might prove to be a problem 
(Kennedy, 1998).  None of the correlation coefficients for the variables used in either model are 
greater than or equal to 0.80.  The highest coefficient in Table 6.2 (Appendix C) for testing 
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multicollinearity for variables used in the multinomial logit is 0.48, between total farm diversity, 
TOTALFD, and corn production, CORN, which suggests that corn production is one of the 
enterprises that makes up the diversity of the farm. (The first value in the Pearson Correlation 
tables in Appendix C represents the coefficient estimates, while the second and third number 
represent the probabilities and observations, respectively.)  For the binomial logit, the highest 
coefficient is 0.24, between new facilities required, NEWREFAC, and MOPUNDCO months 
under contract, which suggests that the longer a producer has been producing hogs under 
contract, the more likely he was required to purchase new or renovate existing facilities (Table 
6.4, Appendix C).    
Since correlation coefficients are not precise indicators of multicollinearity (they may be 
low, but multicollinearity still may be present), VIF and condition indexes were calculated.  The 
test results are presented in Tables 4.3a) and b) and Tables 4.4a) and b).  
Examining the VIF coefficients, all variables in both tables are 1.43 or smaller.  Some of 
the VIF coefficients in Table 4.3a) that are slightly larger than the rest of the variables are 
autonomy is not important, AUNOTIMP, contract is with a neighboring farmer, NEIGFARM, 
and debt asset ratio, DARATIO.  The same variables had relatively larger correlation coefficients 
(Table 6.2, Appendix C).  Also, in Table 4.4a), the VIF coefficients for the binomial logit model 
that are slightly larger than the rest of the variables are MOPUNDCO and number of acres on the 
farm NUMACRES.  Judging purely from the size of the VIF coefficients, multicollinearity does 
not appear to be problem.  However, VIF measures are not precise indicators of 
multicollinearity, as was discussed in Chapter 3.     
 The final test of multicollinearity is conducted by examining the condition indexes 
presented in Table 4.3b) and Table 4.4b).  For two variables, the condition indexes are greater 
than 30.  Therefore, these two variables may cause multicollinearity.  Unfortunately, this test  
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Number Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
           1  15.69144 1.00000 
 2 1.33335 3.43052 
3 1.01152 3.93861 
4 0.91677 4.13714 
5 0.73992 4.60509 
6 0.72222 4.66120 
7 0.63683 4.96384 
8 0.52201 5.48267 
9 0.46525 5.80747 
10 0.36967 6.51518 
11 0.36433 6.56273 
12 0.24717 7.96775 
13 0.23505 8.17049 
14 0.15350 10.11066 
15 0.12187 11.34710 
16 0.11470 11.69611 
17 0.09943 12.56245 
18 0.08609 13.50089 
19 0.05374 17.08823 
20 0.03978 19.85974 
21 0.03158 22.29209 
22 0.02546 24.82742 
23 0.01593 31.38083 
24 0.00239 81.08269 
Number Eigenvalue Condition 
Index 
           1   3.91073 1.00000 
 2 0.79501 2.21791 
3 0.71842 2.33314 
4 0.29048 3.66921 
5 0.23635 4.06775 
6 0.04903 8.93139 
Variable Variance 
Inflation 







does not allow one to determine which particular variables are causing multicollinearity.  Though 
condition indexes greater than 20 may point to multicollinearity, only condition indexes of 100 
or more can cause substantial variance inflation and large potential harm to regression estimates 
(Belsley, Kuh and Welsch).  In both models, the condition indexes are less than 100.  This 
indicates that there are no serious multicollinearity problems for either model.    
4.10 Multinomial Logit Analysis  
 The results section will proceed in the following order: first, the results of the 
multinomial logit will be discussed; and secondly, the results of the binomial logit will be 
discussed.                     
Table 4.5 shows the results of the multinomial logit analysis of business arrangement 
choices.  At the top of the table, the different business arrangement combinations are shown.    
The results shown are associated with each exogenous variable. The results reported include the 
coefficient estimates and the associated standard errors (in parenthesis).  Marginal effects are 
also reported.  Two asterisks by the coefficient estimate indicate that the variable is significant at 
the 5 percent level, while one asterisk indicates that the variable is significant at the 10 percent 
level.  The percentage correctly predicted for the multinomial logit analysis was 77.6, and the 
McFadden’s likelihood ratio index (or Pseudo R2) was 0.2643.       
4.10.1 Farm / Locational Characteristics 
 In the multinomial logit analysis, all of the variables discussed in each category were 
significant at the 10% or 5% level except producer’s age.  From Table 4.5, cooperative producers 
and producers under contract have a higher probability of raising more finisher hogs than do 




Table 4.5:  Results of the Multinomial Logit Analysis of Business Arrangement Choice. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Cooperative Flat-fee           Incentive Flat-fee         Incentive         Flat-fee 
         vs.     Contract vs.         Contract vs. Contract vs.      Contract vs.     Contract vs.  
   Independent Independent        Independent Cooperative      Cooperative     Incen. Con.  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant   0.273171  1.432510             2.195337  *  0.784372               1.926771          -1.32389 
                   (1.14666)                         (1.11060)             (1.19374)                (1.80390)            (1.62870)          (1.49277) 
Farm/Locational Characteristics 
 
No. of 250 Pound Hogs Produced 0.000076  ** 0.000081 **            0.000092  ** 0.000005              0.000015           -0.000010 
                   (.000020)                         (.000023)             (.000020)               (.000018)            (.000013)           (.000014) 
 
Number of Breeding Sows    0.000001                     -0.002268 **          -0.000440  **        -0.002259  **      -0.000444  **     -0.001795 ** 
                   (.000034)                         (.000751)             (.000180)               (.000755)            (.000181)           (.000759) 
 
Number of other Enterprises  -0.077506                    -0.260791  **          -0.058967  -.2165605  *         0.018646            -.2242453 * 
on Farm                   (.091862)                         (.104584)             (.082979)                (.127242)            (.106524)           (.115785) 
 
Corn Produced on the Farm                 -0.716955  **                 -0.821658  **          -0.736454  **   0.210977             -0.019529              0.219606 * 
                   (.278575)                         (.283807)             (.275020)                (.131210)            (.113166)            (.117702) 
 
Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co. -0.013794  1.109618  **          -0.574232  **  1.092989  **       -0.562195  **        1.656162  ** 
                   (.293307)                         (.305514)             (.266033)                (.394174)            (.357309)            (.357094) 
 
Incentive Contracts in the Co. 0.882185  ** 0.028259             2.227833  **  -.845766  **        1.345251 **       -2.206412 ** 
                   (.295108)                          (.297359)              (.305779)               (.091862)            (.392517)            (.386804) 
 
Farm Located in the Southern U.S. 0.058974  0.150382             1.693151  **     .2087404             1.634253  **      -1.261179 *  
                   (.674094)                         (.714558)                 (.430471)                (.902693)            (.694865)            (.668546) 
 
No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year 0.001170                    -0.000695            -0.000298  -0.001848  **      -0.001485           -0.000338  
                   (.000848)                         (.000505)              (.000487)                (.000945)            (.000928)            (.000590) 
 
No. of Hours Worked off Farm 0.005618  0.011698  *              0.014903 **  -0.007035            0.009385           -0.002443  
                   (.007506)                         (.006922)              (.006578)                (.009186)            (.008847)            (.008050) 
 
Freq. of Checking Market Prices -1.500616                    -0.883093             -2.62640  **   0.582653              -1.12772              1.912145 
                   (1.23939)                         (1.12260)             (.962640)                (1.47973)            (1.37436)            (1.18935) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Farm Financial Characteristics 
 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio  0.000096                    -0.001212  **          -0.001217 **  -0.001311           -0.001313  *          0.000015  
                   (.000669)                         (.000538)             (.000462)                (.000808)            (.000745)             (.000608)   
 
Total Value of Farm Assets 0.000026                     0.001626  **           0.000284 -0.001565 *          0.000254              0.001339  * 
                   (.000556)                         (.000673)             (.000502)                (.000821)            (.000679)             (.000749) 
 
Net Household Income ≥ $100,000  0.099078                    -0.967470              0.321851 -1.094316             0.225601            -1.332742 ** 
                   (.419063)                         (.598787)             (.369594)                (.679275)            (.483895)            (.636729) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Producer Attitudes   
 
Autonomy Is Not Very Important 0.950459  ** 1.755178  **           1.565193  **     0.791276  **       0.611828  **       0.194493  
                   (.264615)                         (.223250)             (.214569)                (.274725)            (.260847)            (.209713) 
 
Autonomy Is Very Important             -0.950381  **                    -1.754728 **          -1.561233  ** -0.790883 **      -0.607934  **     -0.197379  
                   (.264397)                         (.223117)             (.214395)                (.274556)            (.260644)            (.209669) 
 
Rating of Biosecurity  0.000083  0.002837  **           0.000035  0.002704  *        -0.000057             0.001951  
                   (.000711)                         (.001419)             (.000618)                (.001539)            (.000873)            (.001226)   
  
Self Assess. of Risk Preference 0.396397                    -0.144010           -0.291659 -0.547608        -0.690644  *           0.098299  




Imp. of Relations with Farmers 0.002527                     0.475214  **           0.168021  0.471062  **       0.162947             0.290802  *  
                   (.008206)                         (.174202)            (.159020)                (.174008)            (.159207)            (.159536) 
 
Imp. of Relations with Lenders 0.163143  0.070932            0.376650  **         -0.097169          0.209600            -0.289576 *  
                   (.164777)                         (.176723)             (.170290)                (.223702)            (.218308)             (.264615) 
 
Imp. of Relations with Feed Merch.   -0.165125                    -0.546852  **         -0.543779  ** -0..375195  **      -0.372179  **      -0.002670  
                   (.164692)                         (.133070)             (.133082)                (.188174)            (.188187)             (.002164) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          (Table Continued) 
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Cooperative Flat-fee           Incentive Flat-fee         Incentive         Flat-fee 
         vs.     Contract vs         Contract vs Contract vs.      Contract vs.     Contract vs.  
   Independent Independent        Independent Cooperative      Cooperative     Incen. Con.  
______________________________________________________________________________
Producer Characteristics   
Age                     -0.001428                   -0.000829            0.001840  -0.000659            0.003269            -0.002542  
                   (.000925)                         (.001100)             (.002479)                (.001230)            (.002547)             (.002586) 
 
Producer Completed High School      -0.638242                   -0.409624           -1.244805  **  0.156464          -0.607999              0.763650  
                   (.587859)                         (.658668)             (.511471)                (.798653)            (.677438)             (.724486) 
 
Producer Holds Bachelor’s Degree 0.228868                    -0.387197           -0.611277  ** -0.592506          -0.835997  **        0.304908  
                   (.296363)                         (.340116)             (.310721)                (.416749)            (.388279)             (.407182) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
% Correctly Predicted: 77.6; McFadden’s likelihood ratio index: 0.2643; Chi-Squared = 440.35** 
 
 
































Table 4.6: Marginal Effects of the Multinomial Logit Analysis of Business Arrangement 
Choice. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Independent Cooperative        Flat-fee Incentive  
     Production  Member          Contract Payment Contract 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant                  -0.202117  -0.000483          0.076047            0.126552               
                   (.206751)                     (.143817)          (.116179)            (.084333)           
Farm / Locational Characteristics 
 
No. of 250 Pound Hogs Produced      -0.000016 ** 0.000006  **     0.000005  ** 0.000004  **     
                   (.000005)                     (.000002)          (.000002)             (.000001)    
 
Number of Breeding Sows    0.000171 ** 0.000027        -0.000185  **     -0.000013        
   (.000063)                    (.000016)          (.000077)            (.000012)     
 
Number of other Enterprises              0.026623 **               -0.004675        -0.020467  *       -0.001479       
on farm   (.013344)                    (.009237)          (.010587)            (.004965)            
 
Corn Produced on the Farm               0.149671 ** -0.058386  *     -0.056245  *       -0.035039  *                 
   (.072180)                     (.034104)          (.032543)            (.020797)    
 
Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co.      -0.045036    -0.008630         0.095635  **      -0.041968  *      
   (.046371)                      (.029475)         (.042991)            (.022233)           
 
Incentive Contracts in the Co.           -0.182350 **  0.072127  **    -0.020263 0.130486  **              
   (.054155)                     (.036049)          (.026997)            (.048855)    
 
Farm Located in the Southern U.S.     -0.096304                  -0.008355         0.001661 0.102998  **        
   (.091989)                     (.067220)          (.057947)            (.043567)   
    
No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year       -0.000036   0.000127        -0.000068           -0.000023                
   (.000095)                     (.000091)          (.000048)            (.000030)     
 
No. of Hours Worked Off Farm          -0.001961**  0.000333        -0.000822           -0.000805  *                
   (.001015)                     (.000748)          (.000616)            (.000470)   
 
Freq. of Checking Market Prices        0.309790 *                 -0.122752         -0.041794          -0.145244  *       
   (.169037)                     (.125748)            (.090190)          (.074295)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Farm Financial Characteristics 
 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio  0.000131   0.000031         -0.000094 *       -0.000068  **       
   (.000086)                     (.000068)          (.000055)            (.000036)     
 
Total Value of Farm Assets -0.000124  -0.000016         0.000132  * 0.000007       
   (.000087)                     (.000055)          (.000073)            (.000030)     
 
Net Household Income ≥ $100,000  0.040624   0.017673        -0.083214 0.024916                
   (.067642)                     (.041897)          (.057060)            (.023963)     
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Producer Attitudes   
 
Autonomy Is Not Very Important -0.271013 **                0.066030 *        0.126249  ** 0.078733  **                
   (.063962)                     (.034603)           (.048734)           (.030024)     
 
Autonomy Is Very Important  0.270787 **              -0.066057 *       -0.126236  **     -0.078492  **       
   (.063906)                     (.034588)           (.048728)           (.029939)            
 
Rating of Biosecurity                  -0.000197                  -0.000021           0.000234  *      -0.000015       
   (.000135)                     (.000073)            (.000135)          (.000038)                    
 
Risk Averse   -0.009367   0.043778           -0.014317        -0.020093                
   (.043793)                     (.036398)            (.025661)          (.017966)     
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          (Table Continued) 








Variable   Independent Cooperative        Flat-fee Incentive  




Imp. of Relations with Farmers         -0.039890 *                 -0.005960           0.038376  0.007474                
   (.023400)                    (.004660)            (.025142)           (.011389)     
 
Imp. of Relations with Lenders         -0.036392 * 0.012920           0.001915  0.021556 **       
   (.020443)                    (.013215)            (.013894)           (.005727)     
 
Imp. of Relations with Feed Merch. 0.076241 **               -0.006903          -0.040361 **     -0.028975 **      
   (.023521)                    (.015034)            (.015464)           (.010584)    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Producer Characteristics   
 
Age                      0.000085                  -0.000149         -0.000065  0.000129                
   (.000184)                    (.000102)           (.000091)            (.000157)           
 
Producer Completed High School       0.140164 *                 -0.050892         -0.019828           -0.069443  *               
   (.083455)                    (.058030)           (.053239)            (.037466)    
 
Producer Holds Bachelor’s Degree 0.036103                  0.031779         -0.030817           -0.037064        
   (.045436)                    (.031129)           (.029460)            (.022673)    
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 




























and equipment to raise a larger number of finishing hogs are likely to find the provisions of a 
contract more attractive than smaller producers.  Also, the uncertainty associated with marketing 
and financing the large capital investment is reduced with a contract.  Likewise, cooperative 
producers are able to combine their resources so that the resources owned by one member of the 
cooperative can be devoted to buying more of his or her production specialty.  This, in turn,  
increases the possibility of cooperative hog producers being able to expand herd size given the 
availability of resources.   
As expected, a large number of breeding sows is associated with a lower probability of 
being a contract producer relative to an independent or cooperative producer.  The managerial 
abilities required for breeding sows are generally greater than for other types of hog operations.  
Thus, vertical coordinators are more likely to manage the breeding of sows in house and contract 
out the less management-intensive finishing stage (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995).  From a 
production contract perspective, the probability is higher that incentive payment contract 
producers would have a larger number of breeding sows than flat-fee contract producers.  
Incentive payments provide greater incentive for closer management in this management 
intensive stage.          
 Flat-fee contract producers have a lower probability of having other enterprises on their 
farms relative to independent, cooperative or incentive payment contract producers.  It was 
hypothesized that diversified farms would more likely be managed by independent and 
cooperative producers than by contract producers.  Diversification is a risk management strategy.   
Thus, as expected, the greater risk associated with nondiversified production provides greater 
incentive for a risk reducing flat-fee contract.  In addition, diversified farms, particularly farms 
with other animals, pose the threat of disease outbreaks that could potentially destroy the hog 
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herd.  Some contractors do not allow their hog producers to raise other farm animals to avoid this 
problem.      
 Raising corn is associated with a greater probability of being an independent producer 
relative to a cooperative or contract producer.  Because independent producers are more likely to 
be responsible for supplying all of the production inputs, it is expected that they would be more 
likely to raise corn.  Corn is the most important input used in the production of hogs as feed 
accounts for the largest percentage of total production costs.  Independent producers are likely to 
raise corn to lower the production costs associated with transportation, transaction costs, etc.  
Cooperative producers are less likely to raise corn for the following reasons.  Cooperative farms 
are often structured such that the members combine their resources and management expertise to 
produce hogs.  Given the nature of certain cooperatives, such as ValAdCo, corn and other 
resources may be supplied by other members of the cooperative.   Of the two contracts, flat-fee 
contract producers are more likely to raise corn than incentive payment contract producers.  Flat-
fee producers raise more corn, but they are less diversified than incentive payment producers.   In 
some instances where flat-fee producers are contracting with neighboring farmers (particularly in 
the Midwestern Corn Belt) who have an excess supply of hogs, the growers may be responsible 
for supplying production inputs, including feed.  This would increase the demand for corn by 
flat-fee contract producers.        
 In counties where flat-fee contracts are used, there is a lower probability that contracts 
with incentive payments are present relative to independent, cooperative, or flat-fee contract 
production.  One explanation for this is flat-fee producers were more likely to enter into short-
term contracts with neighboring farmers, who were likely independents or cooperatives who had 
an excess supply of hogs.  It is possible that short-term flat-fee contracts are complementary with 
independent production, especially during periods of favorable prices.  There is a greater 
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probability of other flat-fee contracts being present relative to producers under other business 
arrangements.                   
 In counties where contracts with incentive payments are used, the probability is higher 
that more incentive payment contract and cooperative producers are present.  Contrary to the 
reported result, it was hypothesized that cooperative producers were less likely to coexist in 
counties with contracts with incentive payments.  Cooperatives are, in some cases, arising as an 
alternative to production contracts.  Perhaps the greater likelihood of cooperatives existing in 
counties with more incentive payment contracts is due to the greater awareness of the need for 
remaining independent producers to compete with the vertically coordinated firms.  The 
remaining independent producers must cooperate to compete.  Another possible reason could be 
that slaughters/packagers in the area require a minimum number of hogs delivered.    
 Producers in the South have a higher probability of being an incentive payment contract 
producer relative to an independent or cooperative producer.  Southern states such as Arkansas, 
Mississippi and North Carolina have experienced substantial increases in contract production.  
This change may be partially due to a lack of anti-corporate farming laws, the need for economic 
development in rural communities, and the previous introduction and acceptance of broiler 
contracting in the region.                                      
 The greater the frequency of selling hogs, the higher the probability that the producer is a 
cooperative producer relative to a flat-fee contract producer.  By having more control over their 
production, marketing and management decisions than flat-fee contract producers, cooperative 
producers may sell hogs as often as they like.   This freedom, in turn, increases the number of 
transactions incurred by cooperative producers, which also increases transaction costs.  For some 
flat-fee contract producers, market transaction costs are internalized and absorbed primarily by 
the contractor.  The frequency at which hogs are sold is controlled and regulated by the 
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contractor.  Contract production is designed to lower transaction costs by reducing the number of 
market transactions.     
 The more hours worked off-farm, the higher the probability of being a contract producer 
versus an independent producer.  Most contract producers are relieved from the responsibility of 
making all of the production, marketing and management decisions, thus allowing time for off-
farm employment.  Independent producers manage their own hog operations, making all 
production and marketing decisions.  These responsibilities leave less time for off-farm 
employment.     
An increase in the frequency of checking market prices of hogs is associated with an 
increase in the probability of being an independent producer relative to an incentive payment 
contract producer.  Independent producers are more interested in the market price of hogs 
because their payments are directly dependent upon market prices.  Conversely, incentive 
contract producers are less interested in these prices because their wages are predetermined and 
bonuses are typically based on production efficiency.  This shows evidence of the decreased 
information costs associated with collecting price data under production contracts relative to 
cooperative or independent production.     
4.10.2 Farm Financial Characteristics  
 A higher debt-asset ratio is associated with a higher probability of being an independent 
producer relative to a flat-fee contract producer. Also, a higher debt-asset ratio is associated with 
a higher probability of being an independent or cooperative producer relative to an incentive 
payment contract producer.  Independent and cooperative producers incur higher debt-asset 
ratios than contract producers because the additional production inputs such as feed, animals, 
medication, and veterinary services that are supplied by the contractor must be purchased by 
independent and most cooperative producers.     
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 A higher total value of farm assets is associated with a higher probability of being a flat-
fee contract producer relative to an independent or incentive payment contract producer.  
However, a higher total value of farm assets is associated with a higher probability of being a 
cooperative producer relative to a flat-fee producer.  Given these results, logically, it seems 
fitting for cooperative producers to also have greater farm assets than independent or incentive 
payment contract producers.   It was hypothesized that flat-fee or incentive payment contract 
producers would have the highest total value of farm assets because of the stipulations that 
govern contract eligibility.         
 Having a higher net household income is associated with an increased probability of the 
producer being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a flat-fee contract producer.   
Incentive payment contract producers had the highest net household income as shown in the 
previous descriptive data analysis.        
4.10.3 Producers’ Attitudes     
 The feeling that it is not very important to have complete control over production, 
marketing, and management decisions is associated with a higher probability of being a contract 
producer relative to being an independent or cooperative producer.  Likewise, the feeling is 
associated with a higher probability of being a cooperative producer relative to an independent 
producer.  Autonomy is most important to the independent producers.  Their business structure is 
generally designed such that power or authority is shared with no other party.  Contract 
production and some cooperative operations involve relationships where managerial 
responsibilities are shared.  These results show the differences in attitudes of producers under 
different business arrangements toward autonomy.  Results of the “autonomy is very important” 
variable are similar to those of the “autonomy is not very important” variable.       
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 Higher bio-security ratings are associated with an increased probability of being a flat-fee 
contract producer relative to an independent or cooperative producer.  As hypothesized, contract 
producers have higher bio-security ratings due to higher demand for state-of-the-art facilities.  
Some of the state-of-the-art hog facilities purchased by contract producers are equipped with air-
tight doors and showers to prevent disease outbreaks.  These facilities are necessary for 
eligibility of some contracts.  State-of-the-art facilities are optional for independent or 
cooperative production.       
 Cooperative producers were more likely to be risk averse than incentive payment contract 
producers.  This is consistent with the hypothesis.  The marginal effects show no significance for 
this variable.        
4.10.4 Social Capital 
 A higher rating of the importance of relationships with neighboring farmers is associated 
with a greater probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to the other business 
arrangements.  It was hypothesized that independent and cooperative producers would rate the 
importance of relationships with neighboring farmers higher than contract producers.  One 
explanation for this unexpected finding may exist in the number of flat-fee contracts with 
neighbors.  Thirty-two percent of flat-fee contracts are with neighboring farmers.  This high 
percentage of flat-fee neighbor contracts is likely to encourage or be the result of good social 
relations between the two parties.                 
 In contrast to the hypothesis made about relations with lending institutions, a higher 
rating of the importance of relationships with lending institutions is associated with a greater 
probability of being a contract with incentive payments producer relative to an independent or 
flat-fee contract producer.  The structure of an incentive payment contract is competitive.  In 
order for an incentive contract producer to maximize profits, he or she must be able to produce 
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efficiently to the contractor’s standards.  Production efficiency begins with the technology 
adopted.  Investing in technologies that increase the level of production efficiency reinforces the 
importance of establishing relationships with lending institutions.  According to the results of the 
survey, on average, incentive contract producers are larger, and are thus more likely to borrow 
more money from lending institutions.   
   A higher rating of the importance of relationships with feed merchants is associated 
with a greater probability of being an independent or cooperative producer relative to flat-fee 
contract or incentive contract producer.  Resource providing contracts, such as flat-fee or 
incentive payment contracts, supply producers with certain inputs for hog production.  One of 
those inputs is feed.  Because feed is supplied by contractors, flat-fee contract and incentive 
payment contract producers have little need to develop strong relationships with feed merchants, 
which is not the case for most independent and cooperative producers.  Independent and many 
cooperative producers are responsible for providing all inputs used in hog production.   
4.10.5 Producer Characteristics  
 Having a high school diploma is associated with a higher probability of being an 
independent producer relative to an incentive payment contract producer.   Likewise, having a 
college bachelor’s degree is associated with a higher probability of being an independent or 
cooperative producer relative to being an incentive payment contract producer.  As expected, 
these results indicate that independent and cooperative producers have higher levels of education 
than do incentive payment contract producers.  This is consistent with the greater span of control 
associated with independent production and cooperative farming relative to contract production.  
The skills needed to run an independent or cooperative farm are generally greater due to the 
managerial, financial, marketing, and farm knowledge that go into operating the farm.  The 
knowledge contract producers need to run their hog operations is less relative to independent and 
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cooperative producers because contractors generally teach producers how to raise hogs, instruct 
them on what technologies to use, provide feed rations, and determine when and where hogs are 
to be placed and sold.      
4.11 Binomial Logit Results 
Table 4.7 shows the results of the binomial logit model for contract choice.  Marginal 
effects for the model are reported in Table 4.8.  Two asterisks by the coefficient estimate indicate 
that the variable is significant at the 5 percent level, while one asterisk indicates that the variable 
is significant at the 10 percent level.  The percentage correctly predicted for the binomial logit 
analysis was 70.5, and McFadden’s likelihood ratio index was 0.1438.    
The number of years producing under contract, contract with neighboring farmers and the 
purchase of new or renovation of existing facilities were significant at the 10%, 5%, and 5% 
levels, respectively.  The same variables were also significant at their respective levels in the 
marginal effects (see Table 4.8).   As shown in Table 4.7, more years producing under contract is 
associated with a greater probability of being an incentive payment contract producer relative to 
a flat-fee contract producer.  Incentive payment contract producers have a lower probability 
associated with having contracts with neighboring farmers than do flat-fee contract producers.  
Most contracts with neighboring farmers are based on some type of a fixed rate payment.  In 
instances where a neighboring farmer allows spillover hogs to be raised by another farmer, he or 
she normally pays for rented space or simply provides the producer a set wage to grow-out the 
hogs to market weight.  Neighboring farm contracts are less likely to be incentive payment 
contracts because incentive payment contracts are normally associated with larger contract 
producers and neighboring farm contracts do not typically involve other competing contract 
producers.  A higher probability that contracts with neighboring farmers are under a flat-fee 
contract is consistent with the proposed hypothesis for this variable. 
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Table 4.7:  Results of the Binomial Logit Analysis of Production Contracts. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable             Incentive Contract   
                     vs   
               Flat-fee Contract  
________________________________________________________________ 
Constant                                                -0.124452   
                        (.531560) 
 
Number of Years Producing Under Contract                      0.006998  *        
                                        (.004170)      
 
Producers Who Had Contracts with Neighboring Farmers          -1.741972 **   
                                             (.401280)             
 
Producers Required to Obtain New or Renovate Facilities         0.936739  **     
                                                             (.330611)      
 
Number of Acres Used for Hog Production   0.000130 
      (.000224) 
 
Producers Had Raised Hogs Prior to Accepting a Contract          -0.041332 
      (.530340) 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 












































Table 4.8: Marginal Effects of the Binomial Logit Analysis of Production Contracts. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable             Incentive Contract   
                     vs   
                 Flat-fee Contract  
________________________________________________________________________ 
CONSTANT                     -0.029909       
                       (.127969) 
 
Number of Years Producing Under Contract                    -0.001682  *        
                                        (.001000)      
 
Producers Who Had Contracts with Neighboring Farmers         -0.418644 **   
                                             (.097681)             
 
Producers Required to Obtain New or Renovate Facilities          0.225124  **    
                                                            (.079373)      
 
Number of Acres Used for Hog Production  0.000031 
     (.000054) 
 
Producers Had Raised Hogs Prior to Accepting a Contract        -0.009933 
     (.127460) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 












 Producers who were required to purchase new or renovate existing facilities have a 
higher probability associated with being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a 
flat-fee contract producer.  Because incentive payment contracts are based on incentive or merit 
payments, there is greater incentive for producers under this business arrangement to acquire the 
best technology available to increase profit.  From a contractor’s prospective, new or renovated 
existing facilities are needed to produce production uniformity.  Thus, one way contractors can 
ensure a certain quality or standard is maintained, is by imposing a stricter policy associated with 
















SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 The Problem 
 Understanding the reasons why hog producers are using certain types of business 
arrangements in an industry that is undergoing substantial structural change is what this study 
sets out to accomplish.  Problems with income stability due to price risk and frequent production 
transactions continues to be one of the essential factors responsible for some producers to accept 
contract production over independent or cooperative production.  On the contrary, independent 
production continues to be the most widely used business arrangement in the U.S hog industry.  
Thus, it is of interest to know the factors influencing producers’ choice of business arrangement.       
5.2 The Purposes of the Study 
This study is of interest because it brings together some the most influential economic 
and non-economic factors used in agricultural production to examine business arrangement 
choice.  The primary objective of this study was to determine the effect of transaction costs, risk, 
autonomy, social capital, production characteristics and demographic variables on hog 
producers’ choice of business arrangements.  The specific objectives of this study were to: 
identify alternative business arrangements currently being used in the U.S. hog industry; identify 
the determinants that influence hog producers’ choice among different types of business 
arrangements; develop a survey to collect information on the various business arrangements used 
by hog producers in the U.S.; and determine the influence of economic and non-economic factors 
on the choice of business arrangements by hog producers.    
5.3 General Procedures 
Objective One was accomplished through a comprehensive literature search of 
agricultural related journal articles and magazines.  Through this search, six alternative business 
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arrangements currently being used in the U.S. hog industry were identified.  The six alternative 
business arrangements include the following: independent production, cooperative farming, 
contract with incentives payments, tournament contract, flat-fee contract, and vertical 
integration.  These business arrangements are arranged in order from the highest level of 
autonomy and income risk to the lowest level.      
Objective Two, identify potential determinants that influence producers’ choice among 
different types of business arrangements, was satisfied through an investigation of previous 
studies (e.g. Gillespie et al., (1998), Hobbs (1997), Grimes and Rhodes (1992)) and 
implementation of economic theory.      
Business Arrangement Choice = f(Farm/Locational Characteristics, Farm Financial 
                                                       Characteristics, Producer Attitudes, Social Capital, 
                   Production Characteristics)           
 
Choice Among Contracts = f(contract and producer characteristics). 
                                                   
The dependent variables are business arrangements chosen by the producer.  The independent 
variables are factors hypothesized to influence their decisions.  There were eight production 
characteristics variables, two autonomy variables, one risk variable, two transaction cost 
variables, three social capital variables and seven socioeconomic variables included in the 
business arrangement choice model.  Only five variables were used in the contract choice model.   
 Objective Three, develop a survey form to collect information on the various business 
arrangements used by hog producers in the U.S., was accomplished through a national mail 
survey.  The survey consisted of a six section questionnaire that identified several economic and 
non-economic variables.  These six sections are identified in the business arrangement choice 
model above.  A hybrid of Dillman’s Total Design Approach was used as a method to increase 
the survey response rate.  The hybrid method consisted of an initial mailing of the survey 
followed by a postcard reminder two weeks later, then a second mailing of the survey.  
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Objective Four, determine the influence of economic and non-economic factors on the 
choice of business arrangements by hog producers, was achieved through the estimation of two 
empirical models.  These two models were derived from a logistic function having 
polychotomous and dichotomous variables.  The polychotomous or multinomial model consists 
of four alternative choices, while the dichotomous or binomial model consists of two alternative 
choices (Kennedy, 1998).  The multinomial logit and binomial logit models were constructed to 
link the decision or outcome to a set of factors, at least in the spirit of regression (Maddala, 1997; 
Greene, 1997; Judge et al., 1988).     
5.4 Results Summarized 
A total 4,986 surveys were mailed.  A total of 1,031 surveys were returned completed.  
Excluding producers who indicated they were no longer in business, the return rate was 21 
percent.  The information collected from the survey was then separated into six different 
categories to simplify discussion.  Those categories included farm characteristics, financial 
characteristics, producer attributes, social capital, producer and locational characteristics, and 
contract production characteristics.  A descriptive analysis of the survey data revealed that, of the 
1,031 completed surveys, 684 were completed by independent producers, while 66, 81, 118, 21 
and 61 were from cooperative, flat-fee, incentive payment/tournament, vertical integration and 
other producers, respectively. 
5.5 Summary of Descriptive Analysis 
In the farm characteristics category, larger percentages of flat-fee contract, cooperative, 
and incentive payment contract producers were involved in sole proprietorships, partnerships, 
and family corporations, respectively.  Cooperative producers had higher percentages of persons 
involved in non-family corporations and cooperatives than did producers under other business 
arrangements.  The average number of hogs sold was higher among incentive payment contract 
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producers than it was for the other business arrangements.  Over 80% of the contract producers 
surveyed were involved in finishing hogs at weights ranging from 200 to 300 pounds.  
Cooperative producers had more breeding sows, on average, than any other business 
arrangement.  Contract producers sold more feeder pigs per farm than independent producers.  
However, cooperative and incentive payment contract producers were more likely to have feeder 
pig operations than were independent producers.  More farm enterprises (i.e. more 
diversification) were owned by independent producers than by any other business arrangement.  
On average, independent producers had been raising hogs longer than producers under any other 
business arrangement.  Cooperative producers, on average, used more acres for their hog 
operations than producers under contract.  Corn was raised by a higher percentage of 
independent producers than by incentive payment contract or cooperative producers.  Sixty-eight 
percent of the flat-fee contract producers surveyed indicated that there were other flat-fee 
contract producers in their counties, while 81% of the incentive payment contract producers 
indicated that there were other incentive payment contract producers present in their counties.  
Thirty-one percent of the incentive payment contract respondents were from one of the southern 
states of the U.S.  The average number of times per year independent and cooperative producers 
placed hogs on the market was 32 and 48, respectively, which were greater than for contract 
producers.  Flat-fee contract producers worked more hours off-farm than did cooperative or 
independent producers.  The average number of full-time workers employed on a hog farm was 
higher for cooperative hog farms than for other hog farms.  The average number of full-time 
workers employed on a hog farm was higher for cooperative farms than contract farms. 
 Independent producers had lower debt-asset ratios than did cooperative, flat-fee or 
incentive payment contract producers.  Cooperative producers had higher values of total farm 
assets than did producers under other business arrangements.  The percentage of producers with 
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total net household income for 1999 greater than or equal to $100,000 was higher for incentive 
payment producers than for independent or flat-fee contract producers. 
  The producer attitudes category revealed that a larger percentage of flat-fee contract 
producers felt that autonomy was either not important at all, or not very important than did other 
business arrangements.  A higher percentage of independent producers felt that autonomy was 
very important than did cooperative, incentive payment, or flat-fee contract producers.  
Independent producers rated their bio-security systems lower than any of the other business 
arrangements.  Independent producers consulted sources for information on market prices for 
hogs more often than did other business arrangements. 
 In the social capital category, a higher percentage of cooperative producers thought that 
relationships with lending institutions were more important relative to producers under other 
business arrangements.  Relationships with lending institutions were more important to 
cooperative than they were to independent or flat-fee contract producers.  From a contract 
perspective, incentive payment contract producers felt relationships with lending institutions 
were more important than did flat-fee contract producers.  Relationships with feed merchants 
were more important to cooperative and independent producers than they were to contract 
producers.  Cooperative, independent and incentive payment contract producers felt relationships 
with veterinarians were more important than flat-fee producers.   Relationships with non-farmers 
were more important to incentive payment contract producers than they were to independent 
producers.  Cooperative producers valued relationships with a packer/slaughterer more than did 
independent, flat-fee contract, or incentive payment contract producers.  Also, relationships with 
a packer/slaughterer were important more to independent producers than they were to contract 
producers.  Flat-fee contract producers valued relationships with neighboring farmers more than 
did independent, cooperative or incentive payment contract producers.   
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The producer and locational characteristics category showed that independent producers 
were older than flat-fee contract or cooperative producers.  The percentage of producers who 
completed high school was higher for incentive payment contract producers than flat-fee contract 
producers.  Cooperative producers held more bachelor and graduate degrees than independent 
and incentive payment contract producers.   
 Contract production characteristics revealed that, on average, incentive payment contract 
producers had been producing under contract longer than flat-fee contract producers.  A higher 
percentage of flat-fee contract producers than incentive payment contract producers were with 
neighboring farmers.  A higher percentage of incentive payment contract producers than 
incentive payment contract producers were required to purchase new or renovate existing 
facilities. 
5.6 Summary of Results of the Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit Analyses  
From the multinomial logit analysis, cooperative, flat-fee contract and incentive payment 
contract producers were likely to finish more hogs than independent producers.  Independent and 
cooperative producers were more likely to have a larger breeding sow herd than contract 
producers.   When comparing the two contracts, incentive payment contract producers were more 
likely to have a larger breeding sow herd than flat-fee contract producers.   
Farms owned by independent, cooperative and incentive payment contract producers 
were more diversified than farms owned by flat-fee contract producers.  Corn was more likely to 
be produced by independent producers.  Flat-fee contract producers were more likely to raise 
corn than incentive payment contract producers.    
In counties where flat-fee contracts were used, there were more likely to be independent, 
cooperative, or flat-fee contract operations present.  Cooperative and incentive payment contract 
production were more likely to be present in counties where incentive payment contracts were 
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used.  The number of producers under incentive payment contract production is higher in the 
southern states.  Cooperative producers were likely to sell hogs more times per year than flat-fee 
contract producers.  Producers with off farm jobs were more likely to be contract producers 
relative to independent producers.  Market prices were checked more frequently by independent 
producers than by incentive payment contract producers.            
A higher debt-asset ratio was associated with a higher probability of being an 
independent producer relative to a contract producer.  A higher debt-asset ratio was associated 
with a higher probability of being a cooperative producer relative to an incentive payment 
contract producer.  A higher total value of assets was associated with a higher probability of 
being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an independent or incentive payment contract 
producer.  A net household income greater than or equal to $100,000 was associated with a 
higher probability of being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a flat-fee contract 
producer.       
 Autonomy rated as not very important was associated with a higher probability of being 
a contract producer relative to being an independent or cooperative producer.  Autonomy rated as 
very important was associated with a higher probability of being an independent producer 
relative to a cooperative producer.  A higher level of bio-security was associated with a higher 
probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an independent or cooperative 
producer.  More risk averse attitudes were associated with a higher probability of being a 
cooperative producer relative to an incentive payment contract producer.   
A higher rating of the importance of relationships with neighboring farmers was 
associated with a higher probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to producers 
under other business arrangements.  A higher rating of the importance of relationships with 
lending institutions was associated with a higher probability of being an incentive payment 
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contract producer relative to an independent or flat-fee contract producer.  A higher rating of the 
importance of relationships with feed merchants was associated with a higher probability of 
being an independent or cooperative producer relative to a contract producer.   
Age was included in the model.  Surprisingly, age was not significant in any of the runs. 
Reasons for this insignificant are not known.  Independent and cooperative producers tended to 
be more educated than incentive payment contract producers.   
In the binomial logit analysis, a higher number of years under contract was associated 
with a higher probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an incentive payment 
contract producer.  Involvement in a contract with a neighboring farmer was associated with a 
higher probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an incentive payment contract 
producer.  The requirement of the producer to purchase new or renovate existing facilities was 
associated with a higher probability of being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a 
flat-fee contract producer. 
5.7 Conclusions 
 This study shows that the choice of business arrangement by producers in the U.S. hog 
industry is greatly influenced by factors such as farm/locational characteristics, producer 
attitudes, farm financial and producer characteristics.  Results of this study show that contract 
producers continue to raise more finishing hogs but flat-fee contract producers are less likely to 
be involved in the farrowing segment.  One of the reasons for this is that farrowing requires a 
higher skill level and is more labor intensive than a finishing operation.  Because most flat-fee 
contracts are short-term, time and other production factors are not as conducive for sow breeding 
operations as would be the case for finishing operations.     
 Results indicate that the number of other enterprises on the farm is greater among 
independent, cooperative, and incentive payment contract producers.  Independent and 
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cooperative producers use diversification to shield themselves from risk.  Incentive payment 
contract producers diversify to avoid low farm returns, which may come as a result of low feed 
efficiency, high mortality rates, and/or low weaning rates.  Flat-fee contracts minimize price risk.     
Corn is the one of the main inputs used in the production of hogs.  Findings from the 
multinomial logit analysis reveal that corn production is higher among independent producers 
than producers under other business arrangements.  Independent producers are self-reliant and 
may grow corn primarily for hog feed, whereas different firms may supply the corn used in 
cooperative and contract production.     
 In counties where flat-fee contracts are used, results indicate that incentive payment 
contracts are less likely to be present, and in counties where contracts with incentive payment are 
used, it is less likely that flat-fee contracts will be present.  However, the most interesting results 
here are that in counties where flat-fee contracts are used, independent and cooperative producers 
are more likely to be present, and in the counties where incentive payment contracts are used, 
cooperative producers are more likely to be present.  Approximately 40% of the flat-fee contracts 
surveyed were with neighboring farmers.  Thus, the presence of independent and cooperative 
production in counties where flat-fee contracts exist suggests that a relatively high percentage of 
flat-fee contracts are with neighboring farmers who are independent and cooperative producers.  
These results indicate possible complementary relationships between independent, cooperative 
and flat-fee contract production.                  
 Location continues to be a driving force for structural change in the hog industry 
(Gillespie et al., 1998, Reimund et al., 1981).  Results indicate that a significant number of 
incentive payment contract producers are located in the southern states.  This increase in the 
number of contract producers in the South is most pronounced in North Carolina, which is 
presently the second largest hog producing state in the United States.  The South is growing in 
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hog production because labor is relatively inexpensive, growers are experienced in contracting, 
and the overall business environment is more favorable, partially due to the absence of anti-
corporate farming laws.   
 Findings from this study show that contract producers worked more hours off-farm than 
independent producers.  The production, marketing, and management responsibilities associated 
with independent production are greater than they are for contract production.  An independent 
producer’s time is divided between raising hogs, growing and/or purchasing feed, managing the 
farm and supervising workers, and marketing hogs.  In contrast, most contract producers’ 
responsibilities consist of raising hogs and managing the farm and/or supervising workers.  Thus, 
fewer responsibilities give contract producers time to work more hours off-farm.  
 Transaction costs may partially explain the greater acceptance of production contracts.    
Results indicate that independent producers check market prices more frequently and sell hogs 
more frequently than producers under other business arrangements.  The more frequently 
producers check market prices and market animals, the higher are their transaction costs.   
Results from the multinomial logit analysis reveal that independent and cooperative 
producers have higher debt than contract producers of the same size.  This is partially due to the 
loans acquired to purchase production inputs.  Production inputs purchased by independent and 
cooperative producers may include animals, feed, medication, labor, buildings, machinery, etc.  
Of these inputs, feed accounts for the largest percentage of producer’s total production costs.  
Feed makes up approximately two-thirds of the total production cost (Barkema and Cook, 1993).  
Because most producers do not have the available cash to pay for the total costs of production 
inputs, many independent and cooperative producers rely on loans, which in turn increases debt.  
On the other hand, for most contract producers, the contractor supplies feed and other inputs, 
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such as animals, medication, and veterinary service, thus the contractee need not debt finance to 
obtain these inputs. 
As the U.S. hog industry continues to become more vertically coordinated, autonomy is 
likely to become less important to hog producers.  Results reveal that autonomy is more 
important to independent producers than it is to producers under other business arrangements.  
Independent producers are self-governing, self-reliant individuals who utilize their educational 
skills/knowledge to make business decisions.  Autonomy is most important to independent 
producers because they value their freedom to make production, marketing, and management 
decisions more than producers under other business arrangements who are willing to sacrifice 
autonomy in exchange for financial stability.  
 Risk preference as measured by the investment choice elicitation procedure was not 
significant in explaining business arrangement choice.  However, there are dimensions of risk 
other than production and price risk that may influence business arrangement choice.  One of the 
risk factors that contract producers face is contract renewal.  In some instances, there are no 
guarantees that contracts will be renewed.  Some contractual agreements are short-term in that 
they are established between neighboring farmers only when hog prices are “good” and a 
producer has an excess number of pigs and needs assistance raising them.   If there is no excess 
or surplus of hogs to be finished, some flat-fee contract producers may have no income to meet 
financial obligations.  Although the technology adopted by producers helps reduce production 
risk, and flat-fee contractual agreements eliminate hog price risk, flat-fee contract producers still 
incur contract risk under seasonal or year-to-year contracts.  Contract risk may help to explain 
why a risk preference elicitation procedure that analyzes choice of investment does not explain 
choice of business arrangement.          
 130
The nature of social capital in the hog industry appears to be changing as the industry 
moves toward more contracting.  As U.S. hog farms continue to reduce in number and increase 
in size, relationships with lending institutions have become more important.  Results reveal that 
relationships with lending institutions are most important to incentive payment contract 
producers.  The reasons for the importance of these relationships are not fully understood, given 
that incentive payment contract producers, on average, had lower debt than producers under 
other business arrangements.  Perhaps relationships with lending institutions are likely most 
important to incentive payment contract producers because of the financial obligations associated 
with the purchase of new facilities or renovation of existing facilities.  Most incentive payment 
contract producers depend on lending institutions for loans to purchase state-of-the-art facilities 
(Hurt, Boehlje, and Hale, 1995).  The benefits of these relationships may result in a greater 
likelihood of loan approval or a more favorable interest rate.  
Because feed is one of the essential inputs in hog production, relationships with feed 
merchants will continue to be of great importance to independent and cooperative producers.  
Independent producers, as well as members of some cooperatives rely on feed merchants to meet 
their production demands for feed.  Relationships with feed merchants that are built on 
consistency, loyalty and reliability are beneficial to producers in that they may give rise to higher 
quality services, short-term credit, and/or other benefits.   
 Short-term contracts that evolve due to an overflow of animals are often agreements 
established between neighboring farmers via flat-fee contract.  Findings from this study show 
that relationships with neighboring farmers are more important to flat-fee contract producers than 
they are to producers under other business arrangements.  Flat-fee contracts are normally 
established such that the owner of the animals pays the grower a set price per pound, per animal, 
or a set price based on the space occupied by each animal.  Because some flat-fee contract 
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producers depend on neighboring farmers for constant flows of animals to grow-out so that they 
may meet their financial obligations, relationships with neighboring farmers are believed to be 
more important to flat-fee contract producers.                          
 Income is generally associated with years of education.  When comparing producers’ 
education and net household income greater than or equal to $100,000, results reveal that 
independent and cooperative producers have more years of education, but incentive payment 
contract producers have higher net incomes.  One explanation for this may be the technology 
requirement by many incentive payment contractors.  Technology adoption generally is 
associated with an increase in operation size and economies of size.  Some independent and 
cooperative producers refuse to adopt technology because its adoption involves a large 
investment and debt financing.  Hog operations run by incentive payment contract producers are 
larger, on average, than those run by independent and cooperative producers.  This, coupled with 
the greater prevalence of off-farm employment among contract producers, likely explains the 
finding that the less educated incentive payment contract producer had higher income.   
 Approximately 60% of the contract producers who responded to the survey were 
incentive payment contract producers.  Results reveal that incentive payment contract producers 
have more years of experience producing hogs under contract than flat-fee contract producers.  
Flat-fee contracts are likely to be short-term contracts established by large producers with an 
over supply of hogs and under capacity of space during “favorable” price periods.  However, it is 
also likely that incentive payment contracts have been longer term because the discounted future 
returns associated with incentive payment contract production are greater than for flat-fee 
contract production as growers improve their production efficiency.  The success of the producer 
becomes beneficial to the contractor, as well.  As efficiency increases for incentive contract 
producers, profit increases for contractors.  Therefore, one may conclude that incentive payment 
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contracts are long term because of the monetary benefits producers and contractors stand to gain 
from them.   
The U.S. hog industry is experiencing tremendous growth due to the adoption of 
technology.  Results indicate that incentive payment contract producers are more likely to 
purchase new facilities or renovate old facilities than flat-fee contract producers.  New and 
improved production facilities give rise to greater levels of production efficiency.  State-of-the-
art facilities are important to incentive payment contract producers because their payments are 
highly correlated with their production efficiency.  Feed efficiency and lower mortality rates 
yield higher income for producers.  Other factors such as grow-out time and weaning percentage 
may also be influenced by production facilities.  These factors have a direct effect upon 
payments.  For some flat-fee contracts, state-of-the-art facilities are required, but production 
efficiency is not emphasized to the extent of incentive payment contracts.  
In short, this research shows that independent producers are, in general, more likely to be 
breeding sow operators, diversified, corn producers, located in the same counties as flat-fee 
contract producers, frequent checkers of market prices, have higher debt, value autonomy and 
relationships with feed merchants more, and be relatively more educated than incentive payment 
contract producers.  Cooperative producers are also more likely to be breeding sow operators, 
diversified, corn producers, and located in the same counties as flat-fee contractees.  They are 
also likely to have accumulated greater assets, have higher debt and greater farm assets, be risk 
averse, be concerned about autonomy and relationships with feed merchants, and be relatively 
more educated than incentive payment contract producers.  Flat-fee contract producers are more 
likely to be finishers located in counties with independent and cooperative producers, work more 
hours off-farm, and be owners of greater farm assets.  They are less likely to value autonomy and 
more likely to value relationships with neighboring farmers.  Finally, incentive payment contract 
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producers are generally larger, lower debt finisher or breeding sow operators who work more 
hours off-farm, value autonomy less and relationships with lenders more than other business 
arrangements.  They are likely to be located in counties with cooperative producers. 
5.8 Implications 
The structure of the hog industry is changing rapidly.  Some of the major driving forces 
of this structural change in the hog industry include change in technology, shift in location of 
production, industry growth and development, and adjustment to risk and transaction costs 
(Gillespie et al., 1998, Reimund et al., 1981).  Thus, as technology adoption continues, we can 
expect to see more contract production and more independent producers becoming members of 
cooperatives in order to compete with vertically coordinated firms.  As alliances are formed in 
different regions of the U.S. that require the adoption of new technology, the size of hog farms is 
expected to increase.  Evidence of this change has been shown in the average numbers of 
finished hogs by independent producers in comparison to contract producers.  Larger farms will 
lead to an increase in the total asset value per farm, but the number of enterprises held per farm 
will likely decline.  Transaction costs incurred by newly formed cooperatives and production 
contracts will decline through the sharing of information, market agreements, and resources.  
These agreements and mergers could potentially lead to reductions in price risk and more 
stabilized earnings for newly formed cooperatives.      
In addition, we can expect to see larger finishing operations run by cooperative and 
incentive payment contract producers.  Through the merger of some independent producers into 
cooperatives, cooperative production could potentially expand, producing more finishing hogs on 
a larger scale.  This expansion is also expected to occur with contract production.  Contract 
production has always and is expected to continue to be characterized primarily by finishing 
operations.  One explanation for this is the uniformity and consistency associated with finishing 
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hog operations.  Because breeding sow operations are labor intensive and require a higher quality 
of labor, it is expected that independent, cooperative, and incentive payment contract producers 
will continue to have more breeding sow operations than flat-fee contract producers.  Short-term 
contracts will less likely involve operations that are labor intensive and require great 
management skills.  Thus, vertically coordinated firms are expected to continue to use incentive 
payment contracts to produce pigs for finishing operations and manage the breeding sow 
operations in-house.   
The continuation of this change will also have an impact on producers’ preferences as 
they relate to exercising complete control over production, marketing, and management 
decisions.  An increase in the number of contract producers will reduce the array of 
responsibilities held by producers due to the mandated inputs used in production and the 
management exercised by the contractor.  Thus, the responsibility of making production as well 
as marketing and management decisions will no longer be solely made by the producer but by 
the contractor also.  For independent producers, autonomy will still be very important, but to 
those producers who may decide to form cooperatives, a portion of their autonomy will be 
sacrificed for other benefits.  Cooperatives will be formed to increase farm size and compete 
with contractors.  
Social capital will continue to evolve in the business relations of hog producers.  
Relationships of hog producers with lending institutions will become more important as the 
number of incentive payment contract producers increases.  These relationships are driven by the 
adoption of technology and an increase in farm size.  Independent and cooperative producers’ 
relationships with feed merchants will continue to be important.  The larger independent and 
cooperative farms become, the more they will rely on feed merchants.  However, given the 
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current reduction in the number of independent producers, it is expected that these relationships 
would be on the decline.   
One of the most interesting questions that is at the center of agricultural debates is, “will 
the hog industry follow the poultry industry and become 100 percent vertically integrated.”  The 
answer to this question is not easy to predict.  It has become increasingly difficult for small 
farmers to compete with larger vertically integrated/coordinated firms.  In 1999, low hog prices 
delivered “deadly” blows to many small hog farmers, forcing them out-of-business.  However, 
most of the larger, vertically integrated firms were able to continue producing hogs (Iowa State 
University Cooperative Extension Service, 1991–2000).  As vertically integrated/coordinated 
firms become larger, it will only become more difficult for smaller independent producers to 
survive unless they too begin to form appropriate strategic alliances.   
On the other hand, over sixty percent of the U.S. hog farmers are independent producers, 
and the majority of their farms are located in the Midwestern states.  Some counties within the 
Midwestern states have anti-corporate farming laws.  In order for the hog industry to become 100 
percent vertically integrated, anti-corporate farming laws must be weakened or eliminated, or 
alternative vertically coordinated business arrangements will need to be formed that provide the 
benefits of the typical integrator-contractee relationship, but are in accordance with the anti-
corporate farming laws.                   
5.9 Limitations of the Study and Further Research Needs  
The current study is limited to producers who had sold 200 or more hogs.  In an attempt 
to capture more contract producers in the surveys returned, we disregarded producers who had 
sold 199 hogs or less.  Presently, there are approximately 85,760 hog producers in the U.S.  Five 
thousand hog farmers were surveyed using a stratified sample.  Eight hundred thirty-three 
surveys were mailed to six different size categories.  The sample population is biased toward the 
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larger size category (10,000 or greater), which is not entirely representative of the U.S. hog farm 
population.  The numbers of hog farms having 200 to 999 head, 1,000 to 1,999 head or 2,000 to 
2,999 head are greater than the numbers of hog farms with 10,000 or more head. 
 Another important assumption constraining this study is related to the choice of 
cooperative farming.  There are several types of cooperative farmers; this study did not 
specifically focus on any one in particular.  Emphasis was placed on the general structure of 
cooperative farming, which is based on the combining of resources and the sharing of 
production, marketing and management decisions.     
This study is limited to six business arrangements.  One of these business arrangements 
was disregarded due to low respondents and another was combined with another business 
arrangement because of their similar characteristics.  Outside of these four business 
arrangements, there are others that are used by U.S. hog producers that are unidentified and 
unexplained in this study.  
An investigation of the effects that independent variables used in this study have on the 
contract choice in a nested multinomial logit framework is of great interest.  The nested portion 
of the logit model involves the different contracts, namely, flat-fee contract, incentive payment 
contract, and tournament contract.  A nested multinomial logit approach coupled with a larger 
sample size would enhance the results and provide more information for academia, government 
agencies, and U.S. hog producers. 
This study represents a pioneering application that includes independent variables that 
have not been analyzed together in one study.  The survey design is believed to have had an 
impact on the 21% response rate.  In that sense the proposed methodology is promising and 
could be adopted to analyze other studies that involve polychotomous dependent variables. 
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Based on the outcomes of the current study, the following general recommendations are 
made for future research. 
      1.  Design a survey that proposes hypothetical questions to producers concerning their 
behavior and attitude toward hog production if they were operating under a different 
business arrangement.  This information may be used to help further explain why 
producers accept one business arrangement over another.   
2. Conduct an analysis that allows contracts to be nested.  The NML is an extension of the 
discrete choice model that is based on variations of a two, three, or four level tree 
structure (Greene, 2000).   The NML model is an integration of the multinomial logit and 
conditional logit models.  This analysis gives one the latitude to evaluate contracts along 
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Table 4.1  Descriptive Statistic Results on Sole Proprietorship Used by Producers. 
        
 Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.541298 0.25 0.560976 0.474576       
Standard Deviation 0.248294 0.1875 0.246282 0.249354       
   I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution 5.212089382*** -4.09718*** 1.207868 -0.33899 -3.21793*** 1.33997
 v = degree of freedom 86.38707924 149.627 177.0583 302.801 175.2328 692.0063
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.2  Descriptive Statistic Results on Partnership Used by Producers. 
   
Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 0.187316 0.382352941 0.195122 0.186441       
Standard Deviation 0.152228 0.23615917 0.157049 0.151681       
   I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution -3.207496989*** 2.550688*** 0.153449 -0.16876 2.840096*** 0.022517
 v = degree of freedom 76.17692889 130.5708 174.3835 653.8223 52.29272 731.8639
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.3  Descriptive Statistic Results on Family Corporation Used by Producers. 
   
Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 0.238938 0.132352941 0.182927 0.262712       
Standard Deviation 0.181847 0.11483564 0.149465 0.193694       
   I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution 2.40937545** -0.85345 -1.35556 1.224907 -2.25893** -0.54402
 v = degree of freedom 90.42085726 149.5551 189.4886 305.2318 185.5874 525.5454
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.4  Descriptive Statistic Results on Non-Family Corporation Used by Producers. 
   
Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F)  Incentive  (IN)    
Mean Value 0.025074 0.102941176 0.04878 0.042373       
Standard Deviation 0.024445 0.092344291 0.046401 0.040577       
   I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution -2.085524405** 1.234799 0.21244 -0.96628 1.468185 -0.88751
 v = degree of freedom 70.70729241 119.0158 168.5898 956.9319 27.85582 829.2706
















Table 4.5  Descriptive Statistic Results on Cooperative Used by Producers. 
   
Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 0.001475 0.132352941 0 0.016949       
Standard Deviation 0.001473 0.11483564 0 0.016662       
   I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution -3.182758433*** 3.220696*** -1.42635 1.000738 2.697734*** -1.29233
 v = degree of freedom 67.17760765 67 117 677 78.51956 116.9951
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.6  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of 250 Pounds Hogs Sold. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 2522.841481 7794.852941 3899.95 10926.8103       
Standard Deviation 22321401.78 433440992.6 29552918 1828914878       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.082797899** 1.5008693 -1.76446932* -2.1958012** -0.669665 -2.1323964**
  v = degree of freedom 67.71442236 74.81912 122.501991 28949.919 94.461843 122.59841
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.7  Descriptive Statistic Results on Producers Who Have Finishing Operations. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.368731563 0.514705882 0.8414634 0.80508475       
Standard Deviation 0.241618155 0.249783737 0.1334027 0.25861821       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.29954704** -4.4882952*** 0.58870537 -10.615199*** -3.7916837*** -8.6443886***
  V = degree of freedom 80.95833913 121.51258 199.8086 873.81665 59.806809 357.56738
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.8  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Breeding Sows.    
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 262.5480059 758.7014925 48.597561 297.347458       
Standard Deviation 7325136.514 2991510.777 101741.02 1113050.41       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.119523732** 3.3388091*** -2.40775354**1.9494574* 1.9959988** -0.2446262
  v = degree of freedom 104.4003781 70.898741 146.676695 10740.915 1.9560712 121.88156
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 4.9  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Breeding Sow Operations. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.05899705 0.044117647 0.0365854 0.03389831       
Standard Deviation 0.055516398 0.04217128 0.0352469 0.03274921       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 0.56156749 0.2324506 0.10103049 0.9907343 0.3410805 1.3238901
  v = degree of freedom 86.26710215 139.34684 172.146436 491.08948 78.430522 759.43743
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 149
 
Table 4.10  Descriptive Statistic Results on Pigs Sold at 50 pounds. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 356.8142645 1322.794118 2178.6585 2183.5431       
Standard Deviation 3556902.552 30039517.19 55152990 46677088.7       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.444815771 -0.8107616 -0.00472614 -2.2128221** -0.9406525 -2.8853749***
  v = degree of freedom 68.64756159 147.99771 166.650062 225.83037 273.38787 865.69592
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.11  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Feeder Pig Operations. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.182890855 0.323529412 0.2682927 0.21186441       
Standard Deviation 0.14944179 0.218858131 0.1963117 0.16697788       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.398244834** 0.7373063 0.91429197 -1.6702292* 1.640436 -0.7164383
  v = degree of freedom 76.73686762 141.72028 166.947643 453.7048 84.906244 856.61375
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.12  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Farrow to Finishing Operations. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.58259587 0.367647059 0.0121951 0.03389831       
Standard Deviation 0.272676447 0.232482699 0.0120464 0.03274921       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 3.477316381*** 5.9525656*** -1.05344955 24.342227*** 5.4894677*** 21.046028***
  v = degree of freedom 84.06740764 72.942179 196.558432 25517.544 -0.9405801 201.44853
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.13:  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Farrow to Wean Operations. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.156342183 0.25 0.0853659 0.16101695       
Standard Deviation 0.131899305 0.1875 0.0780785 0.13509049       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.723826694* 2.7030898*** -1.65201803* 2.09597** 1.4244697 -0.1277346
  v = degree of freedom 77.03991411 111.61917 198.456466 1251.3431 34.282011 395.25634














Table 4.14  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Enterprises. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.333333333 2.779411765 2.5925926 2.92372881       
Standard Deviation 2.871189774 3.730752595 2.1673525 3.51113186       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 2.278551965** 0.655223 -1.39698185 4.2299791*** -0.4961155 2.2217143**
  v = degree of freedom 78.01446616 124.99416 197.08564 780.73575 59.822553 420.80629
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.15  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Years Raising Hogs. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 26.79464286 20.76470588 18.469136 19.2136752       
Standard Deviation 173.169138 159.0622837 125.36016 149.774856       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 3.743524396*** 1.1672155 -0.44510156 6.2328926*** 0.8165095 6.1395119***
  v = degree of freedom 82.78812964 137.22604 185.762203 527.49944 82.331842 572.21744
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.16  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Acres Used in the Operation. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 623.2567976 803.3538462 496.93243 479.157895       
Standard Deviation 781342.7135 1141605.029 330727.2 519683.624       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.344579591 2.1235495** 0.1935063 1.7542206* 2.2269857**1.9331216*
  v = degree of freedom 76.76034072 99.276485 196.307781 2188.1818 14.759279 429.58385
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.17  Descriptive Statistic Results on Whether Corn Is Produced on the Farm. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.865781711 0.705882353 0.8024691 0.65254237       
Standard Deviation 0.11620374 0.207612457 0.1585124 0.22673082       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 2.815881865*** -1.3678319 2.41486955** 1.3801255 0.7562667 4.6612173***
  v = degree of freedom 74.93964928 136.03387 193.372255 549.69865 87.437537 476.21877
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 4.18  Descriptive Statistic Results on Whether Soybeans are Produced on the Farm. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.81120944 0.691176471 0.7530864 0.65254237       
Standard Deviation 0.153148685 0.213451557 0.1859473 0.22673082       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 2.069264388** -0.84197 1.55344593 1.1639669 0.543096 3.4240282***
  v = degree of freedom 77.24612716 140.76416 186.735501 469.25413 98.954582 562.26109




Table 4.19  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Total Number of Techonologies and Management Practices Adopted. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 2.573746313 3.955882353 1.9756098 2.37288136       
Standard Deviation 4.869930213 6.130406574 1.8530637 3.18299339       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -4.430109213*** 5.8974471*** -1.78429042* 3.4660099*** 4.625425*** 1.0868318
  v = degree of freedom 78.38106136 100.56973 198.326361 2038.9785 17.833428 394.9756




Table 4.20  Descriptive Statistic Results on Percentage of Flat-fee Contracts Used in the County. 
        
 Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 0.39528 0.485294118 0.682927 0.347458    
Standard Deviation 0.239034 0.249783737 0.216538 0.226731    
  I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution -1.4186682 -2.48718** 4.966698*** -5.25759*** 1.842784* 1.002854
 v = degree of freedom 80.80315134 140.6007 178.9205 471.48 89.85963 664.921
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.21  Descriptive Statistic Results on Percentage of Incentive Contracts Used in the County. 
        
 Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 0.373156 0.602941176 0.5 0.813559    
Standard Deviation 0.233911 0.239403114 0.25 0.151681    
  I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution -3.695821071*** 1.270065 -4.76283*** -2.17734** -3.03809*** -10.9068***
 v = degree of freedom 81.10467011 145.989 147.2397 382.7688 95.07156 1334.049




Table 4.22  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Percentage of Business Arrangements Located in the Southern U.S. 
        
 Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 0.023599 0.014705882 0.134146 0.313559    
Standard Deviation 0.023042 0.014489619 0.116151 0.21524    
  I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution 0.565766472 -2.95881** -3.1517*** -2.90266*** -6.62135*** -6.72682***
 v = degree of freedom 90.52603008 104.9389 199.4279 107.8421 364.943 373.5561










Table 4.23  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Average Number of Times per Year Producers Sell Hogs at Local Auctions, Packing or Slaughter 
Houses. 
        
 Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)    
Mean Value 32.0739 34.34848485 18.625 12.29358    
Standard Deviation 848.2854 1028.28765 1116.734 1445.895    
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
 t - distribution -0.562131158 2.93292*** 1.24476 3.487652*** 4.215279** 5.382623***
 v = degree of freedom 78.83400145 146.869 189.4497 367.2747 144.2836 527.5494
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.24  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Hours Worked Off-Farm. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 25.98922414 22.375 32.85 30.2765957       
Standard Deviation 442.6432028 410.046875 235.8275 416.45541       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 1.398074832 -3.5100359*** 1.01681211 -3.6522376*** -2.555641** -2.0964831**
  v = degree of freedom 82.64894392 124.57641 198.795308 788.96926 62.95119 387.62462




Table 4.25  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Full-Time Workers. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 1.122137405 3.402985075 0.7922078 1.68695652       
Standard Deviation 9.359128256 41.04655825 3.9308484 26.7367864       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.902702049*** 3.2343842*** -1.70770955* 1.3278034 1.8833492* -1.1520039
  v = degree of freedom 70.18810286 77.975181 162.145218 15177.804 11.193348 172.56553
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.26  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Part-Time Workers. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.779141104 1.166666667 0.4473684 0.69642857       
Standard Deviation 7.530975949 3.108585859 0.6419668 1.76498724       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.625704443 3.108538*** -1.64993395* 2.4109644**1.9090776* 0.5123198
  v = degree of freedom 103.9689109 90.403987 196.288118 3113.6627 14.141242 249.83181













Table 4.27  Descriptive Statistic Results on Producer’s Debt-to-Asset Ratio. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 2.498417722 3 3.109589 3.09708738       
Standard Deviation 1.487339269 1.125 1.4674423 1.52455462       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -3.664228071*** -0.5905234 0.07121681 -4.3120122*** -0.5656091 -4.8697008***
  v = degree of freedom 86.35382453 149.57282 178.490831 304.83638 174.85043 671.56147




Table 4.28  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Total Value of Farm Assets. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 2.79705401 3.661290323 2.5131579 2.72380952       
Standard Deviation 2.819696722 3.901404787 2.486669 2.86657596       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -3.484018286*** 3.8769936*** -0.90135514 1.5287982 3.2805004*** 0.4342298
  v = degree of freedom 77.32341432 128.83195 183.993656 690.56437 54.643422 596.45926




Table 4.29  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Net Household Income > $100,000. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.123762376 3.606557377 2.8243243 3.63551402       
Standard Deviation 4.01933634 2.500940607 1.6042732 2.58677614       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.336223762** 3.2954655*** -3.98263876***1.8754285* -0.1195165 -3.0665229***
  v = degree of freedom 90.79153294 129.09508 196.971815 678.73729 70.797916 418.793
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.30  Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Not Important at All. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.019578313 0.075757576 0.2531646 0.21551724       
Standard Deviation 0.019195003 0.070018365 0.1890723 0.16906956       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.727168165* -3.071808*** 0.61571862 -4.8349309*** -2.8164105*** -5.1260183***
  v = degree of freedom 70.84089177 138.07948 169.903858 171.67956 426.51075 808.13485













Table 4.31  Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Not Very Important. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.024096386 0.121212121 0.164557 0.14655172       
Standard Deviation 0.02351575 0.106519743 0.137478 0.12507432       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.427020728** -0.7611357 0.34419151 -3.3954583*** -0.4944448 -3.7012029***
  v = degree of freedom 70.0857692 149.48326 170.917077 308.5404 164.39728 791.02715
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.32  Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Somewhat Important. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.254518072 0.454545455 0.4177215 0.37931034       
Standard Deviation 0.189738623 0.247933884 0.2432303 0.23543401       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.427020728** -0.7611357 0.34419151 -3.3954583*** -0.4944448 -3.7012029***
  v = degree of freedom 70.0857692 149.48326 170.917077 308.5404 164.39728 791.02715
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.33  Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Very Important. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.701807229 0.333333333 0.164557 0.25862069       
Standard Deviation 0.209273842 0.222222222 0.137478 0.19173603       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 6.161256264*** 2.4002083** -1.63708164 12.057905*** 1.0681024 10.078814***
  v = degree of freedom 80.5749319 127.60131 192.451579 716.94345 59.591574 486.17216
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.34   Statistical Results on the Rating of Biosecurity. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 5.899212598 7.030769231 6.691358 6.95535714       
Standard Deviation 5.435511191 4.091360947 3.9911599 4.54264987       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -4.333461023*** 1.0288034 -0.89416911 -3.3270015*** 0.240083 -4.8970153***
  v = degree of freedom 86.45330806 144.23468 183.346569 411.66118 115.04705 603.5295
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.35   Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Twice or More Times a Week for Market Hog Prices. 
        
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.634586466 0.582089552 0.2911392 0.3539823       
Standard Deviation 0.231886483 0.243261305 0.2063772 0.22867883       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 0.838541704 3.7270194*** -0.9415548 6.4234351*** 3.0715204*** 5.8766441***
  v = degree of freedom 80.74734622 139.86584 181.958351 483.54768 89.436978 623.37677




Table 4.36  Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Once a Week or Less for Market Hog Prices. 
        
 Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.365413534 0.417910448 0.7088608 0.6460177       
Standard Deviation 0.231886483 0.243261305 0.2063772 0.22867883       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -0.838541704 -3.7270194*** 0.9415548 -6.4234351*** -3.0715204*** -5.8766441***
  v = degree of freedom 80.74734622 139.8658 181.95835 483.5477 89.43698 623.3768





Table 4.37  Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Once a Month or More for Leanness and Back-Fat Values. 
        
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.552469136 0.523076923 0.2151899 0.26548673       
Standard Deviation 0.24724699 0.249467456 0.1688832 0.19500352       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 0.462808657 4.0680165*** -0.82552381 6.8502028*** 3.5312143*** 6.3896363***
  v = degree of freedom 81.31563407 131.29492 184.076099 637.59728 61.208557 593.36083
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.38   Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Once Quarterly for Leanness and Back-Fat Values. 
        
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.205246914 0.353846154 0.1898734 0.21238938       
Standard Deviation 0.163120618 0.228639053 0.1538215 0.16728013       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.475646793** 2.2655839** -0.39233917 0.3341699 2.0460267** -0.1753991
  v = degree of freedom 77.18662069 131.04229 180.968187 643.90001 58.017421 637.07361




Table 4.39  Statistical Results on the Rating of Labor Quality. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 5.916535433 7.212121212 6.3291139 6.50442478       
Standard Deviation 6.81980532 4.318640955 6.2967473 7.25882998       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -4.776626646*** 2.35742** -0.47140013 -1.3999931 2.0014682** -2.1974413**
  v = degree of freedom 90.35205563 149.999 183.994222 274.48568 209.93528 596.72015











Table 4.40  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Identified as Risk Averse for a Particular Investment. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.785016 0.828125 0.730769 0.766355       
Standard Deviation 0.168766 0.142333984 0.196746 0.179055       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -0.890770239 1.452508 -0.56861 1.054135 1.027991 0.44402
  v = degree of freedom 84.26278427 149.9121 170.9368 288.6015 183.1748 787.127
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.41  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Lending Institutions. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.428139183 3.686567164 3.45 3.65811966       
Standard Deviation 0.647256598 0.334595678 0.6225 0.39593834       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -3.371544767*** 2.1149071** -1.98915242** -0.2364732 0.3127056 -3.5030718***
  v = degree of freedom 95.996508 147.77502 149.890004 223.03031 266.98545 1246.8726
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.42  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Feed Merchants. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.233082707 3.358208955 2.9240506 3       
Standard Deviation 0.57574764 0.349298285 0.677776 0.96551724       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.617270988 3.7502348*** -0.59220053 3.2369148*** 3.103839*** 2.4526144**
  v = degree of freedom 91.43983556 146.99763 193.22712 215.93759 284.27327 477.94707




Table 4.43  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Veterinarians. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.434848485 3.388059701 3.0625 3.2991453       
Standard Deviation 0.494240129 0.446424593 0.7835938 0.77375995       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 0.547845151 2.5640911** -1.86425584* 3.671535*** 0.7761867 1.589783
  v = degree of freedom 83.06729532 148.67363 175.647451 234.04989 261.33404 715.01513














Table 4.44  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Non-Farmers. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.35347432 3.373134328 3.4 3.48717949       
Standard Deviation 0.597110286 0.532412564 0.415 0.52333991       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -0.21065287 -0.2366255 -0.89462822 -0.6035851 -1.0297902 -1.8338541*
  v = degree of freedom 83.28596023 136.81487 188.287112 534.47486 83.576516 539.80021




Table 4.45  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Packer/Slaughterer. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.240487062 3.432835821 2.6625 2.68965517       
Standard Deviation 0.67580372 0.454444197 1.0985938 1.31747919       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -2.194903663** 5.4361692*** -0.17326695 4.8175215*** 5.5628664*** 4.9948156***
  v = degree of freedom 88.91192308 141.50474 185.943218 184.33151 353.97486 573.12811




Table 4.46  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Neighboring Farmers. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 3.50678733 3.417910448 3.6 3.64957265       
Standard Deviation 0.488264641 0.482067276 0.34 0.31309811       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 1.005728051 -1.7178591* -0.60116926 -1.3361855 -2.3470253** -2.4583368**
  v = degree of freedom 81.64296614 132.94195 171.625992 605.21064 56.710544 769.54386
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.47  Statistical Results on the Producer’s Age. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 48.41728763 44.54545455 43.691358 46.7372881       
Standard Deviation 146.0285536 155.7327824 92.163999 111.430982       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 2.446039213** 0.4622387 -2.11794707** 4.0835985*** -1.2187167 1.5600342
  v = degree of freedom 80.51435648 125.76318 186.333879 760.43096 49.226274 563.68794













Table 4.48  Statistical Results on the Producer Who Completed Less Than High School. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.044378698 0.030769231 0.0487805 0.06779661       
Standard Deviation 0.042409229 0.029822485 0.046401 0.06320023       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 0.607955517 -0.5683082 -0.57297743 -0.1755924 -1.1863356 -0.957513
  v = degree of freedom 87.90000985 149.81635 191.542146 259.12247 231.39389 500.08191
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.49  Statistical Results on the Producer Who Completed High School. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.334319527 0.261538462 0.2560976 0.37288136       
Standard Deviation 0.222549981 0.193136095 0.1905116 0.23384085       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 1.292983013 0.0757176 -1.77989869* 1.5190716 -1.6034361 -0.8023366
  v = degree of freedom 83.75378947 144.53951 187.046834 406.97913 121.62566 556.90266
*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.  ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
 
Table 4.50  Statistical Results on the Producer Who Completed Some College. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.355029586 0.323076923 0.4634146 0.33898305       
Standard Deviation 0.228983579 0.218698225 0.2486615 0.22407354       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution 0.53598843 -1.775345*1.77192827* -1.8669904* -0.2224018 0.3392978
  v = degree of freedom 82.15822281 147.77004 170.356371 349.88212 132.94608 796.11738




Table 4.51  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producer Who Completed a Bachelor’s Degree. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.218934911 0.323076923 0.2073171 0.1779661       
Standard Deviation 0.171002416 0.218698225 0.1643367 0.14629417       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -1.768330685* 1.6021827 0.51533496 0.2445822 2.1738549** 1.0606433
  v = degree of freedom 78.19642132 135.42457 169.640296 560.05698 62.626852 806.81607














Table 4.52  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producer Who Completed a Master’s Degree. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.032544 0.046153846 0.02439 0.033898       
Standard Deviation 0.031485 0.044023669 0.023795 0.032749       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -0.516665908 0.710761 -0.39905 0.444431 0.402972 -0.07522
  v = degree of freedom 77.21232225 122.0067 191.9473 861.7611 45.95052 493.5147




Table 4.53  Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producer Who Completed a Ph.D. Degree. 
               
  Independent (I) Cooperative ( C) Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN)       
Mean Value 0.014793 0.015384615 0 0.008475       
Standard Deviation 0.014574 0.015147929 0 0.008403       
    I vs C C vs F F vs IN I vs F C vs IN I vs IN 
  t - distribution -0.037860619 1.030776 -1.00426 3.190639*** 0.40302 0.656219
  v = degree of freedom 80.88043214 67 117 72919.6 4.656429 115.1295




Table 4.54   Statistical Results on Number of Months Producers Have Been  
                     Producing Under Contract. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 43.21951 55.491525
  Standard Deviation 1244.684 2100.6906
      F vs IN 
  t - distribution   -2.136881**
  V = degree of freedom   197.98882
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.  
 
 
Table 4.55   Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Had Contracts  
                    with Neighboring Farmers. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 0.390244 0.1016949
  Standard Deviation 0.237954 0.0913531
      F vs IN 
  t - distribution   4.759143***
  V = degree of freedom   124.89453











Table 4.56  Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Required  
                   to Obtain New or Renovated Facilities. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 0.414634 0.6864407
  Standard Deviation 0.242713 0.2152399
      F vs IN 
  t - distribution   -3.929754***
  v = degree of freedom   169.41487




Table 4.57   Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Provided  
                    Feed by the Contractor.  
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
 Mean Value 0.878049 0.90678
 Standard Deviation 0.107079 0.08453
    F vs IN 
 t - distribution  -0.63891




Table 4.58   Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Provided  
                    Animals by the Contractor. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 0.8658537 0.91525424
  Standard Deviation 0.1161511 0.07756392
      F vs IN 
  t - distribution   -1.08479779




Table 4.59   Statistical Results on Medication Provided by the Contractor. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 0.8658537 0.89830508
  Standard Deviation 0.1161511 0.09135306
      F vs IN 
  t - distribution   -0.69334081











Table 4.60  Statistical Results on Producers Who Had Raised Hogs  
                   Prior to Accepting a Contract. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 0.8902439 0.90677966
  Standard Deviation 0.0977097 0.08453031
      F vs IN 
  t - distribution   -0.37856612
  v = degree of freedom   167.95216
 
 
Table 4.61   Statistical Results on Average Acres Used for Hog Production. 
    
   Flat-fee (F) Incentive (IN) 
  Mean Value 496.9324 479.1579
  Standard Deviation 330727.2 519683.6
     F vs IN 
  t - distribution  0.193506





























































APPENDIX B: TESTING FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY USING THE                                  









































Table 5.1a. Results From the Multinomial          Table 5.1b. Results From the Multinomial 
 Logit Model Before Testing for                         Logit Model After Testing for   
 Heteroskedasticity.                                             Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL  
 (Cooperative vs Independent).                           (Cooperative vs Independent). 
                            


























































INTERCEPT  1.46662 0.8522 
HOG250 0.00002 0.0002 
BREEDSOW 0.00003 0.9552 
TOTALFD 0.09186 0.3988 
DARATIO 0.00067 0.8855 
AUNOTIMP 0.26462 0.0003 
AUVERIMP 0.26440 0.0003 
BIOSECUR 0.00071 0.9066 
AGE 0.00092 0.1227 
COMPHS 0.58785 0.2776 
BACHELO 0.29636 0.4400 
CORN 0.27857 0.0101 
MKTPRICE 1.23940 0.2260 
VALFARAS 0.00056 0.9619 
NEIGFARM 0.00821 0.7581 
RISKAVER 0.34070 0.2446 
FFLATFEE 0.29330 0.9625 
FCONTRWI 0.29510 0.0028 
HINCOME 0.41906 0.8131 
SOUTH 0.67409 0.9303 
LENDINST 0.16478 0.3221 
FEEDMERC 0.16470 0.3161 
TIMEHSYR 0.00085 0.1680 







INTERCEPT  1.46662 0.8522 
HOG250 0.00002 0.0002 
BREEDSOW 0.00003 0.9552 
TOTALFD 0.09186 0.3988 
DARATIO 0.00067 0.8855 
AUNOTIMP 0.26462 0.0003 
AUVERIMP 0.26440 0.0003 
BIOSECUR 0.00071 0.9066 
AGE 0.00092 0.1227 
COMPHS 0.58785 0.2776 
BACHELO 0.29636 0.4400 
CORN 0.27857 0.0101 
MKTPRICE 1.23940 0.2260 
VALFARAS 0.00056 0.9619 
NEIGFARM 0.00821 0.7581 
RISKAVER 0.34070 0.2446 
FFLATFEE 0.29330 0.9625 
FCONTRWI 0.29510 0.0028 
HINCOME 0.41906 0.8131 
SOUTH 0.67409 0.9303 
LENDINST 0.16478 0.3221 
FEEDMERC 0.16470 0.3161 
TIMEHSYR 0.00085 0.1680 
NHWOFFFA 0.00751 0.4542 
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Table 5.2a. Results From the Multinomial          Table 5.2b. Results From the Multinomial 
Logit Model Before Testing for                          Logit Model After Testing for   
Heteroskedasticity.                                              Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL  
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Independent).                    (Flat-Fee Contract vs Independent). 
                            


























































INTERCEPT  1.43251 0.4382 
HOG250 0.00002 0.0005 
BREEDSOW 0.00075 0.0025 
TOTALFD 0.10458 0.0126 
DARATIO 0.00054 0.0243 
AUNOTIMP 0.22325 0.0000 
AUVERIMP 0.22311 0.0000 
BIOSECUR 0.00142 0.0456 
AGE 0.00110 0.4511 
COMPHS 0.65866 0.5340 
BACHELO 0.34011 0.2549 
CORN 0.28381 0.0038 
MKTPRICE 1.12260 0.4315 
VALFARAS 0.00067 0.0157 
NEIGFARM 0.17420 0.0064 
RISKAVER 0.31166 0.6442 
FFLATFEE 0.30551 0.0003 
FCONTRWI 0.29736 0.9243 
HINCOME 0.59879 0.1062 
SOUTH 0.71456 0.8333 
LENDINST 0.17672 0.6881 
FEEDMERC 0.13307 0.0000 
TIMEHSYR 0.00051 0.1683 







INTERCEPT  1.43251 0.4382 
HOG250 0.00002 0.0005 
BREEDSOW 0.00075 0.0025 
TOTALFD 0.10458 0.0126 
DARATIO 0.00054 0.0243 
AUNOTIMP 0.22325 0.0000 
AUVERIMP 0.22311 0.0000 
BIOSECUR 0.00142 0.0456 
AGE 0.00110 0.4511 
COMPHS 0.65866 0.5340 
BACHELO 0.34011 0.2549 
CORN 0.28381 0.0038 
MKTPRICE 1.12260 0.4315 
VALFARAS 0.00067 0.0157 
NEIGFARM 0.17420 0.0064 
RISKAVER 0.31166 0.6442 
FFLATFEE 0.30551 0.0003 
FCONTRWI 0.29736 0.9243 
HINCOME 0.59879 0.1062 
SOUTH 0.71456 0.8333 
LENDINST 0.17672 0.6881 
FEEDMERC 0.13307 0.0000 
TIMEHSYR 0.00051 0.1683 
NHWOFFFA 0.00692 0.0910 
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Table 5.3a. Results From the Multinomial          Table 5.3b. Results From the Multinomial 
Logit Model Before Testing for                          Logit Model After Testing for   
Heteroskedasticity.                                              Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL  
(Incentive Payment Contract vs Independent).   (Incentive Payment Contract vs Independent).          
                            


























































INTERCEPT  1.19374 0.0659 
HOG250 0.00002 0.0000 
BREEDSOW 0.00018 0.0146 
TOTALFD 0.08298 0.4773 
DARATIO 0.00046 0.0085 
AUNOTIMP 0.21457 0.0000 
AUVERIMP 0.21440 0.0000 
BIOSECUR 0.00062 0.9548 
AGE 0.00248 0.4579 
COMPHS 0.51147 0.0149 
BACHELO 0.31072 0.0492 
CORN 0.27502 0.0074 
MKTPRICE 0.96264 0.0064 
VALFARAS 0.00050 0.5709 
NEIGFARM 0.15902 0.2907 
RISKAVER 0.27608 0.2908 
FFLATFEE 0.26603 0.0309 
FCONTRWI 0.30577 0.0000 
HINCOME 0.36959 0.3839 
SOUTH 0.43047 0.0001 
LENDINST 0.17029 0.0270 
FEEDMERC 0.13308 0.0000 
TIMEHSYR 0.00049 0.5412 







INTERCEPT  1.19374 0.0659 
HOG250 0.00002 0.0000 
BREEDSOW 0.00018 0.0146 
TOTALFD 0.08298 0.4773 
DARATIO 0.00046 0.0085 
AUNOTIMP 0.21457 0.0000 
AUVERIMP 0.21440 0.0000 
BIOSECUR 0.00062 0.9548 
AGE 0.00248 0.4579 
COMPHS 0.51147 0.0149 
BACHELO 0.31072 0.0492 
CORN 0.27502 0.0074 
MKTPRICE 0.96264 0.0064 
VALFARAS 0.00050 0.5709 
NEIGFARM 0.15902 0.2907 
RISKAVER 0.27608 0.2908 
FFLATFEE 0.26603 0.0309 
FCONTRWI 0.30577 0.0000 
HINCOME 0.36959 0.3839 
SOUTH 0.43047 0.0001 
LENDINST 0.17029 0.0270 
FEEDMERC 0.13308 0.0000 
TIMEHSYR 0.00049 0.5412 
NHWOFFFA 0.00657 0.0235 
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Table 5.4a. Results From the Multinomial          Table 5.4b. Results From the Multinomial 
Logit Model Before Testing for                          Logit Model After Testing for   
Heteroskedasticity.                                              Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL  
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Cooperative).                    (Flat-Fee Contract vs Cooperative).                                     
                            


























































INTERCEPT  1.80391 0.6637 
HOG250 0.00004 0.7768 
BREEDSOW 0.00076 0.0028 
TOTALFD 0.12724 0.0888 
DARATIO 0.00081 0.1046 
AUNOTIMP 0.27473 0.0040 
AUVERIMP 0.27456 0.0040 
BIOSECUR 0.00154 0.0789 
AGE 0.00123 0.5924 
COMPHS 0.79865 0.8447 
BACHELO 0.41675 0.1551 
CORN 0.13121 0.1078 
MKTPRICE 1.47974 0.6938 
VALFARAS 0.00082 0.0566 
NEIGFARM 0.17401 0.0068 
RISKAVER 0.43235 0.2053 
FFLATFEE 0.39417 0.0056 
FCONTRWI 0.39100 0.0305 
HINCOME 0.67928 0.1072 
SOUTH 0.90269 0.8171 
LENDINST 0.22370 0.6645 
FEEDMERC 0.13308 0.0462 
TIMEHSYR 0.00049 0.0506 







INTERCEPT  1.80391 0.6637 
HOG250 0.00004 0.7768 
BREEDSOW 0.00076 0.0028 
TOTALFD 0.12724 0.0888 
DARATIO 0.00081 0.1046 
AUNOTIMP 0.27473 0.0040 
AUVERIMP 0.27456 0.0040 
BIOSECUR 0.00154 0.0789 
AGE 0.00123 0.5924 
COMPHS 0.79865 0.8447 
BACHELO 0.41675 0.1551 
CORN 0.13121 0.1078 
MKTPRICE 1.47974 0.6938 
VALFARAS 0.00082 0.0566 
NEIGFARM 0.17401 0.0068 
RISKAVER 0.43235 0.2053 
FFLATFEE 0.39417 0.0056 
FCONTRWI 0.39100 0.0305 
HINCOME 0.67928 0.1072 
SOUTH 0.90269 0.8171 
LENDINST 0.22370 0.6645 
FEEDMERC 0.13308 0.0462 
TIMEHSYR 0.00049 0.0506 
NHWOFFFA 0.00657 0.4436 
 167
Table 5.5a. Results From the Multinomial          Table 5.5b. Results From the Multinomial 
Logit Model Before Testing for                          Logit Model After Testing for   
Heteroskedasticity.                                              Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL  
(Incentive Payment Co. vs Cooperative).            (Incentive Payment Co. vs Cooperative).                                
                            


























































INTERCEPT  1.62870 0.2368 
HOG250 0.00001 0.2392 
BREEDSOW 0.00018 0.0141 
TOTALFD 0.10654 0.8610 
DARATIO 0.00075 0.0779 
AUNOTIMP 0.26084 0.0190 
AUVERIMP 0.26064 0.0197 
BIOSECUR 0.00087 0.9473 
AGE 0.00255 0.1995 
COMPHS 0.67744 0.3695 
BACHELO 0.38828 0.0313 
CORN 0.11317 0.8630 
MKTPRICE 1.37436 0.4119 
VALFARAS 0.00068 0.7081 
NEIGFARM 0.15921 0.3061 
RISKAVER 0.40436 0.0876 
FFLATFEE 0.35731 0.1156 
FCONTRWI 0.39252 0.0006 
HINCOME 0.48390 0.6411 
SOUTH 0.69487 0.0187 
LENDINST 0.21831 0.3370 
FEEDMERC 0.18819 0.0480 
TIMEHSYR 0.00093 0.1095 







INTERCEPT  1.62870 0.2368 
HOG250 0.00001 0.2392 
BREEDSOW 0.00018 0.0141 
TOTALFD 0.10654 0.8610 
DARATIO 0.00075 0.0779 
AUNOTIMP 0.26084 0.0190 
AUVERIMP 0.26064 0.0197 
BIOSECUR 0.00087 0.9473 
AGE 0.00255 0.1995 
COMPHS 0.67744 0.3695 
BACHELO 0.38828 0.0313 
CORN 0.11317 0.8630 
MKTPRICE 1.37436 0.4119 
VALFARAS 0.00068 0.7081 
NEIGFARM 0.15921 0.3061 
RISKAVER 0.40436 0.0876 
FFLATFEE 0.35731 0.1156 
FCONTRWI 0.39252 0.0006 
HINCOME 0.48390 0.6411 
SOUTH 0.69487 0.0187 
LENDINST 0.21831 0.3370 
FEEDMERC 0.18819 0.0480 
TIMEHSYR 0.00093 0.1095 
NHWOFFFA 0.00885 0.2888 
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Table 5.6a. Results From the Multinomial          Table 5.6b. Results From the Multinomial 
Logit Model Before Testing for                          Logit Model After Testing for   
Heteroskedasticity.                                              Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL  
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).   (Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).                        
                            






















































INTERCEPT  1.49280 0.3752 
HOG250 0.00001 0.4454 
BREEDSOW 0.00076 0.0181 
TOTALFD 0.11578 0.0528 
DARATIO 0.00061 0.9801 
AUNOTIMP 0.20971 0.3537 
AUVERIMP 0.20967 0.3465 
BIOSECUR 0.00123 0.1115 
AGE 0.00259 0.3257 
COMPHS 0.72449 0.2919 
BACHELO 0.40718 0.4540 
CORN 0.11770 0.0621 
MKTPRICE 1.18936 0.1079 
VALFARAS 0.00075 0.0739 
NEIGFARM 0.15954 0.0683 
RISKAVER 0.36539 0.7879 
FFLATFEE 0.35772 0.0000 
FCONTRWI 0.38680 0.0000 
HINCOME 0.63673 0.0363 
SOUTH 0.66855 0.0592 
LENDINST 0.15950 0.0694 
FEEDMERC 0.00217 0.2180 
TIMEHSYR 0.00059 0.5669 







INTERCEPT  1.49280 0.3752 
HOG250 0.00001 0.4454 
BREEDSOW 0.00076 0.0181 
TOTALFD 0.11578 0.0528 
DARATIO 0.00061 0.9801 
AUNOTIMP 0.20971 0.3537 
AUVERIMP 0.20967 0.3465 
BIOSECUR 0.00123 0.1115 
AGE 0.00259 0.3257 
COMPHS 0.72449 0.2919 
BACHELO 0.40718 0.4540 
CORN 0.11770 0.0621 
MKTPRICE 1.18936 0.1079 
VALFARAS 0.00075 0.0739 
NEIGFARM 0.15954 0.0683 
RISKAVER 0.36539 0.7879 
FFLATFEE 0.35772 0.0000 
FCONTRWI 0.38680 0.0000 
HINCOME 0.63673 0.0363 
SOUTH 0.66855 0.0592 
LENDINST 0.15950 0.0694 
FEEDMERC 0.00217 0.2180 
TIMEHSYR 0.00059 0.5669 
NHWOFFFA 0.00805 0.7615 
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Table 5.7a. Results From the Binomial              Table 5.7b. Results From the Binomial 
Logit Model Before Testing for                          Logit Model After Testing for   
Heteroskedasticity.                                              Heteroskedasticity Using the Multiplicative.  
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).   (Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).                        
                            





















































INTERCEPT  0.53156 0.8149 
HOG250 0.00417 0.0933 
BREEDSOW 0.40128 0.0000 
TOTALFD 0.33061 0.0046 
DARATIO 0.00022 0.5628 







INTERCEPT  0.53156 0.8149 
HOG250 0.00417 0.0933 
BREEDSOW 0.40128 0.0000 
TOTALFD 0.33061 0.0046 
DARATIO 0.00022 0.5628 
























APPENDIX C: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE EXOGENOUS 

























Table 6.1  Statistics of the Exogenous Variables Used in the Multinomial Logit Model. 
______________________________________________________________________________________   
 Variable              N           Mean        Std Dev        Sum              Minimum       Maximum 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    United States 
    (state)               946 22.61  9.98  21386  1.00    50.00 
 
    Number of Breeding Sows 
    (breedsow)            944      283.53  2375         67650              0   70000 
 
    No. of 250 Pound Hogs Produced  
    (hog250)              939         4060          16874        3812474              0         400000 
 
    Number of Enterprises 
    (totalfd)             945        3.18  1.74  3004              0       11.00 
     
    Corn Produced on the Farm 
    (corn)                945        0.82  0.38       777.00                 0       1.00 
 
    Debt-to-Asset Ratio 
    (daratio)             872        2.65         1.24            2317         1.00       5.00 
 
    No. of Hours Worked Off Farm 
    (nhwofffa)            946       10.03  18.07  9487              0       80.00 
 
    Autonomy Is Not Very Important 
    (aunotimp)            925        0.07  0.25  63.00              0        1.00 
 
    Autonomy Is Very Important 
    (auverimp)            925        0.57         0.49       531.00              0        1.00 
 
    Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co.  
    (fflatee)             946        0.42         0.49       398.00              0        1.00 
 
    Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co. 
    (fcontrwi)            946        0.46         0.50  431.00  0        1.00 
 
    Freq. of Checking Market Price 
    (mrkprice)            924        0.57  0.50  524.00                 0        1.00 
 
    No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year 
    (timesyr)             883       28.71  31.79  25347              0      365.00 
 
    Total Value of Farm Assets 
    (valfaras)            854        2.83         1.71           2413              0        7.00 
 
    Rating of Biosecurity 
    (biosecur)            893        6.19         2.30           5524              0       10.00 
 
    Producer Age 
    (age)                 936       47.52        11.85          44482       17.0       87.00 
 
    Producer Completed High School   
    (comphs)              941        0.95         0.21       897.00              0        1.00 
 
    Producer Holds Bachelor’s Degree 







______________________________________________________________________________________    
 Variable              N           Mean        Std Dev        Sum              Minimum       Maximum 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Net Household Income ≥ 100,000 
    (nhincome)            848        3.16         1.59           2681         1.00        7.00 
 
    Imp. of Relations with Farmers  
    (neigfarm)            927        3.53         0.68           3269         1.00        5.00 
 
    Imp. of Relations with Lenders 
    (lendinst)            925        3.48         0.77           3217              0        4.00 
 
    Imp. of Relations with Feed Merch. 
    (feedmerc)            927        3.19         0.79           2954              0        5.00 
 
     Self Assess. of Risk Preference 




































Table 6.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the Exogenous Variables for the Multinomial Logit Model. 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
    state       breedsow     hog250             totalfd                corn           daratio     nhwofffa       aunotimp 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 state         1.00000        0.01257         0.03110         0.12552       -0.03324        0.02738       0.00808        0.02404 
                                                 0.6996           0.3412           0.0001           0.3073         0.4194         0.8040           0.4652 
                                       946               944                939                945                945              872              946                925 
 
 breedsow                0.01257        1.00000         0.10742        -0.07635        -0.11001       0.03063     -0.04609         0.02787 
                                  0.6996                                0.0010            0.0190           0.0007         0.3669        0.1571           0.3977 
                                       944               944                937                 943                943              870             944                923 
 
 hog250        0.03110       0.10742          1.00000        -0.00400        -0.07304       0.10824     -0.05448         0.14729 
                                   0.3412         0.0010                                  0.9027            0.0253         0.0014        0.0952           <.0001 
                                        939              937                 939                938                 938              865             939                918 
 
 totalfd                     0.12552      -0.07635         -0.00400         1.00000          0.48594      -0.04830     -0.07141       -0.00954 
                                   0.0001         0.0190            0.9027                                  <.0001         0.1544        0.0282           0.7721 
                                        945              943                 938                945                 945               871             945               924 
 
 corn                       -0.03324       -0.11001        -0.07304         0.48594           1.00000      -0.03404    -0.13286        -0.04554 
                                   0.3073         0.0007            0.0253           <.0001                                 0.3156       <.0001            0.1667 
                                        945              943                 938                945                  945               871            945                924 
 
 daratio                     0.02738        0.03063         0.10824        -0.04830         -0.03404        1.00000      0.07195         0.04823 
                                   0.4194          0.3669           0.0014           0.1544             0.3156                             0.0336           0.1577 
                                        872               870                865                871                  871               872             872                860 
 
 nhwofffa                  0.00808      -0.04609        -0.05448        -0.07141         -0.13286        0.07195      1.00000         0.06862 
                                    0.8040         0.1571           0.0952           0.0282             <.0001          0.0336                              0.0369 
                                         946              944                939                945                  945               872             946                925 
 
 aunotimp                  0.02404       0.02787         0.14729       -0.00954          -0.04554        0.04823      0.06862         1.00000 
                                     0.4652        0.3977           <.0001           0.7721             0.1667          0.1577        0.0369 




























________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
       state       breedsow     hog250             totalfd                corn            daratio     nhwofffa      aunotimp 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   
auverimp                   -0.03806     -0.06789       -0.07581          0.08331           0.05393      -0.15432     -0.04963       -0.31385 
                                     0.2476         0.0392          0.0216            0.0113             0.1013         <.0001        0.1315          <.0001 
                                          925              923               918                 924                  924              860             925                925 
 
 fflatee                       -0.08422       0.02180       -0.03468         -0.09871          0.07614       0.11283       0.07784        0.02747 
                                      0.0096        0.5036           0.2885            0.0024            0.0192         0.0008         0.0166          0.4040 
                                           946             944                939                 945                 945              872              946               925 
   
  
fcontrwi        -0.05116     -0.01876         0.05955        -0.08325         -0.04100       0.06605       0.01230        0.09518 
                       0.1159        0.5649           0.0681           0.0105            0.2080         0.0512         0.7055          0.0038 
                              946             944                939                945                 945              872              946               925 
               
 mrkprice        -0.04249      0.03485         0.02767         0.09353          0.10826       0.00370      -0.09798      -0.14394 
                          0.1969        0.2905           0.4026           0.0045            0.0010         0.9137          0.0029         <.0001 
                              924             922                917                923                 923              859               924              909 
 
 timesyr        -0.04230      0.06785         0.35032         0.02822          0.07055       0.12337       -0.11452      -0.04422 
                                       0.2092         0.0441          <.0001           0.4022            0.0361         0.0004          0.0007          0.1928 
                                            883              881               877                883                 883               828              883               869 
 
 valfaras        -0.04130       0.13719        0.20784         0.13746          0.17057      -0.03483       -0.23808       0.01372 
                                        0.2279        <.0001          <.0001          <.0001            <.0001         0.3192          <.0001         0.6911 
                                            854              852               849                854                 854               820              854               842 
 
 biosecur           0.00520      0.07481        0.08519         -0.05991        -0.05476        0.02631      -0.09948      -0.03159 
                          0.8767        0.0255          0.0112            0.0737            0.1021          0.4508         0.0029         0.3501 
                                             893             891               886                 892                 892               824              893              877 
 
 age              -0.11369     -0.04113        0.01956       -0.00549          0.01356    -0.20018     -0.16044      -0.00303 
                        0.0005         0.2092         0.5516            0.8668            0.6787          <.0001        <.0001         0.9270 






























________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
         state       breedsow     hog250             totalfd                corn            daratio     nhwofffa      aunotimp 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
comphs           -0.12381       0.00127      0.00377         -0.08144          0.01494         0.03715      0.07888      -0.02324 
                        0.0001         0.9689        0.9085             0.0125            0.6474           0.2743        0.0155         0.4812 
                                             941              939             934                  940                 940                868             941              921 
 
 bachelor                      -0.00839       0.07895       0.09562          0.00736         -0.04600         0.05691      0.01975       0.03155 
                        0.7971        0.0155         0.0034             0.8217            0.1588           0.0938         0.5451        0.3389 
                                             941             939              934                  940                 940                868              941             921 
 
 nhincome           0.01598       0.11428      0.15044          -0.04064          0.01945        -0.10596       0.04950      0.06136 
                                        0.6421         0.0009        <.0001             0.2374            0.5720           0.0027         0.1498        0.0769 
                                             848              846             844                   847                847                802               848             832 
 
 neigfarm                      -0.00546       0.02244      0.01636           0.04084          0.04160         0.00458      -0.02668     -0.01807 
                                        0.8681         0.4956        0.6203             0.2144             0.2059           0.8935         0.4172        0.5865 
                                             927              925             920                  926                  926                855              927             908 
 
 lendinst                       -0.03112       0.02874      0.02872          -0.04346           0.01368         0.26606       0.01384     -0.04409 
                                        0.3445         0.3831        0.3848             0.1869             0.6780           <.0001         0.6741        0.1846 
                                             925              923             918                  924                  924                853              925             907   
 
 feedmerc                      0.04318      -0.05003      0.00273           0.03423           0.04256        -0.07245      -0.00567     -0.15854 
                                        0.1890         0.1284        0.9342             0.2981             0.1956            0.0341         0.8632        <.0001 
                                             927              925             920                  926                  926                 856              927             909 
                                         
 choicinv                      -0.00157        0.06895     0.06783          -0.01655          -0.02141          0.09969       0.05461    -0.00904 
                                        0.9632          0.0431       0.0471             0.6275              0.5301            0.0046         0.1089       0.7926 

































________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
      auverimp        fflatee     fcontrwi          mrkprice              timesyr         valfaras       biosecur             age 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
state            -0.03806      -0.08422      -0.05116          -0.04249            -0.04230        -0.04130       0.00520      -0.11369 
                                        0.2476          0.0096         0.1159             0.1969                0.2092           0.2279         0.8767         0.0005 
                                             925               946              946                  924                     883                854              893              936 
 
breedsow                     -0.06789         0.02180     -0.01876           0.03485              0.06785         0.13719        0.07481     -0.04113 
                                        0.0392           0.5036        0.5649             0.2905                0.0441           <.0001         0.0255         0.2092 
                                             923               944             944                   922                     881                852               891             934 
 
 hog250                        -0.07581       -0.03468       0.05955          0.02767               0.35032         0.20784        0.08519      0.01956 
                                        0.0216          0.2885         0.0681            0.4026                 <.0001           <.0001          0.0112        0.5516 
                                             918               939              939                 917                      877                849                886             929 
 
 totalfd                           0.08331       -0.09871     -0.08325          0.09353               0.02822         0.13746       -0.05991     -0.00549 
                                         0.0113          0.0024        0.0105            0.0045                 0.4022           <.0001          0.0737         0.8668 
                                             924                945             945                 923                      883                854               892              935 
 
 corn                              0.05393         0.07614     -0.04100          0.10826               0.07055         0.17057       -0.05476      0.01356 
                                        0.1013           0.0192        0.2080            0.0010                  0.0361          <.0001          0.1021         0.6787 
                                             924                945             945                 923                       883               854               892              935 
 
 daratio                         -0.15432         0.11283     0.06605           0.00370                0.12337       -0.03483        0.02631     -0.20018 
                                        <.0001           0.0008       0.0512             0.9137                  0.0004          0.3192          0.4508         <.0001 
                                             860                872            872                  859                        828              820               824              865 
 
 nhwofffa         -0.04963         0.07784     0.01230          -0.09798               -0.11452      -0.23808       -0.09948     -0.16044 
                        0.1315           0.0166       0.7055              0.0029                  0.0007         <.0001          0.0029         <.0001 
                                             925                946            946                  924                        883              854                893              936 
 
 aunotimp        -0.31385         0.02747     0.09518          -0.14394               -0.04422        0.01372       -0.03159      -0.00303 
                                        <.0001           0.4040       0.0038             <.0001                  0.1928          0.6911          0.3501         0.9270 































________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
      auverimp        fflatee     fcontrwi          mrkprice             timesyr            valfaras         biosecur           age 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 auverimp          1.00000         -0.09363    -0.11394           0.11924              0.06238       -0.01984      -0.05252       0.04682 
                                                              0.0044        0.0005             0.0003                0.0661          0.5653          0.1201        0.1566 
                                            925                 925             925                  909                     869               842               877             917 
                                           
 fflatee          -0.09363          1.00000      0.29525           0.06748              0.06197       -0.05440        0.09287     -0.11042 
                                       0.0044                               <.0001             0.0403                0.0657           0.1121         0.0055        0.0007 
                                            925                 946             946                  924                     883                854              893             936 
    
 fcontrwi                     -0.11394           0.29525     1.00000            0.01307             0.00517         0.02757        0.08139    -0.08859 
                                       0.0005             <.0001                                0.6915               0.8781           0.4210          0.0150       0.0067 
                                            925                  946            946                   924                    883                854               893            936 
 
 mrkprice                     0.11924            0.06748     0.01307            1.00000             0.22194         0.14624        0.01327     0.05534 
                                       0.0003             0.0403       0.6915                                        <.0001           <.0001          0.6950       0.0945 
                                            909                  924            924                   924                    870                 841               876           914 
             
 timesyr                       0.06238            0.06197    0.00517             0.22194             1.00000          0.26885        0.07623     0.05594 
                                       0.0661             0.0657       0.8781              <.0001                                      <.0001          0.0273      0.0982 
                                            869                  883            883                   870                    883                  811               838           875 
 
 valfaras                      -0.01984          -0.05440     0.02757            0.14624             0.26885           1.00000       0.23217     0.11229 
                                       0.5653             0.1121       0.4210              <.0001               <.0001                                <.0001       0.0011 
                                            842                 854            854                    841                     811                 854              813            847 
 
 biosecur                     -0.05252          0.09287      0.08139            0.01327              0.07623           0.23217       1.00000   -0.06265 
                                       0.1201            0.0055        0.0150              0.6950                0.0273             <.0001                          0.0625 
                                            877                 893             893                   876                     838                  813              893           885 
 
 age                               0.04682         -0.11042    -0.08859            0.05534              0.05594           0.11229      -0.06265    1.00000 
                                       0.1566            0.0007        0.0067              0.0945                0.0982             0.0011         0.0625 






























________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
  auverimp         fflatee         fcontrwi            mrkprice         timesyr            valfaras         biosecur          age 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
age                             0.04682         -0.11042       -0.08859            0.05534         0.05594           0.11229       -0.06265       1.00000 
                                    0.1566             0.0007          0.0067              0.0945           0.0982             0.0011           0.0625 
                                         917                  936               936                   914                875                  847                885             936 
 
 comphs                   -0.01928          -0.01561        0.04149            0.07212          0.03843          -0.02669       -0.01567     -0.02037 
                                       0.5591            0.6325          0.2035              .0288            0.2554              0.4370          0.6405        0.5343 
                                            921                 941               941                  919                 878                  850               891             933 
 
 bachelor                      -0.07451         0.06854        0.08095           0.11049          0.07702            0.10773        0.03669     -0.01666 
                                       0.0237            0.0355          0.0130               0.000            0.0225              0.0017          0.2740        0.6112 
                                            921                 941               941                  919                 878                   850               891             933 
 
 nhincome                   -0.08637          0.03102        0.06056            0.00376          0.05137            0.31218        0.08507      0.13306 
                                       0.0127            0.3669          0.0780             0.9138             0.1466              <.0001          0.0156        0.0001 
                                            832                 848               848                  830                  800                   813               808             843 
 
 neigfarm                      0.03847         -0.02210         0.01991         -0.01719          0.00992             0.02649        0.06001     0.01112 
                                       0.2469            0.5016           0.5449             0.6047            0.7705               0.4435          0.0752       0.7362 
                                            908                 927                927                  909                 867                    839               880            920 
                                           
 lendinst                      -0.00567          0.04003         0.06150           0.01508          0.02360            -0.03006       0.09250    -0.02499 
                                       0.8646            0.2239           0.0615             0.6504            0.4881               0.3850          0.0061       0.4495 
                                            907                 925                925                  906                 865                    837               878            918 
  
 feedmerc                     0.10509          0.00455        -0.02862           0.06309          0.02165            -0.02440        0.03890     0.00289 
                                       0.0015            0.8899           0.3841             0.0572            0.5244               0.4801          0.2488       0.9301 
                                            909                 927               927                   909                 867                    840               881            920 
 
 choicinv                      -0.04341          0.05524        0.02261            0.01019         0.03859             0.06877         0.05062   -0.03254 
                                       0.2063             0.1049          0.5071              0.7672           0.2711               0.0527           0.1451       0.3419 































________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
     comphs           bachelor      nhincome           neigfarm              lendinst          feedmerc           choicinv 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 
   state           -0.12381          -0.00839        0.01598            -0.00546             -0.03112            0.04318         -0.00157 
                                       0.0001              0.7971          0.6421               0.8681                0.3445              0.1890             0.9632 
                                            941                   941               848                    927                     925                   927                  863 
 
   breedsow                   0.00127            0.07895        0.11428             0.02244             0.02874            -0.05003          0.06895 
                                       0.9689              0.0155          0.0009               0.4956                0.3831               0.1284            0.0431 
                                            939                   939               846                    925                     923                    925                 861 
  
   hog250                      0.00377            0.09562        0.15044             0.01636               0.02872            0.00273           0.06783 
                                      0.9085              0.0034          <.0001                0.6203                0.3848              0.9342             0.0471 
                                           934                   934               844                     920                     918                   920                  857 
  
   totalfd                     -0.08144            0.00736       -0.04064             0.04084               -0.04346           0.03423          -0.01655 
                                      0.0125              0.8217          0.2374                0.2144                  0.1869             0.2981             0.6275 
                                           940                   940               847                     926                       924                  926                  862 
 
   corn                         0.01494            -0.04600        0.01945              0.04160                0.01368           0.04256          -0.02141 
                                     0.6474               0.1588          0.5720                0.2059                  0.6780             0.1956              0.5301 
                                          940                    940               847                     926                       924                  926                   862 
 
   daratio                      0.03715            0.05691       -0.10596              0.00458                0.26606          -0.07245            0.09969 
                                      0.2743              0.0938          0.0027                0.8935                  <.0001             0.0341              0.0046 
                                           868                   868               802                     855                       853                  856                   806 
 
   nhwofffa                  0.07888             0.01975        0.04950            -0.02668                0.01384          -0.00567             0.05461 
                                      0.0155               0.5451          0.1498               0.4172                   0.6741            0.8632               0.1089 
                                           941                    941               848                    927                        925                 927                    863 
                 
   aunotimp      -0.02324               0.03155        0.06136            -0.01807               -0.04409        -0.15854            -0.00904 
                                      0.4812                0.3389           0.0769               0.5865                  0.1846            <.0001               0.7926 































________________________________________________________________________________________________________           
   comphs              bachelor        nhincome         neigfarm                lendinst           feedmerc             choicinv 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   auverimp     -0.01928              -0.07451       -0.08637             0.03847               -0.00567           0.10509              -0.04341 
                                    0.5591                 0.0237           0.0127               0.2469                  0.8646             0.0015                 0.2063 
                                         921                      921                832                    908                       907                  909                      849 
 
 
   fflatee      -0.01561              0.06854          0.03102           -0.02210                0.04003            0.00455              0.05524 
                                    0.6325                 0.0355           0.3669               0.5016                  0.2239              0.8899                0.1049 
                                         941                      941                848                    927                       925                   927                     863 
  
   fcontrwi                 0.04149               0.08095          0.06056             0.01991                0.06150          -0.02862               0.02261 
                                    0.2035                 0.0130            0.0780              0.5449                   0.0615             0.3841                 0.5071 
                                         941                      941                 848                   927                        925                  927                      863 
 
   mrkprice                0.07212                0.11049          0.00376           -0.01719                 0.01508          0.06309               0.01019 
                                    0.0288                 0.0008            0.9138              0.6047                   0.6504             0.0572                 0.7672 
                                         919                      919                 830                   909                        906                  909                      846 
 
   timesyr                   0.03843               0.07702         0.05137             0.00992                 0.02360           0.02165               0.03859 
                                    0.2554                 0.0225           0.1466                0.7705                   0.4881            0.5244                  0.2711 
                                         878                      878                800                     867                        865                  867                      815 
   
   valfaras                  -0.02669              0.10773          0.31218            0.02649                -0.03006          -0.02440                0.06877 
                                     0.4370                0.0017            <.0001              0.4435                    0.3850             0.4801                 0.0527 
                                          850                     850                 813                    839                         837                 840                      794 
  
   biosecur                  -0.01567             0.03669           0.08507           0.06001                  0.09250           0.03890                0.05062 
                                      0.6405               0.2740             0.0156             0.0752                     0.0061           0.2488                   0.1451 
                               891                    891                  808                  880                          878                 881                       830 
 
   age                          -0.02037             -0.01666          0.13306           0.01112                  -0.02499         0.00289               -0.03254 
                                      0.5343                0.6112            0.0001             0.7362                     0.4495            0.9301                  0.3419 





























_______________________________________________________________________________________________________            
  comphs              bachelor         nhincome          neigfarm                lendinst            feedmerc               choicinv 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
comphs           1.00000              0.13322         -0.02729         -0.00254                     0.05150         -0.05537               0.03614 
                                                                 <.0001            0.4273             0.9386                      0.1179             0.0924                0.2895 
                                           941                     941                 848                  925                            923                  925                     861 
          
 bachelor                      0.13322             1.00000           0.08597          -0.09093                  -0.05257          -0.07215              0.03303 
                                      <.0001                                       0.0123             0.0056                      0.1105             0.0282                0.3331 
                                           941                    941                  848                  925                           923                  925                      861 
 
 nhincome                  -0.02729             0.08597            1.00000         -0.00545                    0.01581           0.01819              0.13527 
                                      0.4273               0.0123                                     0.8749                      0.6487             0.5994                 0.0001 
                                           848                    848                  848                  835                           833                  836                      792 
 
  neigfarm                  -0.00254            -0.09093           -0.00545          1.00000                    0.31230           0.20940              0.07089 
                                     0.9386                0.0056              0.8749                                             <.0001             <.0001                0.0383 
                                          925                     925                   835                 927                            923                 925                     854 
  
  lendinst                     0.05150             -0.05257            0.01581         0.31230                    1.00000           0.33685               0.02287 
                                      0.1179                0.1105              0.6487           <.0001                                              <.0001                0.5043 
                                           923                     923                   833                923                            925                 923                      855 
 
  feedmerc                  -0.05537             -0.07215            0.01819          0.20940                     0.33685         1.00000             -0.00277 
                                      0.0924                0.0282              0.5994            <.0001                       <.0001                                      0.9357 
                                           925                     925                   836                 925                            923                 927                     854 
 
   choicinv                   0.03614               0.03303            0.13527         0.07089                      0.02287         -0.00277            1.00000 
                                     0.2895                  0.3331              0.0001           0.0383                        0.5043            0.9357 
















































APPENDIX D: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE EXOGENOUS 

































Table 5.3. Statistics of the Exogenous Variables Used in the Binomial Logit Model. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 Variable            N           Mean        Std Dev            Sum               Minimum    Maximum 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   mopundco 200 50.46  42.36  10092  0 216.00 
   contwnfa          200   0.22         0.42        44.00              0        1.00 
   newrefac          200        0.58         0.50       115.00                  0        1.00 
   exraihog          200        0.90    0.30   180.00     0  1.00 










































Table 6.4  Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the Exogenous Variables for the Binomial Logit Model. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
            mopundco     contwnfa        newrefac     numacres        exraihog   
 
         mopundco     1.00000        0.04877             0.24748       -0.21471         0.19765    
                                             0.4929                     0.0004          0.0031          0.0050     
                                  200                    200                     200                   188                       200     
 
          contwnfa      0.04877         1.00000           -0.12941          0.00349         0.05633    
                             4929                                 0.0678               0.9620            0.4282     
                                  200                      200                          200                         188                      200     
 
         newrefac       0.24748       -0.12941           1.00000          -0.06658       0.15172     
                          0.0004             0.0678                              0.3639           0.0320     
                                  200                       200                          200                         188                     200     
 
         numacres     -0.21471       0.00349          -0.06658              1.00000      -0.18671    
                             0031           0.9620                0.3639                    0.0002         
                                     188                     188                          188                         188                          188      
 
         exraihog       0.19765         0.05633             0.15172           -0.18671        1.00000   
                                0.0050            0.4282                 0.0320                 0.0103                     














































































U.S. HOG PRODUCER SURVEY 
 
 
Section I : Production Characteristics                                                                                                               
 
1. My farm business is structured as a (circle one) 
 
 a) sole proprietorship  c) family corporation  e) cooperative  
 b) partnership   d) non-family corporation 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
2. Do you have breeding sows in your operation?  If yes, approximately how many? 
   
 a) yes _________ (number)  b) no  
 
3. Did you raise hogs to a weight of 200 - 300 lbs for market in 1999?  If yes, approximately 
how many? 
   
 a) yes _________ (number)  b) no  
    
4. Did you raise feeder pigs to a weight of 40 - 60 lbs for market in 1999?  If yes, approximately 
how many? 
   
 a) yes _________ (number)  b) no  
    
5. How many years have you been raising hogs? 
         
 __________ (years) 
  
6. Approximately how many acres of land are used to support your hog operation (including 
land for crops that support the operation, such as corn for feed and manure disposal)? 
 
 __________ (acres) 
 
7. Are your hogs raised indoors or outdoors on or off “concrete”? 
 a) indoors (confinement)     b) outdoors on concrete     c)  outdoors off concrete 




      
Throughout this survey, you will be asked questions about your hog farm and how you make 
decisions with regard to the operation.  Please circle the answer that best reflects your situation.  
Please follow the directions that are written in italics as you go through the survey. 
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8. For this question, please refer to the following definitions of alternative production phases 
before responding.   
       
Production Phase                                                          Definition 
Farrow-to-Wean  These operations provide breeding care for pigs from the time they are      
                                      farrowed until they are weaned. 
 
Feeder Pig/Nursery      These operations involve raising weaned pigs until they are ready             
    to be transferred to the finishing operation (weighing approximately         
    40 to 60 pounds). 
  
Finishing   These operations raise pigs from approximately 40 to 60 pounds to  
                                     market weight of approximately 200 to 300 pounds. 
 
 In which of the above production phases are you currently involved? (Circle all that apply)  
 
 a) farrow-to-wean  c) finishing   e) farrow-to-finish 
 b) feeder pig or nursery d) raising breeding stock        
 
9. Of the buildings in your hog operation in which hogs are raised, how many of these buildings 
are less than 10 years old? 
  
 a) 0  c) 2  e) 4   g) 6  i) 8  k) 10 or more 
 b) 1  d) 3  f) 5  h) 7  j) 9   
  
10. Of the buildings in your hog operation in which hogs are raised, how many of these buildings 
are 10 years old or greater? 
 
 a) 0  c) 2  e) 4   g) 6  i) 8  k) 10 or more 
 b) 1  d) 3  f) 5  h) 7  j) 9   
 
11. What would be the total value of your hog facilities, if you were to sell them to another hog 
producer today? 
 
 __________ (dollars) 
 
12. What other type(s) of farm animals and/or crops do you raise? (Circle all that apply) 
 
 a) corn       g)  sorghum  m) sheep   s)  vegetable production 
 b) cotton h)  rice   n)  beef cattle    t)   fruit production  
 c) wheat      i)  tobacco  o)  dairy cattle  u)  forestry   
 d) barley j)  peanuts  p)  goats   v) others (please list) 
 e) soybeans k) sugarcane/beets q)  horses       _______________ 




13.  Of the following modern technologies and/or practices, please circle all of those that you are 
presently using on your hog farm. 
 
 a) “All in - all out” hog finishing   f)  Terminal cross breeding programs 
 b) Weekly farrowing    g) Artificial insemination 
 c) High-density, fat-added diets  h) Porcine Somatotropin (pST) 
 d) Intensive breeding to keep facilities full       i) Computer Programs 
 e)  Split-sex feeding     
 
14. How many part-time employees work on your hog farm between 5 and 39 hours per week? 
 
 __________ (number) 
 
15. How many full-time (40 hours or more per week) employees work on your hog farm? 
 
 __________ (number) 
 
16. What is your debt-to-asset ratio?  This is your total debts divided by your total assets. 
 a) No Debt    c) 20 to 40%   e) 61% or greater 
         b) 1 to 20%   d) 40 to 60% 
 
17. Do you receive any income from an off-farm job?  If yes, approximately what percentage of 
your total net household income for 1999 is from an off-farm job? 
   
 a) yes _________ (%)  b) no   
 
If you answered “no” in Question 17, please skip to Question 19.  Otherwise, please answer 
Questions 18 and 19.   
 
18. How many hours per week do you work off the farm? 
 
 _________ (number) 
 
18. How many family members work on your farm without pay? 
 
 _________ (number) 
 
 
Section II: Autonomy 
 
1. How important is it to you for you to have complete control over all production, marketing, 
and  management decisions in your hog operation? 
 
 a) not important at all    c) somewhat important   
 b) not very important    d) very important 
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2. Approximately what portion of the everyday production, marketing and management 
decisions do you make on your operation? (Please circle one)    
 
 a) I make none of these decisions.  d) I make most of these decisions. 
 b) I make few of these decisions.  e) I make all of these decisions. 
 c) I share these decisions equally with another party. 
 
            3. Approximately what percentage of the production, marketing and management decisions 
would you prefer to make?  
      
a) I prefer to make none of these decisions. 
 b) I prefer to make few of these decisions.                
 c) I prefer to share these decisions equally with another party. 
d) I prefer to make most of these decisions.               
 e) I prefer to make all of these decisions.
 
4. Would/Do you prefer determining the type of feed (corn and/or soybeans) used in the 
production process over allowing a contractor or integrator to determine the type of feed? 
 
 a) yes   b) no 
 
5. Would/Do you prefer determining the market in which to sell finished hogs over allowing a 
contractor or integrator to make this decision? 
 
 a) yes   b) no 
 
6. Would/Do you prefer having full control over herd size and the number of hogs to be 
marketed each period over allowing a contractor or integrator to make this decision? 
 
 a) yes   b) no 
 
7. Would/Do you prefer determining the type of equipment and facilities used in your 
production process over allowing a contractor or integrator to make this decision? 
 
 a) yes   b) no 
  
8. Would/Do prefer to determine when to place and remove your hogs, rather than having a 
contractor or integrator to make this decision? 
 











Section III : Business Arrangements  
 
 
The following definitions categorize some of the different types of business 




Based on the above definitions, which business arrangement best describes the 
agreement  under which you are presently producing hogs? (Please circle only one) 
         
 a) I am an independent producer. 
b) I am a cooperative producer.  
 c) I produce hogs under a flat-fee contract.
d)  I produce hogs under a contract with incentive payments.  
 e)   I produce hogs under a tournament contract. 
  f) I work for a vertically integrated firm. 






Independent Producer All inputs involved in the production process are owned or 
    purchased and managed by you.  You are responsible for all 
    aspects of producing and marketing hogs.  
 
Cooperative Producer A jointly owned farm enterprise consisting of you and one or 
more other farmers who combine resources and/or expertise to 
finance, produce and/or sell hogs.  
 
Contract with Incentives A contractor provides you with inputs such as feeder pigs, feed, 
veterinary services and medication while you supply the labor, 
utilities, buildings, and fuel. This contract provides you with an 
incentive-based payment that is rewarded on the basis of feed 
efficiency, mortality, and/or length of time in grow-out.    
 
Tournament Contract This contract is the same as the contract with incentives except 
that farmers compete for monetary bonuses that vary with 
performance.  
 
Flat-Fee Contract This contract is the same as the contract with incentives except 
that it does not include bonus or incentive payments.  You are 
simply paid a previously agreed upon base price per finished hog 
when the production is completed.  
       
Vertical Integration A firm that owns production resources and hires employees to 
produce hogs for the company.     
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2. How do you feel about the business arrangement under which you are presently producing 
hogs? 
 
 a) dis-satisfied             d) satisfied 
b) uncertain      e) very satisfied 
 c) somewhat satisfied  
    
3. What type(s) of business arrangements are farmers in your county presently producing hogs 
under?  (Circle all that apply) 
  
 a) Independent Producer  e) Tournament Contract 
 b) Cooperative Producer  f) Vertical Integration 
 c) Flat-fee Contract   g) I do not know 
 d) Contract with Incentives  h) There are no other hog farmers in my county. 
 
If you are producing hogs under a contract, please skip to Question 6. Otherwise proceed to 
Question 4.  
  
4. Have you ever considered producing under a contract? 
 
 a) yes    b) no 
 
5. If you were to accept a contract, what type of contract would you prefer?   
 
a) a flat-fee contract     
 b) a contract with incentive payments     
 c) a contract with incentive bonuses/tournaments 
 d) other ____________________________ 
 
If you are not producing hogs under contract, please skip to Question 15.  Otherwise, please proceed 
to Question 6. 
 
6. How long have you been producing under contract? 
 
 ______________ (please indicate years and months)  
  
7. Did you have experience raising hogs or any other livestock before signing your first 
production contract?   
 
 a) yes    b) no 
  
8. Is your present contract with a neighboring farmer? 
 
 a) yes    b) no 
  
9. Were new facilities or renovation of old facilities a requirement of your contract? 
 
 a) yes    b) no  
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10. Are some of your production inputs (such as feed, veterinary services, etc.) supplied by the 
contractor? 
 
 a) yes   b) no 
 
11. If you answered “yes” to question 11, please circle all the inputs that are supplied by the 
contractor. 
 
 a) animals                   e) veterinary services   i) buildings 
b) medication   f)  equipment    g) labor 
 c) feed    h) nutrition (manure) management  d) others _________ 
  
12. If your contract includes incentive or bonus payments, what are they dependent upon? (circle 
all that apply) 
 
         a) feed efficiency  d) lean value       g) all of the above    
 b) weight gain   e) efficiency of other producers  h) others_________ 
 c) mortality   f)  production cost relative to others 
    
13. Please rank from 1 to 5 the following reasons for why you accepted a production 
contract (with 1 being the most important reason and 5 being the least important). 
 
 _____ a) The contract stabilizes my farm income.  
 _____ b) The contract improves management by lowering costs.    
 _____ c)  I was better able to expand hog production capabilities. 
 _____ d) The contract allowed me to afford to adopt new technology. 
 _____ e) The contract increases my income. 
 
14. Did the cost of obtaining information on feed prices influence your decision to accept a 
production contract?  
 
 a) yes   b) no 
 
15. What is your primary source of information about market prices for finished hogs, 
feeder pigs or breeding sows? (Please circle only one) 
 
 a) Extension Service  
 b) media: tv, radio or magazines 
 c) other farmers 
 d) farm organizations 
 e) computer price reports (off the Internet) 
 f) I do not use the above sources to obtain price information 




16. How regularly do you consult sources of information pertaining to market prices for hogs? 
 
 a) two or more times a week   d) once monthly                     
 b) once a week      e) once quarterly    
  c) once every two weeks  f) never                                                  
 
17. How regularly do you consult sources to obtain information on desired leanness and back fat 
of hogs? 
 
 a) two or more times a week   d) once monthly                     
 b) once a week      e) once quarterly    
  c) once every two weeks  f) never           
 
18. What type of arrangement do you use to transport your hogs to the market? 
 
 a) I pay for my hogs to be transported to the market. 
 b) I transport my hogs to the market. 
 c) A contractor transports my hogs to the market. 
  




20. How close is your production site to the nearest hog sale barn? 
 
 a) 1 to 40 miles b) greater than 41 miles   
   
21.  How far is your production site from the nearest packing plant or slaughter house? 
 
 a) 1 to 40 miles b) greater than 41 miles  
    
22.  How far is your production site from the nearest feed supplier? 
 
 a) 1 to 40 miles b) greater than 41 miles  
   
23. Do you plan to increase the number of hogs or pigs you produce next year?   If yes, by what 
percentage?   
 
 a) yes______% b) no 
 
24.  What is the value of your total farm assets including land value? 
    
 a) $0 - $499,999     d) $1,500,000 to $1,999,999 
 b) $500,000 to $999,999  e) $2,000,000 to $2,499,999 






25. On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you rate the bio-security of your hog production system 
(with 10 being the highest level of bio-security and 0 being the lowest)? 
 
[-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----] 
 0     5                  10 
 
26. On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you rate the quality of labor available to assist in operating    
your production unit(s) (with 10 being highly skilled and 0 unskilled)?  
 
[-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----] 
 0     5                  10 
 
 
27. As an eligible voter, what is your opinion of the Pork Checkoff? 
 
 a) Strongly Agree   c) Uncertain   e) Strongly Disagree  
 b) Agree    d) Disagree 
 
28. As an eligible voter, how would you cast your vote? 
  
 a) I would vote to continue the Pork Checkoff. 
 b) I would vote to discontinue the Pork Checkoff. 
 
Section IV : Demographic 
 
1. Are you a male or a female? 
 
 a) male  b) female 
 
2. What is your age? 
 
 ____________  (years) 
 
For questions 25 - 26, please place an X along the line that corresponds to your response.  For 
example,  [-----!-----X-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----] 
     0           5                        10 
Pork Checkoff Referendum 
         
Later this summer, hog producers will vote on the Pork Checkoff Referendum. The Pork Checkoff is a 
mandatory legislative program that was established through the Pork Act of 1985.  Under this legislation, 45 
cents of every $100 generated through the sale of market pigs/hogs are used to fund programs of promotion, 
education and research for the purpose of strengthening the pork industry’s position in the marketplace.  These 
programs are used to expand domestic and foreign markets for pork and pork products, and to fund research 
that supports the advancement of the pork industry.  
 
 195
3. Are you married? 
 
 a) yes   b) no 
 
 
4. Which of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background? 
 
 a) American Indian  c) Black (African American)  e) White (Caucasian) 
 b) Asian or Pacific Islander  d) Hispanic    f)  other ________ 
      
5.  How many years of educational training have you completed? 
    
a) less than high school       d) completed 4 yr college Bachelor’s degree 
 b) completed high school         e) completed college Master’s degree 
 c) some college or technical school  g) completed college Doctoral degree 
 
6. What was your total net household income for 1999? 
           
 a) $19,999 or less  d) $60,000 to 79,999          g) $200,000 or more         
 b) $20,000 to 39,999     e) $80,000 to 99,999  
 c) $40,000 to 59,999  f) $100,000 to 199,999                     
 
7. Please rank from 1 to 3 the following reasons why you choose to farm (with 1 being the most 
important reason and 3 being the least important). 
 
 ______a) maximize profits     
 ______b) provide family with farming experience  
 ______c) to produce food for family consumption 
 
 8. With respect to your social relationships and farm operation, how important are each of the 
following relations? (Please circle your response)                                                                 
 
             I)    Relationship with neighboring farmers.   NI NVI SI VI 
 II)   Relationship with lending institutions (banks).  NI NVI SI VI 
 III)  Relationship with feed merchants (grain suppliers). NI NVI SI VI 
 IV)  Relationship with packers and/or slaughter houses. NI NVI SI VI 
 V)   Relationship with veterinarians.    NI NVI SI VI 
 VI) Relationship with neighbors that are non-farmers.  NI NVI SI VI 
 
     Section V : Risk Preference  
1. Relative to other investors, how would you characterize yourself? (Please circle one) 
 a) I tend to take on substantial levels of risk in my investment decisions. 
 b) I tend to avoid risk when possible in my investment decisions. 
 c) I neither seek nor avoid risk in my investment decisions. 
NI =Not Important at All; NVI = Not Very Important; SI = Somewhat Important; VI = Very 
Important   
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Suppose you have $100,000 to invest.  Suppose there are five different options in which you might 
invest your money.  These options are illustrated below both in the chart and table. With the first 
option, you are certain to receive $10,000, or a 10% return.  Thus, at the end of the year you will 
have $100,000 + $10,000 = $110,000. Money in a savings account would be an example of such an 
investment.  However, you can increase your average net return by increasing the riskiness of your 
investment.  In Option 2, for instance, you have a 1/3 chance of receiving an average net return of 
$10,600.  However, with this investment, you increase the riskiness since you would also have a 1/3 
chance of receiving $8,170 and a 1/3 chance of receiving $13,030.  Please examine the five options 
and answer the following question. 
















                                      (Series 1)                         (Series 2)                       (Series 3)  
Investment Number Lowest    Average  Highest 
   Net Return  Net Return  Net Return 
   1/3 Chance  1/3 Chance  1/3 Chance 
======================================================================== 
Investment 1   $10,000  $10,000   $10,000 
======================================================================== 
Investment 2     $8,170  $10,600   $13,030 
======================================================================== 
Investment 3    $6,420  $11,200   $15,980 
======================================================================== 
Investment 4    $5,420  $11,200   $16,980 
======================================================================== 
Investment 5    $3,440  $10,600   $17,760   
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Of these investments, please circle the investment that you would choose (Circle one): 
 A.   Investment 1  D.   Investment 3  F.  Investment 5  




















APPENDIX F:  LETTERS MAILED TO PRODUCERS SURVEYED
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Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Agribusiness 
                         101 Agricultural Administration Building                         
        Louisiana State University 
         Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5604 
        (504) 388-3282 
        FAX: (504) 388-2716 
 
     July 20, 2000 
 
         
 
Dear  Hog Producer: 
 
The U.S. hog industry has undergone major structural change in recent years.  The rapid 
development of technology has led many hog producers to operate larger, more specialized hog 
operations.  Along with these larger operations, a number of alternative business arrangements 
such as contracts have been introduced, while some independent producers have entered into 
alternative marketing agreements.  We are conducting a study to identify the types of business 
arrangements that hog producers are using today and the reasons why they have chosen them.  
This study will help the industry determine the direction it is currently heading and the type of 
producer that will likely be involved in hog production in the future.  This information will be 
valuable as the industry seeks to identify paths leading to a more competitive industry that 
includes viable family farming operations.  
 
You are one of a relatively small number of hog producers who are being asked to provide 
information on their hog operations.  Thus, your participation in this study is vital in assuring that 
as many producers as possible are represented.  Your name was drawn such that we will have a 
random sample of hog producers from throughout the U.S.  
 
You may be assured of complete confidentiality.  The questionnaire has an identification number 
for mailing purposes only.  This is so that we may check your name off the mailing list when your 
questionnaire is returned.  Once the surveys have been returned, we will dispose of the mailing 
list.  Your name will never be placed on the questionnaire. 
 
The results of this research will be made available to all interested citizens, and to the National 
Pork Producer’s Council, which has partially funded this research. You may receive a summary 
of the results by simply writing “copy of results requested” on the back of the return envelope, 
and printing your name and address below it.  Please do not put this information on the 
questionnaire itself, so that we can maintain your anonymity.  
 
After completing the survey, please place it in the enclosed business reply, self-addressed 
envelope, and drop it in a mailbox.  We would be most happy to answer any questions you might 
have.  Please write or call.  Thank you in advance for your assistance. 
 
        Sincerely, 
 
        Jeffrey M. Gillespie, Ph.D.   
        Associate Professor   
        (225) 388-2759    
        jmgille@lsu.edu 




Department of Agricultural   
Economics and Agribusiness 
        101 Agricultural Administration Building            
        Louisiana State University 
        Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5604 
        (504) 388-3282 
        FAX: (504) 388-2716 
 
     August 20, 2000 
         
Dear Hog Producer:  
 
About three weeks ago, I wrote to you asking for your help in a study concerning 
structural change in the U.S. pork industry.  The intent of the study is to determine the 
types of business arrangements pork producers are using today and the reasons they are 
using them.  As of today, we have not yet received your completed survey. 
 
The LSU Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness has undertaken this 
study because it is important that the industry understand the direction it is currently 
heading and the type of producer that will likely be involved in hog production in the 
future.  The information in this study will be valuable as the industry seeks to identify 
paths that could lead to a more competitive industry including viable family farming 
operations.  This research is being partially funded by the National Pork Producers 
Council.  It is important that each questionnaire be completed and returned, as the survey 
was sent to a relatively small number of producers. 
 
Remember that you are assured of complete confidentiality.  The questionnaire has an 
identification number for mailing purposes only.  This is so that we may check your name 
off the mailing list when your questionnaire is returned. 
 
The results of this research will be made available to all interested citizens.  You may 
receive a summary of the results by simply writing "copy of results requested" on the 
back of the return envelope, and printing your name and address below it.  Please do not 
put this information on the questionnaire itself, so that we can maintain your anonymity. 
 
After completing the survey, please place it in the enclosed business reply, self-addressed 
envelope, and drop it in a mailbox.  No postage is necessary.  In the event that your 
questionnaire has been misplaced, a replacement is enclosed.  Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated.  
 
        Sincerely, 
 
        Jeffrey M. Gillespie, Ph.D.   
        Associate Professor   
        (225) 388-2759    
        jmgille@lsu.edu 
 
THE LOUISIANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYMENT                                    
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